Archie v. Knox

224 S.W.2d 504, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 2200
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 26, 1949
DocketNo. 9815
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 224 S.W.2d 504 (Archie v. Knox) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Archie v. Knox, 224 S.W.2d 504, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 2200 (Tex. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

HUGHES, Justice.

Appellee, Will G. Knox, as statutory receiver for Allied Underwriters, a reciprocal insurance exchange organized under the provisions of Chap. 20, Title 78, Arts. 5024 et seq., Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., sued 42 named defendants and approximately 1482 unnamed defendants as subscribers to such exchange, for the purpose of obtaining levy of an assessment against such defendants as provided in Art. 5026, Sub. 4, V.A.C.S.

Trial before a jury resulted in withdrawal of the case from its consideration and rendition of judgment for appellee by the court. Certain of the named defendants have appealed.

Appellants have limited their appeal to questions concerning the alleged insolvency of Allied Underwriters and the period or periods of such insolvency.

The record is very large and contains a mass of technical evidence and exhibits which will be adverted to only in so far as necessary to dispose of the precise points made by appellants in their brief. We gratefully acknowledge efforts of counsel to eliminate our perusal of much of the statement of facts.

Appellants’ first point is that the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that Allied Underwriters was insolvent from December 31, 1940, to August 17, 1943, because a report of an examination conducted by the Board of Insurance Commissioners was, of itself, sufficient to raise a fact issue as to insolvency between December 31, 1940, and September 30, 1941.

This report recited that as of December 31, 1940, the Allied Underwriters had a surplus of $42,013.85, and that as of September 30, 1941, its surplus was $24,796.17.

In our opinion these recitations, even though accepted at face value, reflect insolvency rather than solvency.

• Article 5029, V.A.C.S. requires reciprocal insurance exchanges such as Allied to maintain a surplus over all liabilities, including reserves, of not less than $50,000. This statutory requirement prescribes a standard of solvency or insolvency for these exchanges. Art. 5030, V.A.C.S.; Howell v. Knox, Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 2U S.W.2d 324, par. 7 (Writ Ref. N.R.E.).

Appellant, however, contends that it was exempt from this surplus requirement under the following provision of Art. 5029, supra:

“ * * * Any exchange whose attorney in fact now has a certificate of authority to transact business in this State shall have until December 31, 1941, to fulfill the foregoing financial requirements specified in this Article * *

We find no exemption contained in this language. Only a period of grace is granted. In our opinion an exchange not having the required surplus on the effective date of Art. 5029, supra, was, by virtue of the statute, insolvent, but the consequences of such insolvency were abated until December 31, 1941, during which interval the exchange could obtain the required . surplus or, for good cause, procure an extension of time as permitted by another section of the statute.

Appellants’ second point is to the effect that the trial court erred in finding insolvency, as a matter of .law, at any time between December 30, 1940, and June 30, 1943, because no evidence was offered to show what the Loss Payable Reserve of Allied Underwriters should have been under the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Insurance Commissioner.

Appellants concede that as shown by the balance sheets prepared by Mr. Herring, who was appellee’s witness, and report of an examination report conducted by the Board, the actual insolvency of Allied Underwriters during the period December 30, 1940, to June 30, 1943, is shown, provided that the balance sheets of Mr. Pierring were prepared in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Insurance Commissioners. Appellants deny that they were so prepared.

[507]*507Narrowed down, and as stated by appellants, “the question of whether the reciprocal (Allied Underwriters) was solvent, as shown by its records — or was insolvent — as shown by Mr. Herring’s balance — can be answered only by determining whether the reciprocal’s Loss Payable Reserve was proper or whether such Reserve should have been in the amount determined by Mr. Herring”; the “Per Case Basis” being used by Mr. Herring.

The controversy revolves around the intricacies of bookkeeping and accounting and particularly whether the reserves should have been calculated upon the “Per Case Basis” or by the “Schedule P Method.”

In computing the reserves on the “Per Case Basis” each case or claim against the company is examined to determine the actual liability there'on and a reserve is established on the basis of the total liability disclosed.

The “Schedule P Method” of computing reserves is to base the reserve for the current year on the loss experience of the company in past years.

Mr. Herring testified that during the year 1942 and during all other years pertinent to this lawsuit, the Board of Insurance Commissioners instructed and required Allied Underwriters and other companies of its kind to compute their Loss Payable Reserves according to the “Schedule P” formula.

The legal basis for appellants’ contention that balance sheets of Mr. Herring were improperly prepared and hence in- • sufficient is the following provision of Art. 5029, supra:

“There shall be maintained at all times such reserves as are required, or which, by the laws of this State or by the lawful rules and regulations of the Board of Insurance Commissioners, hereafter may be required, to be maintained by stock insurance companies transacting the same kind or kinds of insurance business.”

It seems to us that the “Schedule P Method” and the “Per Case Basis” of calculating Loss Payable Reserves each has its proper function. Manifestly, it would be impossible for a'reserve to be created from income for the current year according to the “Per Case Basis” because the extent of liability would then be unascertainable. Resort then must be made to the loss experience of previous years.

Quite to the contrary is the situation here where, years after the exchange has ceased business, the exact losses are known, and the issue before the court is one of solvency or insolvency during certain periods of time.

We find nothing in the statute (5029) and nothing in the “Schedule P” requirement of the Board which suggests that the fiction disclosed by “Schedule P” must be accepted by a court as true in face of the facts disclosed by the “Per Case Basis,” in a case of this character. A contrary construction of the “Schedule P” Rule would make it so arbitrary and unreasonable as to render it unenforceable.

Appellants’ last point is that there was evidence other than that set out above which created a jury, question as to the insolvency of Allied Underwriters from December 31, 1940, to June 30, 1943.

The general ledger of Allied Underwriters was offered in evidence by appel-lee and an account marked “Surplus” shows a balance of $269,261.06 as of December 31, 1940; a $276,002.20 balance as of December 31, 1941; a 'balance of $173,420.23 as of December 31, 1942; and a balance of $146,920.23 as of February 28, 1943.

We are not informed by appellants .the manner in which these surpluses were determined. It, is conceded by them, however, that they did not take into account a Reserve for Losses Payable.

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Main Bank & Trust v. Nye
571 S.W.2d 222 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1978)
Jones v. Langdeau
324 S.W.2d 324 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1959)
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273 S.W.2d 81 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1954)
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247 S.W.2d 154 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1952)

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Bluebook (online)
224 S.W.2d 504, 1949 Tex. App. LEXIS 2200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/archie-v-knox-texapp-1949.