1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 APRIL SHAKOOR-DELGADO, Case No.: 24-CV-1811 TWR (BLM) individually and on behalf of all others 11 similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL Plaintiff, CLASS CERTIFICATION 13 v. 14 (ECF No. 24) CORNERSTONE FIRST MORTGAGE, 15 LLC, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff April Shakoor-Delgado’s Motion for 19 Conditional Certification (“Mot.,” ECF No. 24), Defendant Cornerstone First Mortgage, 20 LLC’s Response in Opposition to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 26), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support 21 of (“Reply,” ECF No. 27) the Motion. The Court held a hearing and took the Motion under 22 submission on Thursday, September 25, 2025. (See ECF No. 33.) The Court GRANTS 23 the Motion and CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the proposed class for the following 24 reasons. 25 BACKGROUND 26 I. Factual Background 27 Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Loan Officer from approximately 28 December 10, 2021, until November 6, 2023, and then again from February 9, 2024, until 1 at least July 3, 2025. (See Mot. at 4.) At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a full-time 2 employee of Defendant working in Illinois. (See id.) As employees of Defendant, Plaintiff 3 and her fellow Loan Officers were required to sign a common Employment Agreement 4 with Defendant. (See id.) Defendant currently employs approximately 500 Loan Officers 5 across the country. (See ECF No. 26-2 (“Cahan Decl.”) ¶ 2.) Of those 500 Loan Officers, 6 approximately 350 are employed as full-time employees, and “all are employed on a 7 commission-only basis[.]” (Id. ¶ 3.) 8 Per the Employment Agreement, Defendant’s Loan Officers are paid on a 9 commission-only basis, and their job duties generally include all services necessary to 10 originate, obtain, process, close loans, and complete all related incidental tasks. (See id.) 11 Specifically, Loan Officers are “only considered to have earned and be entitled to payment 12 of commission on loans once they have been sold on the secondary market and the period 13 for any early payment defaulted (“EPD”) or early payoff (“EPO”) has expired.” (ECF No. 14 24-1 (“Whitehead Decl.”) at 17.) Additionally, in the event “a commission is advanced 15 but is later deemed un-earnable as a result of any [EPD] or [EPO], the amounts advanced 16 will be subtracted from [the e]mployee’s net commission in calculating any unearned 17 commission not yet paid to [e]mployee.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of 18 Defendant’s compensation policies, Plaintiff was paid $0.00 during the pay period 19 beginning December 17, 2023 and ending December 24, 2023, despite working more than 20 40 hours that week. (See Mot. at 5; Whitehead Decl. at 31.) Plaintiff also alleges that she 21 and her fellow Loan Officers “are never paid any overtime whatsoever.” (Mot. at 5.) 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant does not provide office space for its Loan Officers 23 to work from, and that it is not possible for Loan Officers to perform their jobs without a 24 highspeed internet connection, phone line, constant access to email, and software platforms 25 such as Encompass, Blend, Zendesk, and Microsoft Teams. (See id. at 6.) Under 26 Defendant’s policies, employee expenses are only eligible for reimbursement if they are 27 “expressly authorized in writing by [Defendant] before [the e]mployee incurs any such 28 expense.” (Whitehead Decl. at 20.) As such, the internet, phone, and home office expenses 1 incurred by Plaintiff and her fellow Loan Officers are not expressly pre-authorized and are 2 therefore not eligible for reimbursement. (See Mot. at 6.) Plaintiff expressly asked her 3 direct supervisor whether the phone and internet expenses that she incurred were eligible 4 for reimbursement, and she was informed that they were not. (Whitehead Decl. at 13.) 5 In its Opposition, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s employment was unique. (See 6 Opp’n at 2, 6). First, Plaintiff, while working as a Loan Officer for Defendant, “was also 7 self-employed through her own business, ‘Skyline Financial Mortgage,’ which originated 8 ‘fix and flip’ loans for investors looking to ‘buy property, fix it up, and sell it.’” (See Opp’n 9 at 2; see also ECF No. 26-1 (“Vivoli Decl.”) at 14:5–25.) Through this self-employment, 10 Plaintiff wrote off as tax deductions “the very ‘expenses’ she sues to recover in this case,” 11 which Defendant asserts to be a double-recovery. (Opp’n at 2.) 