Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-11387 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-22151-KMM
APRIL P. FOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Child Protective Team, DAVID OKON, DCF, CPT Investigator, JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, DR. MARIA BASTOS, DR. JOAN ALVARANGA, ELIZABETH ANTHONY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(September 29, 2020) Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 2 of 8
Before WILSON, LAGOA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
April Fox, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing her
civil complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman1
doctrine. On appeal, she argues that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because she is
invoking federal jurisdiction for violations of her constitutional rights, not for
appellate review of her state-court dependency case. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de
novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 2013).
The party raising a claim bears the burden of proving federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2016). Although we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, we will not
address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief. Timson
v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Liberal construction of pro se
pleadings “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell
v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 3 of 8
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from reviewing state court decisions because lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679
F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). The doctrine applies not only
to federal claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not
raised in the state court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is
inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state-court judgment or if
it succeeds only to the extent the state court wrongly decided the issues. Id.
However, it does not apply when a party did not have a reasonable opportunity to
raise his or her federal claims in state proceedings. Id.
We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman principles to child custody proceedings on
multiple occasions and have concluded that, under Rooker-Feldman, we may not
interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts. See Goodman ex rel.
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2001); Liedel v. Juv. Ct. of
Madison Cnty., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1990); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837
3 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 4 of 8
F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988). In Staley, for example, we held that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court of jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in which “[s]he requested reinstatement of parental custody
and psychiatric care at state expense for her children and herself” based on alleged
violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 837 F.2d at 1017. We concluded that the plaintiff “in essence sought
to reverse a state court’s child custody determination,” when she sought “to
challenge collaterally the state agency and court proceedings that terminated her
parental rights,” noting that “federal courts are not a forum for appealing state court
decisions.” Id. at 1017–18.
In Liedel, parents who lost in a state-court child custody action filed suit under
§ 1983 seeking “a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against
the Department [of Human Resources] and Juvenile Court, preventing them from
enforcing the Juvenile Court’s prior orders and preventing them from issuing further
orders against the [plaintiffs].” 891 F.2d at 1544. We reasoned that the requested
relief “would effectively nullify those state orders,” and therefore held that “[t]o the
extent that the [plaintiffs’] federal court complaint seeks to challenge the final state
court judgment, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 1545–46.
4 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 5 of 8
In contrast, in Goodman, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
search of her home that occurred before the state custody proceedings were initiated
and from which no evidence or other information was introduced in state court or
relied upon by the court. 259 F.3d at 1332–34. We concluded that her claim was
not inextricably intertwined with the state-court custody proceedings because her
federal claim could succeed without calling into doubt the state-court decision. Id.
at 1334. However, as for her due process challenge to the state’s ex parte
proceedings, we concluded that the claim was barred for two reasons: (1) it
succeeded only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the custody issue;
and (2) Goodman had a “reasonable opportunity” to present her constitutional claims
during the state juvenile court proceedings, since Georgia law permitted
constitutional challenges to a juvenile court’s orders to be brought in juvenile court
and those challenges were subject to review by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
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Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-11387 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-22151-KMM
APRIL P. FOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Child Protective Team, DAVID OKON, DCF, CPT Investigator, JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, DR. MARIA BASTOS, DR. JOAN ALVARANGA, ELIZABETH ANTHONY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(September 29, 2020) Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 2 of 8
Before WILSON, LAGOA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
April Fox, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing her
civil complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman1
doctrine. On appeal, she argues that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because she is
invoking federal jurisdiction for violations of her constitutional rights, not for
appellate review of her state-court dependency case. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de
novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 2013).
The party raising a claim bears the burden of proving federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2016). Although we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, we will not
address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief. Timson
v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Liberal construction of pro se
pleadings “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell
v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 3 of 8
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from reviewing state court decisions because lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679
F.3d 1257, 1262–64 (11th Cir. 2012). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). The doctrine applies not only
to federal claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not
raised in the state court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is
inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state-court judgment or if
it succeeds only to the extent the state court wrongly decided the issues. Id.
