Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc.

184 S.W.3d 53, 86 Ark. App. 303, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 426
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
DecidedJune 2, 2004
DocketCA 03-1057
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 184 S.W.3d 53 (Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 53, 86 Ark. App. 303, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 426 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions

John F. Stroud, Jr., Chiefjudge.

Appellant, Kirby Arbaugh, efjudge. June 2,2000, when he was shocked with 440 volts of electricity. This injury occurred when one of Arbaugh’s co-workers, John Hicks, was instructed to repair an electrical cord on a feed-bag line although he told his supervisor that he did not know how to do it. Hicks was told to repair the plug on the cord anyway until he got it right. As a result of the improper wiring by Hicks, Arbaugh was shocked when he attempted to turn on the electrical switch to the feed-bag line.

Appellant contended at the hearing held before the ALJ that as a result of the electrical shock, he suffered both a psychological injury and an organic-brain injury. Appellees, AG Processing, Inc., and Specialty Risk Services, claimed that appellant’s problems were psychological and that they preexisted the injury. The ALJ found that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his cognitive dysfunction and psychological problems were causally related to the June 2, 2000 incident; that he failed to prove that his cognitive dysfunction and psychological problems arose out of and in the course of his employment; that he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the elements necessary to prove a compensable organic-brain injury; and that he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the elements necessary to prove a compensable psychological injury. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s opinion. Appellant now appeals to this court, arguing that there is no substantial evidence that his mental condition was not a result of the admitted 440-volt electrical shock. We affirm the denial of benefits.

Our standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is well-settled. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra. It is the Commission’s function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony. Watson v. Tayco, Inc., 79 Ark. App. 250, 86 S.W.3d 18 (2002).

At the hearing before the ALJ, John Hicks testified that after Arbaugh received the electrical shock he fell “on his can” in front of the line, and he thought Arbaugh was having a heart attack. He said that Arbaugh was so dazed that no one could communicate with him until they got him outside. Hicks described Arbaugh’s condition as “his lights were on but he wasn’t home,” and said that when Arbaugh came back to work after the accident, he was just not himself.

John Wilson, another of Arbaugh’s co-workers, testified that when Arbaugh pressed the button to reset the electrical switch, he saw a “big blue light” and then Arbaugh quickly fell back about five yards. He said that Arbaugh was not coherent for several minutes after the accident, and that there was a “definite difference” in Arbaugh after the accident, such as his motor skills were not the same, and that he walked, talked, and carried things more slowly.

Karen Arbaugh, appellant’s mother, testified that before the accident, Arbaugh was “jolly” and was able to carry on a conversation without losing his train of thought. She acknowledged that prior to the accident, Arbaugh was using methamphetamines and was on the drug Paxil for depression, and that there were documented reports of alcohol abuse and his use of crank and marijuana; however, she said that he had been to rehabilitation for treatment and was, to her knowledge, no longer taking illegal drugs. She said that Arbaugh told her in the mid 1990s that he had been suicidal over the years, and she knew that he had attempted suicide in the past. She also knew that he had been battling depression since he was twelve or thirteen, when his grandfather passed away. She was aware that her son had behavioral problems in school and had not done well in his classes, but she denied knowing of any short-term or long-term memory problems, panic attacks, or hallucinations prior to the accident.

Ms. Arbaugh said that after her son was shocked, he would lose his train of thought and just sit there with a blank look. She worried because he was not getting any care from the company doctor for what she classified as seizures, where his eyes rolled back and most of his body was jerking. She said that after the accident, Arbaugh had a mark on one side of his face that looked like a burn and other marks on his arms that looked like bruises, but she did not know if those marks were caused by the electrical shock or by his subsequent fall. In his opinion, the ALJ held that, due to her awareness of Arbaugh’s prior history of serious psychological and substance-abuse problems, the weight to be given his mother’s testimony was severely diminished when considering her testimony regarding the difference in Arbaugh’s behavior after the work-related incident.

Arbaugh’s wife, Alona, testified that he had used drugs prior to the accident, but that he had undergone rehabilitation and was doing well. She said that when she arrived at the doctor’s office after the incident, her husband was whiter than she had ever seen him, he was shaking, and it took him a long time to answer her questions. She said that the company doctor, Dr. Leslie, told her that everything looked all right, that “electricity would either kill you or you would be okay.” He told Alona that Arbaugh could return to work on Monday, which was only three days later.

Alona said that before the accident, Arbaugh was just “normal,” but that he changed after the accident. She said that he could not stand for their two children to be in the room with him because their voices would make him “hit the floor.” When he told her that he felt like his Paxil had stopped working, Alona took him to their family doctor, who increased his dosage of Paxil. She said that they had been to other doctors and that Arbaugh had done everything that he could to improve, but she did not know if there was much else that could be done. She said that one doctor told them that the recovery period was twelve to eighteen months, and that most of the brain recovery that could occur would happen within that time frame. Alona said that things had “leveled out,” but that it had been a “roller coaster,” with Arbaugh improving and then backsliding.

Alona described Arbaugh’s seizures as “bad.” She said that he had the first seizure about one month after the shock, and that the left side of his face went numb, his eyes rolled back in his head, and he started shaking and twitching. She said that the seizures would render him unconscious, and that when he would regain consciousness, he could not move for a long time.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Miranda v. Dacruz
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 2009
Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc.
202 S.W.3d 519 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
184 S.W.3d 53, 86 Ark. App. 303, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 426, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arbaugh-v-ag-processing-inc-arkctapp-2004.