Aria on the Bay Condominium Association, Inc. v. Bayshore Plaza I, LLC, etc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 3, 2024
• Docket: 2023-0941
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 3, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D23-0941 & 3D23-1125 Lower Tribunal No. 21-14724 ________________

Aria on the Bay Condominium Association, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

Bayshore Plaza I, LLC, etc., et al., Appellees.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Thomas, Judge.

Berger Singerman, LLP, and James D. Gassenheimer and Stephanie M. Chaissan, for appellant.

Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, and Jonathan R. Weiss and Amanda E. Preston, for appellees.

Before EMAS, SCALES and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, appellant Aria on the Bay Condominium

Association, Inc. (“Aria”) challenges two trial court orders that, taken

together, effectively validate transfers, in December 2019, of thirty-four

parking spaces and seven storage spaces located in the Aria on the Bay

condominium building from appellee Bayshore Plaza I, LLC (“Developer”) to

condominium units owned by 1770 Bayshore Plaza Drive, LLC’s

(“Bayshore”).

We affirm the challenged orders because Developer and Bayshore met

their initial summary judgment burden by presenting evidence that, at the

time of the transfers, established: (i) Developer was still offering

condominium units for sale in the ordinary course of business; and (ii) the

assigned parking spaces and five of the seven assigned storage spaces

were assignable pursuant to the Declaration of Condominium. Aria failed to

rebut this showing by presenting record evidence that would create a

genuine issue of material fact. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting

Developer and Bayshore’s summary judgment motion and denying Aria’s

partial summary judgment motion. See Rich v. Narog, 366 So. 3d 1111, 1118

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Under the new [summary judgment] standard, once the

moving party satisfies [the] initial burden [of proof], the burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

2 of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.’ Specifically, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving

party to come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating that a genuine

issue of fact exists as to an element necessary for the non-movant to prevail

at trial.”) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

We also affirm the trial court’s post-summary judgment findings –

regarding the assignability of the two remaining storage spaces and

Bayshore’s ejectment claim – because those findings are supported by

competent, substantial evidence. See SG 2901, LLC v. Complimenti, Inc.,

323 So. 3d 804, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (holding that a trial court did not err

when the findings of fact it made following a bench trial were supported by

competent, substantial evidence).

Affirmed.