12 Second, Defendant highlights the unique circumstances that led to Plaintiff’s 13 employment as a Loan Officer. (See id. at 3.) Plaintiff was employed by Defendant on 14 two separate occasions. (See id. at 4.) Defendant rehired Plaintiff in 2024 because Plaintiff 15 explained that she “loved Cornerstone” and wanted full-time employment primarily to 16 receive health insurance benefits. (See id.; see Cahan Decl. ¶ 4.) As such, Defendant 17 characterizes Plaintiff’s employment as an “exception”: “Plaintiff is the only full-time 18 employee of [Defendant] employed on a commission-only basis that [Defendant] has even 19 perceived could, potentially, fall short of earning a minimum wage, and Plaintiff accepted 20 that employment knowing it was an exception to [Defendant]’s otherwise established 21 company policy.” (Opp’n at 3; see Cahan Decl. ¶ 3.) “As a result of Plaintiff’s lawsuit— 22 over the one and only time [Defendant] employed a [L]oan [O]fficer on a full time basis 23 knowing there was a chance the [L]oan [O]fficer would not earn at least minimum wage— 24 [Defendant] has implemented a no-exceptions policy against employing [L]oan [O]fficers 25 on a commission-only basis if there is any chance the [L]oan [O]fficer will not earn far in 26 excess of minimum wage in the form of commission-only revenue.” (Id. ¶ 7.) 27 Lastly, Defendant introduces that Plaintiff has initiated and subsequently settled two 28 lawsuits filed against other mortgage companies by which she was formerly employed. 1 (Opp’n at 4.) “At her deposition, Plaintiff refused to disclose the terms of her settlements 2 against the two prior employers with whom she settled; claiming they were ‘confidential.’” 3 (Id. (quoting Vivoli Decl. at 41:3–21).) From these facts, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff 4 has cultivated a “unique cottage industry of shaking down her former employers[.]” 5 (Opp’n at 3.) 6 II. Procedural Background 7 On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging that Defendant violated 8 the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by (1) failing to pay at least minimum wage in all 9 weeks worked, (2) failing to pay overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours in any 10 given workweek, and (3) failing to pay all wages free and clear. (See ECF No. 1 11 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 82–93.) Defendant filed its Answer on February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 10.) 12 On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (ECF No. 24.) On August 7, 2025, 13 Defendant filed its Opposition, (ECF No. 26), and on August 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed her 14 Reply, (ECF No. 27). 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 An employee may bring an FLSA collective action on behalf of themselves and other 17 employees who are “similarly situated” and who have filed written consent to join the 18 action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Valladon v. City of Oakland, No. C 06-07478 SI, 2009 WL 19 2591346 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009). The Ninth Circuit’s seminal decision in 20 Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, defined the term “similarly situated” as “whether the 21 named plaintiff and putative plaintiffs are ‘alike with regard to some material aspect of 22 their litigation.’” 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 APRIL SHAKOOR-DELGADO, Case No.: 24-CV-1811 TWR (BLM) individually and on behalf of all others 11 similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL Plaintiff, CLASS CERTIFICATION 13 v. 14 (ECF No. 24) CORNERSTONE FIRST MORTGAGE, 15 LLC, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff April Shakoor-Delgado’s Motion for 19 Conditional Certification (“Mot.,” ECF No. 24), Defendant Cornerstone First Mortgage, 20 LLC’s Response in Opposition to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 26), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support 21 of (“Reply,” ECF No. 27) the Motion. The Court held a hearing and took the Motion under 22 submission on Thursday, September 25, 2025. (See ECF No. 33.) The Court GRANTS 23 the Motion and CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the proposed class for the following 24 reasons. 25 BACKGROUND 26 I. Factual Background 27 Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Loan Officer from approximately 28 December 10, 2021, until November 6, 2023, and then again from February 9, 2024, until 1 at least July 3, 2025. (See Mot. at 4.) At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a full-time 2 employee of Defendant working in Illinois. (See id.) As employees of Defendant, Plaintiff 3 and her fellow Loan Officers were required to sign a common Employment Agreement 4 with Defendant. (See id.) Defendant currently employs approximately 500 Loan Officers 5 across the country. (See ECF No. 26-2 (“Cahan Decl.”) ¶ 2.) Of those 500 Loan Officers, 6 approximately 350 are employed as full-time employees, and “all are employed on a 7 commission-only basis[.]” (Id. ¶ 3.) 