Arender v. Grant Timber & Manufacturing Co.

119 So. 498, 9 La. App. 132, 1928 La. App. LEXIS 633
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 28, 1928
DocketNo. 3186
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 119 So. 498 (Arender v. Grant Timber & Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arender v. Grant Timber & Manufacturing Co., 119 So. 498, 9 La. App. 132, 1928 La. App. LEXIS 633 (La. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

ODOM, J.

A. W. Arrender was employed as a teamster by the defendant company.

On April 19, 1926, while at work and in the course of his employment, he was accidentally injured. He died on December 9th, following, or seven months and twenty days after the injury.

His widow, Mrs. Kate Arrender, for the use and benefit of herself and minor children, prosecutes this suit for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Section 8 of Act No. 20 of 1914, as finally amended by Act No. 216 of 1924 and Section 8, general paragraph 2, Act No. 85 of 1926), which provides that:

“Por injury causing death within one year after the accident there shall be paid to the legal dependents of the employee * * * a weekly sum as hereinafter provided.”

Plaintiff alleges that her husband never fully recovered from said injury and that his death was due thereto.

The defense is that the injury neither caused nor contributed to the death of the deceased, but that he died from Bright’s disease from which he had been suffering for some time prior to the accident.

Plaintiffs’ demands were rejected by the lower court and she appealed.

OPINION

Plaintiff’s husband lived seven months and twenty days after he was injured, and during that time he went back to work for the same company, did manual labor for several months, and drew practically the same wages as she was getting when injured.

This fact, in connection with other circumstances which we shall refer to later, has 'given rise to the contention by defendant that the injury neither caused directly nor contributed to the death of plaintiff’s husband.

On the other hand, plaintiff contends that her husband never fully recovered, and that even if it be true that the injury was not the direct cause of his death, and if it be found that he finally died from the effects of a disease which he had at the time of the injury and which was progressive in it's nature and developed to a critical stage months after the injury, the injury accelerated and aggravated the disease, caused it to progress more rapidly and hastened the inevitable result, and that under such conditions and circumstances she is entitled to recover.

There is no point more clearly and firmly established by our jurisprudence as well as that of other states than this, that in suits for compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Acts for death or disability, if it be shown that the injury complained of hastened death from a disease from which the employee was [134]*134suffering and from which he would ultimately have died, or if such injury aroused and caused to become active a dormant disease or quickened and accelerated an active, progressive disease from which disability results, it will be held that such death or disability was due to the injury and compensation will be awarded.

Behan vs. Honor Co., 143 La. 348, 78 So. 589, L. R. A. 1918F, 862; Craft vs. Lumber Co., 151 La. 281, 91 So. 736; Hicks vs. Meridian Lbr. Co., 152 La. 975, 94 So. 903; Donahoe vs. Scharfenstein & Sons, 154 La. 815, 98 So. 256; Durret vs. Woods, 155 La. 533, 99 So. 530; Hooper vs. Standard Ins. Co., 166 Mo. App. 209, 148 S. W. 116; Connell vs. U. S. Sheet & Window G. Co., 2 La. App. 93; Becton vs. Deas Paving Co., 3 La. App. 683.

But in such cases there can be no recovery unless the evidence establishes with some degree of certainty that there was some connection between the accidental injury and the death or disability as the case may be.

On this point the plaintiff has failed to make out her case.

The deceased was between fifty and sixty years of age and had been employed for something like three years by defendant, most of the time as a teamster, and drew or was drawing at' the time he 'was injured $3.50 per day, and had worked regularly. He was driving a “four-up” team through the woods when one of the rear wheels of the wagon struck a bush or sapling and jerked it down upon his head and shoulder. He was picked up in an unconscious condition and carried to his home and a physician summoned. On the following day he was carried to Alexandria, and placed in a sanitarium where he remained for eight days, during a portion of which time he was irrational. He was carried back to his home where he remained in bed for one week, but, according to his wife, was sick for five weeks from the date of the injury. But she is probably mistaken as to the time, for he was injured on April 19th and went back to work in May.

The testimony shows that he worked six days in the last half of May, twenty-four and one-half days in June, nineteen days and six hours in July, twenty-four days in August, seven hours in September, nine days in October, and one day and three hours in November. During this period, that is, between the time he went back to work in May and the time he quit in November, the mill for which he was working was moved to Arkansas and he moved with it and worked there. He subsequently moved back to Louisiana and worked at Minden for the same company. Considering the time he lost in moving twice, he evidently lost but little time, if any, from sickness. When he was injured he was receiving $3.50 per day as a teamster. He returned to work as a “swamper” at $3.00 per day. His duty as a "swamp-er” was to use a club ax and cut out rights of way and help load logs on the wagons. He quit work in November and died December 9th.

In support of her contention that deceased never recovered from the injury, plaintiff introduced testimony tending to show that while he worked several months after the injury he was not' able to perform heavy manual labor, and cites the fact that after the injury he drew only $3.00 per day whereas before he drew $3.50.

We are not impressed with this theory. Using an ax, cutting down trees, and loading logs requires strenuous physical exertion more so than driving a four-mule [135]*135team, in which process the driver usually rides one of the mules, as deceased seems to have been doing when injured.

Plaintiff also brought on witnesses who swore that deceased complained of pains in his head and neck after he went back to work. But this is disputed by other witnesses who worked with him and who said they heard no such complaints.

In support of its contention that the injury had no connection with the death and that the death was due to a disease which was not in the least accelerated by the injury, defendant cites the fact that deceased went back to work after the injury, and did hard manual labor for several months, and called several physicians who testified hs to the deceased’s condition at the time he was injured and as to the cause -of death.

Dr. D. V. Donaldson, who attended deceased about 10 o’clock in the morning of the day he was hurt, said he was told that deceased had been injured by a bush or sapling, but he paid but little attention to that, but found later some evidence of a lick on the head and neck, and that the patient was under shock caused by the blow. He went back the following day and found that the patient had not made satisfactory progress and he called in Dr. Packer of Alexandria. He and Dr. Packer had the patient sent to a sanitarium where they made an examination and found that the patient’s then condition was caused by nephritis or acute Bright’s disease and they treated him for high blood pressure.

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Bluebook (online)
119 So. 498, 9 La. App. 132, 1928 La. App. LEXIS 633, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arender-v-grant-timber-manufacturing-co-lactapp-1928.