Aragon v. DZR Group Inc.

Opinion

3 Daniel ARAGON, Case No.: 25-cv-0264-AGS-BLM 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE 5 v. 6 DZR GROUP INC., et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 The Court previously dismissed plaintiff Daniel Aragon’s amended complaint and 10 ordered that “[a]ny second amended complaint” be filed “by June 10, 2025.” (ECF 7, at 2.) 11 None has yet been filed, so this case is dismissed without prejudice. 12 “In determining whether to dismiss a claim for failure to prosecute or failure to 13 comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s 14 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; 15 (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic 16 alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). The first factor—the public 18 interest in expeditious resolution—“always favors dismissal.” Id. The second factor 19 regarding the court’s need to manage its docket likewise weighs in favor of dismissal since 20 Aragon’s “noncompliance has caused the action to come to a complete halt, thereby 21 allowing [Aragon] to control the pace of the docket rather than the Court.” See Yourish v. 22 California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). The risk of prejudice to defendants 23 (the third factor) also supports dismissal because the “law presumes injury from 24 unreasonable delay,” and plaintiff has offered no explanation for the tardiness that would 25 render it reasonable. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994). The fourth factor 26 concerning the availability of less drastic alternatives points toward dismissal, too. The 27 Court has afforded Aragon multiple opportunities to amend, and Aragon was warned that 28 if he “fails to file an amended complaint by the deadline, this entire action will be | || dismissed.” (ECF 7, at 2 (citing Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005).) The 2 amendment opportunities “‘constitute[] an attempt at a less drastic sanction,” and “a district 3 || court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal 4 |/can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 5 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). The last factor—the public policy for disposition on 6 merits—is the only consideration that weighs against dismissal. 7 Because “at least four factors support dismissal,” the Court concludes that dismissal 8 the proper remedy here. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. 9 || Dated: July 14, 2025

11 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28