8 Per the Employment Agreement, Defendant’s Loan Officers are paid on a 9 commission-only basis, and their job duties generally include all services necessary to 10 originate, obtain, process, close loans, and complete all related incidental tasks. (See id.) 11 Specifically, Loan Officers are “only considered to have earned and be entitled to payment 12 of commission on loans once they have been sold on the secondary market and the period 13 for any early payment defaulted (“EPD”) or early payoff (“EPO”) has expired.” (ECF No. 14 24-1 (“Whitehead Decl.”) at 17.) Additionally, in the event “a commission is advanced 15 but is later deemed un-earnable as a result of any [EPD] or [EPO], the amounts advanced 16 will be subtracted from [the e]mployee’s net commission in calculating any unearned 17 commission not yet paid to [e]mployee.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of 18 Defendant’s compensation policies, Plaintiff was paid $0.00 during the pay period 19 beginning December 17, 2023 and ending December 24, 2023, despite working more than 20 40 hours that week. (See Mot. at 5; Whitehead Decl. at 31.) Plaintiff also alleges that she 21 and her fellow Loan Officers “are never paid any overtime whatsoever.” (Mot. at 5.) 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant does not provide office space for its Loan Officers 23 to work from, and that it is not possible for Loan Officers to perform their jobs without a 24 highspeed internet connection, phone line, constant access to email, and software platforms 25 such as Encompass, Blend, Zendesk, and Microsoft Teams. (See id. at 6.) Under 26 Defendant’s policies, employee expenses are only eligible for reimbursement if they are 27 “expressly authorized in writing by [Defendant] before [the e]mployee incurs any such 28 expense.” (Whitehead Decl. at 20.) As such, the internet, phone, and home office expenses 1 incurred by Plaintiff and her fellow Loan Officers are not expressly pre-authorized and are 2 therefore not eligible for reimbursement. (See Mot. at 6.) Plaintiff expressly asked her 3 direct supervisor whether the phone and internet expenses that she incurred were eligible 4 for reimbursement, and she was informed that they were not. (Whitehead Decl. at 13.) 5 In its Opposition, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s employment was unique. (See 6 Opp’n at 2, 6). First, Plaintiff, while working as a Loan Officer for Defendant, “was also 7 self-employed through her own business, ‘Skyline Financial Mortgage,’ which originated 8 ‘fix and flip’ loans for investors looking to ‘buy property, fix it up, and sell it.’” (See Opp’n 9 at 2; see also ECF No. 26-1 (“Vivoli Decl.”) at 14:5–25.) Through this self-employment, 10 Plaintiff wrote off as tax deductions “the very ‘expenses’ she sues to recover in this case,” 11 which Defendant asserts to be a double-recovery. (Opp’n at 2.) 12 Second, Defendant highlights the unique circumstances that led to Plaintiff’s 13 employment as a Loan Officer. (See id. at 3.) Plaintiff was employed by Defendant on 14 two separate occasions. (See id. at 4.) Defendant rehired Plaintiff in 2024 because Plaintiff 15 explained that she “loved Cornerstone” and wanted full-time employment primarily to 16 receive health insurance benefits. (See id.; see Cahan Decl. ¶ 4.) As such, Defendant 17 characterizes Plaintiff’s employment as an “exception”: “Plaintiff is the only full-time 18 employee of [Defendant] employed on a commission-only basis that [Defendant] has even 19 perceived could, potentially, fall short of earning a minimum wage, and Plaintiff accepted 20 that employment knowing it was an exception to [Defendant]’s otherwise established 21 company policy.” (Opp’n at 3; see Cahan Decl. ¶ 3.) “As a result of Plaintiff’s lawsuit— 22 over the one and only time [Defendant] employed a [L]oan [O]fficer on a full time basis 23 knowing there was a chance the [L]oan [O]fficer would not earn at least minimum wage— 24 [Defendant] has implemented a no-exceptions policy against employing [L]oan [O]fficers 25 on a commission-only basis if there is any chance the [L]oan [O]fficer will not earn far in 26 excess of minimum wage in the form of commission-only revenue.” (Id. ¶ 7.) 27 Lastly, Defendant introduces that Plaintiff has initiated and subsequently settled two 28 lawsuits filed against other mortgage companies by which she was formerly employed. 1 (Opp’n at 4.) “At her deposition, Plaintiff refused to disclose the terms of her settlements 2 against the two prior employers with whom she settled; claiming they were ‘confidential.’” 3 (Id. (quoting Vivoli Decl. at 41:3–21).) From these facts, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff 4 has cultivated a “unique cottage industry of shaking down her former employers[.]” 5 (Opp’n at 3.) 6 II. Procedural Background 7 On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging that Defendant violated 8 the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by (1) failing to pay at least minimum wage in all 9 weeks worked, (2) failing to pay overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours in any 10 given workweek, and (3) failing to pay all wages free and clear. (See ECF No. 1 11 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 82–93.) Defendant filed its Answer on February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 10.) 