Arandell Corporation v. Xcel Energy Inc.

District Court, W.D. Wisconsin·Decided March 7, 2023·No. 3:07-cv-00076·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ARANDELL CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER v. 07-cv-076-jdp XCEL ENERGY INC., et al.,

Defendants.

NEWPAGE WISCONSIN SYSTEM INC.,

Plaintiff, 09-cv-240-jdp

v.

CMS ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, et al.,

In these consolidated cases, certain commercial and industrial consumers of natural gas in Wisconsin claim that defendants conspired to increase natural gas prices between 2000 and 2002. These cases were formerly centralized with several other actions in the District of Nevada as part of a multi-district ligation (MDL). After spending more than a decade in MDL, these cases were remanded to this court in 2019 for additional pre-trial decisions and trial. On October 21, 2022, plaintiffs in both of the Wisconsin cases reached a settlement with defendants The Williams Companies, Inc., Williams Merchant Services Company LLC (f/k/a Williams Merchant Services Company, Inc.), and WPX Energy Marketing, LLC (f/k/a Williams Power Company, Inc.). Dkt. 276-1 (Williams settlement agreement).1 Pending before

1 Docket citations are to case number 07-cv-076-jdp. the court is plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for the purpose of settlement, preliminarily approve the settlement agreement, appoint class representatives and class counsel, and approve a class notice.2 Dkt. 275. The court will grant the motion, direct plaintiffs to send notice to the class members, set deadlines related to final

approval, and set a date for a fairness hearing.

ANALYSIS Plaintiffs contend that the Williams defendants participated in an unlawful conspiracy to manipulate natural gas price indices in violation of Wisconsin state antitrust laws. They have alleged that defendants’ price manipulation began around January 1, 2000 and continued in many respects until at least October 31, 2002, resulting in class members paying excessive prices for natural gas. Plaintiffs assert that the manipulation was carried out through agreements to falsely report prices to trade publications that generated price indexes and

conduct wash trades and churning activities. They also allege that the manipulative conduct was facilitated through oral communications, face-to-face meetings, electronic communications, trading platforms, and other means. A. Class certification Although the parties have settled, the court must still certify that the proposed class satisfies the three requirements for class certification under Rule 23: (1) the class must be clearly defined with objective criteria, Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015); (2) the class must satisfy the threshold requirements of numerosity, commonality,

2 This court and the MDL court have approved three similar settlements in these cases with other defendant groups. See Dkt. 276, ¶ 21; Dkt. 276-2 at 2. typicality, and adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a); and (3) the class must meet the requirements of at least one of the types of class actions listed in Rule 23(b). 1. Class definition

The parties propose the following class definition for purposes of settlement: All industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas for their own use or consumption during the period from January 1, 2000 until October 31, 2002, and which gas was used or consumed by them in Wisconsin. Excluded from the Class are (a) entities that purchased natural gas for resale (to the extent of such purchase for resale); (b) entities that purchased natural gas for generation of electricity for the purpose of sale (to the extent of such purchase for generation); (c) entities that purchased natural gas from entities that sold natural gas at rates approved by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (to the extent of such purchases at such approved rates); (d) defendants and their predecessors, affiliates and subsidiaries; and (e) the federal government and its agencies. Dkt. 276-1 at 3. The class definition is not vague, based on subjective criteria, or defined in terms of success on the merits. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660-61. It identifies a particular group of companies (industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas with clearly defined exclusions) harmed in a particular way (paid more for natural gas than they would have absent the alleged conspiracy) during a specific period in a particular area. So the parties have satisfied the first requirement for class certification. 2. Rule 23(a) requirements Rule 23(a)(1) requires a proposed class that is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. The court of appeals has deemed classes of 40 members to be sufficient. See Swanson v. Am. Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n.9 (7th Cir. 1969). See also 1 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions, § 3:12 (6th ed. 2022) (“[A] a class of 40 or more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone.”). Plaintiffs state that the United States Energy Information Agency (EIA) reported thousands of commercial and industrial purchasers of natural gas in Wisconsin between 2000 and 2002, so numerosity is easily met. Dkt. 276, ¶ 19.

Commonality requires that the action involve “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Rule 23(a)(2). A proposed class meets this requirement if “determining the truth or falsity of [a] common contention will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each claim.” Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1. v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 426, 434 (7th Cir. 2015). The common question of whether the Williams defendants participated in a nationwide price manipulation conspiracy that resulted in increased prices for natural gas across Wisconsin can be answered by evidence that applies to all plaintiffs. Therefore, the commonality requirement is met.

Typicality requires the class representatives’ claims to be typical of the claims of the proposed class. Plaintiffs suffered the same baseline harm that all members of the proposed class suffered from the alleged price fixing, even if class members purchased natural gas at different prices and in different ways. See Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919, 928- 29 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Even for transactions where prices were negotiated individually or a longer term contract existed, the district court found, reasonably, that the ‘starting point for those negotiations would be higher if the market price for the product was artificially inflated.’”). Plaintiffs have satisfied this requirement.

Adequacy of representation has two components: (1) whether the class representatives’ interests are aligned with the class’s interests; and (2) whether class counsel can capably litigate the case. Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). The court sees no apparent conflicts between the named plaintiffs’ interests and those of the rest of the class. Therefore, Arandell Corporation, Briggs & Stratton Corporation, Carthage College, Ladish Co., Inc. (n/k/a ATI Ladish LLC), Merrick’s, Inc., Verso Minnesota Wisconsin LLC (f/k/a NewPage Wisconsin System Inc., n/k/a Billerud Wisconsin LLC), and Sargento Foods, Inc., are

appointed as class representatives.

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Arandell Corporation v. Xcel Energy Inc., (W.D. Wis. 2023).

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