Arif Ahmed v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.

CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedJune 10, 2026
DocketC.A. No. 2025-1133-DG
StatusPublished

This text of Arif Ahmed v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. (Arif Ahmed v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arif Ahmed v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., (Del. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KATHALEEN ST. J. MCCORMICK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

June 10, 2026

Richard I. G. Jones, Jr. Sarah R. Martin Periann Doko Trevor T. Nielsen BERGER MCDERMOTT LLP Bryan T. Reed 1105 North Market Street, 11th Floor GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP Wilmington, Delaware 19801 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1600 Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Re: Arif Ahmed v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. and J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, C.A. No. 2025-1133-DG

Dear Counsel:

This letter resolves exceptions to Magistrate Gibbs’s Report dated January 21,

2026, which resolved the parties’ cross-motions concerning Plaintiff’s entitlement to

advancement.1 I have reviewed the Magistrate’s thorough factual and legal findings

de novo and adopt them in full.2

Defendants advance two bases for exceptions, which boil down to a single

issue—whether the Magistrate erred when resolving the issue of entitlement by

rejecting Defendants’ proposed 9% transaction-based cutoff in favor of the traditional

approach to allocation.3 The Magistrate did not err. Allocation is best addressed

1 C.A. No. 2025-1133-DG, Docket (“Dkt.”) 63 (“Magistrate’s Report”). Definitions used

in this letter have the same meaning as in the Magistrate’s Report. 2 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. 1999).

3 Dkt. 74 (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”) at 21–33; Dkt. 80 (“Defs.’ Reply Br.”) at 5–17. C.A. No. 2025-1133-DG June 10, 2026 Page 2 of 2

through the Fitracks framework, where Plaintiff’s counsel certifies in good faith

which work relates to matters covered by advancement.4

As to the Investigations, Defendants portray the Report as concluding that

insufficient evidence exists concerning entitlement to advancement.5 In this way,

Defendants argue that the Magistrate turned the burden of proof on its head. Yet

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to some degree of advancement

for the Investigations.6 Nor could they, in my view.7 Properly understood, the Report

held that insufficient evidence exists to allocate fees incurred in connection with the

Investigations. For that reason, the Magistrate appropriately ordered the parties to

confer on a Fitracks framework for allocating fees among claims.

The exceptions are overruled. This matter is remanded to Magistrate Gibbs

for further proceedings in accordance with the Report.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kathaleen St. J. McCormick

Chancellor

cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)

4 Magistrate’s Report at 34–35 (citing Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d 991 (Del.

Ch. 2012)). 5 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 28–32; Magistrate’s Report at 25–26, 33.

6 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 28 (arguing that only 9% of the claims warrant advancement);

Defs.’ Reply Br. at 13 (same). 7 See generally Dkt. 76 (Pl.’s Ans. Br.) at 23–32.

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Related

DiGiacobbe v. Sestak
743 A.2d 180 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1999)
Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc.
58 A.3d 991 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
Arif Ahmed v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arif-ahmed-v-jp-morgan-chase-co-delch-2026.