Arias v. Grubaugh

District Court, N.D. California·Decided October 21, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-04622·Unknown

Opinion

ABEL ARIAS, Case No. 24-cv-04622-RMI

Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE v. TO AMEND

GRUBAUGH, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff, a detainee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Standard of Review Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Further, it should be noted that pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although a plaintiff need not include cause of action and state conclusions; rather a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court recently explained this standard: “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Legal Claims Plaintiff discusses issues with the conditions of confinement at Martinez Detention Facility and West County Detention Facility. Plaintiff appears to be a pretrial detainee. Inmates who sue prison officials for damages for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016). But under both clauses, the inmate must show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 1068. In the context of claims for failure to protect, the standard under the Eighth Amendment to prove deliberate indifference is different than the standard to prove deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whereas a convicted prisoner must prove an individual defendant’s subjective awareness of a risk of harm in order to prevail on a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a pretrial detainee need not do the same in order to prevail on a failure-to- protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068-70 (holding that claims brought by pretrial detainees, also applies to failure-to-protect claims brought by pretrial detainees). Specifically, a pretrial detainee need not “prove an individual defendant’s subjective intent to punish in the context of a . . . failure-to protect claim.” Id. at 1070. A pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to protect instead must prove “more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. at 1071. A claim for a violation of a detainee’s right to adequate medical care arises under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.

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Arias v. Grubaugh, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Edward Czuprynski
8 F.3d 1113 (Sixth Circuit, 1994)
Jonathon Castro v. County of Los Angeles
833 F.3d 1060 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)