12 On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (ECF No. 24.) On August 7, 2025, 13 Defendant filed its Opposition, (ECF No. 26), and on August 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed her 14 Reply, (ECF No. 27). 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 An employee may bring an FLSA collective action on behalf of themselves and other 17 employees who are “similarly situated” and who have filed written consent to join the 18 action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Valladon v. City of Oakland, No. C 06-07478 SI, 2009 WL 19 2591346 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009). The Ninth Circuit’s seminal decision in 20 Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, defined the term “similarly situated” as “whether the 21 named plaintiff and putative plaintiffs are ‘alike with regard to some material aspect of 22 their litigation.’” 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018). “What matters is not just any 23 similarity between party plaintiffs, but a legal or factual similarity material to the resolution 24 of the party plaintiffs’ claims, in the sense of having the potential to advance these claims, 25 collectively, to some resolution.” Id. at 1115. This level of similarity is appropriate for 26 conditional certification because it allows plaintiffs to vindicate rights by pooling 27 resources. Id. at 1114. In sum, if the named plaintiff makes a plausible showing that they 28 share with the putative plaintiffs a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of 1 their FLSA claim, the district court should grant conditional certification. See Campanelli 2 v. Image First Healthcare Laundry Specialists, Inc., No. 15-CV-04456-PJH, 2018 WL 3 6727825, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018); see also Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109–10, 1117. 4 If conditional certification is granted, the “sole consequence” is the “sending of 5 court-approved written notice to workers who may wish to join the litigation as 6 individuals.” Id. at 1101. District courts have discretionary authority to monitor the 7 preparation and distribution of the notice to ensure that it is “timely, accurate, and 8 informative.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989). 9 ANALYSIS 10 I. Conditional Certification 11 Plaintiff argues she is similarly situated to the proposed Collective Members because 12 they all had the same general job duties and were all paid according to Defendant’s 13 compensation policy on a commission-only basis. (See Mot. at 11.) They were all subject 14 to the same commission “claw-back” provision, which provided that, in the event a 15 “commission is advanced but is later deemed un-earnable as a result of any early payment 16 default or early payoff of the loan, the amounts advanced will be subtracted from 17 Employee’s net commission in calculating any unearned commission not yet paid to 18 Employee.” (Id. (quoting Whitehead Decl. at 17).) None were eligible for overtime 19 compensation, even if they worked more than 40 hours in a work week. (See Mot. at 12.) 20 They all suffered from Defendant’s failure to reimburse phone, internet, and home office 21 expenses, even upon Plaintiff’s specific request, thus creating a potential “kick-back” and 22 preventing earned wages from being paid “free and clear,” as required by the FLSA. (Id. 23 at 14.) In sum, Plaintiff argues that she and the proposed Collective Members were all 24 subject to the same terms of employment. 25 In his Declaration, Mr. Cahan states that, of Defendant’s 500 Loan Officers, 350 are 26 employed as full-time employees “on a commission-only basis[.]” (Cahan Decl. ¶ 2.) 27 There is no dispute that the actual terms of employment were the same for Plaintiff and the 28 proposed Collective Members. (ECF No. 33.) Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 1 that she and the proposed Collective Members were employed under the same 2 compensation structure and thus were similarly situated. 3 In its Opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not carried her burden of 4 demonstrating that she is similarly situated to the proposed Collective Members because 5 she has provided only a “naked allegation, unsupported by any supporting evidence and 6 conspicuously identical to two other lawsuits she filed and settled against other former 7 employers accused of the same claims, that her contract is substantially the same as 8 [Defendant]’s roughly 500 other nationwide loan officers.” (Opp’n at 6). Defendant is 9 correct that Plaintiff has only provided her own employment contract with Defendant and 10 not the contracts of Defendant’s other approximately 350 full-time Loan Officers. (See 11 generally Mot.) Such a showing, however, is not required under the FLSA at this stage. 