Archer v. Warren

118 S.W.3d 779, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6011, 2003 WL 21658274
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 15, 2003
Docket07-01-00027-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 118 S.W.3d 779 (Archer v. Warren) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Archer v. Warren, 118 S.W.3d 779, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6011, 2003 WL 21658274 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

PHIL JOHNSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Emily Archer, M.D., appeals from a judgment against her in a medical negligence case. Concluding that the evidence of proximate cause is legally insufficient, we reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Emily Archer, a gynecologist, began treating Anita Warren in 1988. The initial treatment was for pelvic pain. Dr. Archer performed hysterectomy surgery which was successful and relieved Anita’s pain.

Anita continued consulting Dr. Archer, as well as other doctors, through the years. During her annual examination in 1990, Anita related symptoms of mild incontinence, which Dr. Archer diagnosed as stress urinary incontinence (“SUI”). Anita testified at trial that her symptoms in *781 1990 consisted of a feeling of unusual dampness during sexual intercourse. The 1990 pelvic exam by Dr. Archer revealed a cystocele. The cystocele was formed by herniation of part of Anita’s bladder through the wall of her vagina and the resultant protrusion of that part of her bladder into the vagina.

Anita returned to Dr. Archer in 1993. Her complaints included incontinence, which she described at trial as being about the same as in 1990. Examination by Dr. Archer revealed that Anita’s cystocele had progressed to a more advanced state, and that she had developed a rectocele. The rectocele was formed by herniation of part of the wall of Anita’s rectum through the wall of her vagina and the resulting protrusion of part of her rectal wall into the vagina.

On January 17, 1995, Anita returned to Dr. Archer for an annual examination. She had continued complaints of incontinence which, according to her trial testimony, by then had begun occurring with certain physically stressful activities such as coughing, sneezing, and lifting heavy objects, as well as with sexual intercourse. Dr. Archer found that Anita’s cystocele had progressed to involve the urethra (the canal for discharging urine from her bladder) and had compromised the urethra. Dr. Archer classified the cystocele as a second degree cystourethrocele. 2 Anita still had the rectocele, which Archer then classified as a first degree rectocele.

Dr. Archer recommended surgery which she believed would correct the cystoureth-rocele, the rectocele and the SUI. She did not discuss Kegel’s exercises with Anita. Kegel’s exercises are exercises designed to strengthen muscles in a woman’s pelvic floor and muscles supporting the urethra.

Anita testified that she understood the surgery was needed to repair her bladder because the bladder had dropped following her hysterectomy. Anita agreed to the recommendation for surgery and on January 27, 1995, Dr. Archer performed surgery. The surgery stopped Anita’s incontinence and corrected the anatomical defects.

Anita developed pain in her right leg postoperatively. Dr. Archer performed a second surgery to release two sutures which were suspected of impinging on Anita’s obturator nerve and causing the pain. Anita’s pain persisted after the second surgery, despite referrals to and treatments by specialists in physical medicine, pain management, and neurosurgery. At trial, Anita claimed continuing pain and impairment from her right leg pain, which was diagnosed as pain from nerve damage as a result of the surgery. 3

Anita and her husband filed suit alleging that Dr. Archer was negligent in various ways which proximately caused Anita’s continuing pain and impairment. The case eventually was tried on the theory that (1) Dr. Archer negligently failed to offer the non-surgical option of Kegel’s exercises 4 to Anita before doing surgery; (2) Anita *782 would have chosen and performed the nonsurgical option had it been offered; (3) the Kegel’s exercises probably would have corrected her incontinence without surgery; and (4) Anita’s nerve damage would have been avoided if the surgery had not been done. The jury found, in response to a broad form liability question, that Dr. Archer’s negligence was a proximate cause of Anita’s injury in question. Judgment was entered in favor of the Warrens for the amount of damages found by the jury, together with pre- and post-judgment interest.

Via ten issues, Dr. Archer challenges the (1) legal and factual sufficiency of evidence to support the findings of negligence and proximate cause; (2) factual sufficiency of evidence to support the damages findings for lost wages, lost earning capacity and future medical care; (3) failure of the trial court to give limiting instructions to the jury concerning evidence admitted for a limited purpose; (4) trial court’s written notations on an exhibit as a comment on the weight of the evidence; (5) broad form submission of the negligence issue; and (6) trial court’s refusal to hold a hearing on her motion for new trial which alleged jury misconduct. We determine that her third issue, which urges legal insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the alleged negligence proximately caused Anita’s injuries, is dispositive. We will only address that issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs in medical negligence eases are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly negligent act or omission was a proximate cause of the harm alleged. See Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex.1993). To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must prove (1) foreseeability, and (2) cause-in-fact. See Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118-19 (Tex.1996). The cause-in-fact element of proximate cause requires proof that the alleged negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and without which the harm would not have occurred. See Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex.1995). With regard to cause-in-fact, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the injuries based upon a reasonable medical probability. Id. at 511. Opinion evidence relied on as proof must be based on more than possibilities, speculation and surmise. See Schaefer v. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 202-05 (Tex.1980). In evaluating opinion evidence we look to the basis of the expert’s opinion, and not the bare opinion alone. A claim cannot stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit 5 of a credentialed witness. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.1999). Whether expert testimony on causal connection rests upon reasonable medical probability must be determined by the substance and context of the testimony rather than semantics or use of a particular term or phrase. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
118 S.W.3d 779, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6011, 2003 WL 21658274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/archer-v-warren-texapp-2003.