Araceli Gonzalez v. Bank of America Na

Ninth Circuit

Araceli Gonzalez v. Bank of America Na

643 F. App'x 665

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 23, 2016

Docket13-16309

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 643 F. App'x 665 (Araceli Gonzalez v. Bank of America Na) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Araceli Gonzalez v. Bank of America Na, 643 F. App'x 665 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Araceli and Mario E. Gonzalez appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging state law foreclosure claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm.

The district properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). To the extent that plaintiffs challenge the ability of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to assign its interest in plaintiffs’ deed of trust, these arguments fail. See Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 233 Ariz. 215, 311 P.3d 237 (Ariz.Ct.App.2013) (holding that MERS, as nominee and beneficiary of a deed of trust, may assign the note and deed of trust).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) *666 motion.for reconsideration because plaintiffs did not demonstrate any grounds warranting such relief. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Construction Co., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir.2001) (“Because North American and Federal simply rear-gued their case ... the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion [for reconsideration].”).

We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the district court was required to hold a hearing before deciding their motion for reconsideration. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Araceli and Mario E. Gonzalez appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging state law foreclosure claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm.

The district properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). To the extent that plaintiffs challenge the ability of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to assign its interest in plaintiffs’ deed of trust, these arguments fail. See Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 233 Ariz. 215, 311 P.3d 237 (Ariz.Ct.App.2013) (holding that MERS, as nominee and beneficiary of a deed of trust, may assign the note and deed of trust).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) *666 motion.for reconsideration because plaintiffs did not demonstrate any grounds warranting such relief. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Construction Co., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir.2001) (“Because North American and Federal simply rear-gued their case ... the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion [for reconsideration].”).

We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the district court was required to hold a hearing before deciding their motion for reconsideration. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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