12 “At this early stage of the litigation . . . [t]he level of consideration is ‘lenient,’ sometimes 13 articulated as requiring ‘substantial allegations,’ sometimes as turning on a ‘reasonable 14 basis,’ but in any event loosely akin to a plausibility standard, commensurate with the stage 15 of the proceedings.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109 (internal citations omitted). 16 Further, Defendant argues that the circumstances of Plaintiff’s re-hiring were 17 unique. (Opp’n at 2–3, 6.) While this may be true, both Parties agree that the terms of 18 Plaintiff’s employment were standard, thus the unique aspects of Plaintiff’s employment 19 do not prevent her from being similarly situated to the proposed Collective Members at 20 this stage. (ECF No. 33.) 21 If, after engaging in discovery, it becomes apparent that Plaintiff and the proposed 22 Collective Members are not in fact similarly situated, Defendant can “move for 23 ‘decertification’ of the collection action for failure to satisfy the ‘similarly situated’ 24 requirement in light of the evidence produced to that point.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109. 25 Should Defendant choose to file a decertification motion, the Court “will then take a more 26 exacting look at [Plaintiff’s] allegations and the record.” Id. At this stage, however, 27 Plaintiff has carried her burden of plausibly alleging that she and the proposed Collective 28 1 Members are similarly situated in that they “share a similar issue of law or fact material to 2 the disposition of their FLSA claims.” Id. at 1117. 3 II. Notice 4 Plaintiff asks the Court to authorize sending notice of this lawsuit, by way of last 5 known mailing address and email address, to a proposed Collective of all current and 6 former Loan Officers that were employed by Defendant in the United States and were paid 7 on a commission-only basis at any point in the last three years. (See Mot. at 4.) Plaintiff 8 provided a proposed Notice of Rights with the Motion for Conditional Certification. 9 (Whitehead Decl. at 5–9.) Defendant did not object to the proposed Notice of Rights in its 10 Opposition to the Motion for Conditional Certification. (See generally Opp’n). 11 A. Notice Language 12 At the hearing, Defendant requested an amendment to the proposed Notice of Rights 13 to add language referencing the potential burdens of joining the lawsuit. (ECF No. 33.) 14 This amendment is proper to ensure opt-in plaintiffs understand the potential obligations 15 of opting in to the lawsuit. See Zeman v. Twitter, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1288 (N.D. 16 Cal. 2024) (ordering plaintiffs to include in their notice “While this lawsuit is pending, you 17 may be required to respond to written questions, appear for depositions under oath, produce 18 documents, and/or testify”). Plaintiff shall update the proposed Notice of Rights to include 19 a statement to this effect. 20 At the hearing, Plaintiff agreed to amend the language in the proposed Notice of 21 Rights to include the fact that opt-in plaintiffs may opt-in but select their own counsel. 22 (ECF No. 33.) This is proper to ensure that opt-in plaintiffs have a fair statement of their 23 rights. See Robinson v. Maricopa Cnty. Special Health Care Dist., 696 F. Supp. 3d 769, 24 788 (D. Ariz. 2023) (requiring language added to the proposed notice to indicate that 25 “[p]utative class members may choose to opt-in and hire their own lawyer”). Plaintiff shall 26 update the proposed Notice of Rights to include a statement to this effect and SHALL 27 FILE with the Court a copy of the updated proposed Notice of Rights for approval. 28 / / / 1 B. Reminder Notice 2 Plaintiff further requests that she be permitted to send a reminder notice in the form 3 a postcard mailer halfway through the opt-in period. (See Mot. at 4; ECF No. 33.) 4 || Plaintiff did not include a proposed reminder notice with her Motion for Conditional 5 || Certification. Defendant did not object to the proposed reminder notice. (See generally 6 || Opp’n; ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff SHALL FILE with the Court a copy of the proposed 7 ||reminder notice for approval. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion and 10 || CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the proposed class of all current and former Loan 11 || Officers employed by Defendant in the United States who were paid on a commission-only 12 at any point in the past three years. Plaintiff SHALL FILE an amended proposed 13 || notice in compliance with this order and a proposed reminder notice within 30 days of the 14 || date of this Order. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 ||Dated: October 15, 2025 —_—— 17 | od (2 ® re 18 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28