However, it does not apply when a party did not have a reasonable opportunity to
raise his or her federal claims in state proceedings. Id.
We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman principles to child custody proceedings on
multiple occasions and have concluded that, under Rooker-Feldman, we may not
interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts. See Goodman ex rel.
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2001); Liedel v. Juv. Ct. of
Madison Cnty., 891 F.2d 1542, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1990); Staley v. Ledbetter, 837
3 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 4 of 8
F.2d 1016, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 1988). In Staley, for example, we held that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court of jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in which “[s]he requested reinstatement of parental custody
and psychiatric care at state expense for her children and herself” based on alleged
violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 837 F.2d at 1017. We concluded that the plaintiff “in essence sought
to reverse a state court’s child custody determination,” when she sought “to
challenge collaterally the state agency and court proceedings that terminated her
parental rights,” noting that “federal courts are not a forum for appealing state court
decisions.” Id. at 1017–18.
In Liedel, parents who lost in a state-court child custody action filed suit under
§ 1983 seeking “a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against
the Department [of Human Resources] and Juvenile Court, preventing them from
enforcing the Juvenile Court’s prior orders and preventing them from issuing further
orders against the [plaintiffs].” 891 F.2d at 1544. We reasoned that the requested
relief “would effectively nullify those state orders,” and therefore held that “[t]o the
extent that the [plaintiffs’] federal court complaint seeks to challenge the final state
court judgment, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 1545–46.
4 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 5 of 8
In contrast, in Goodman, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
search of her home that occurred before the state custody proceedings were initiated
and from which no evidence or other information was introduced in state court or
relied upon by the court. 259 F.3d at 1332–34. We concluded that her claim was
not inextricably intertwined with the state-court custody proceedings because her
federal claim could succeed without calling into doubt the state-court decision. Id.
at 1334. However, as for her due process challenge to the state’s ex parte
proceedings, we concluded that the claim was barred for two reasons: (1) it
succeeded only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the custody issue;
and (2) Goodman had a “reasonable opportunity” to present her constitutional claims
during the state juvenile court proceedings, since Georgia law permitted
constitutional challenges to a juvenile court’s orders to be brought in juvenile court
and those challenges were subject to review by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
Florida state circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over
termination of parental rights proceedings. Fla. Stat. § 39.801. Any child, parent,
or guardian may appeal a Florida state-court order terminating parental rights to the
state appellate courts. Fla. Stat. § 39.815; Fla. R. App. P. 9.146 (stating that appeal
proceedings in termination of parental rights cases are the same as in civil cases);
see also Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004) (addressing
a constitutional issue on appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding).
5 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 6 of 8
Moreover, we’ve said that parties to dependency proceedings who were present and
participated had “a reasonable opportunity to bring their constitutional challenges”
in state court. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334.
A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims that “form part of
the same case or controversy” as the underlying claims to which the court has
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when it has dismissed all claims over
which it had original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
Here, Fox’s complaint stems from a Termination of Parental Rights (“TPR”)
action the Florida Department of Children and Families (“FDCF”) lodged against
her, after Fox brought her ten-month-old baby to the hospital with injuries that
prompted doctors to report her to FDCF for child abuse. In the state court TPR
proceedings, Fox lost her parental rights and her daughter was removed from her
home, although Fox was ultimately acquitted of the criminal charges filed in
connection with the reported abuse. She then brought this lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against FDCF and others,
arising out of the FDCP’s TPR action.
The record reveals, however, that the district court properly dismissed Fox’s
federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. For starters, Fox’s claims -- that the appellees violated her constitutional
6 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 7 of 8
rights -- are inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment. Casale, 558 F.3d
at 1260. Specifically, she claimed that FDCF violated her constitutional rights by
filing the TPR petition that led to the termination of her parental rights, that a FDCF
investigator violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he removed
her daughter from her home, and that a supervisor at the Family Resource Center of
South Florida, Inc. violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by drafting an
untruthful TPR petition. Succeeding on these federal claims would effectively
nullify the state-court judgment because it would require the federal court to deem
invalid the state court’s order terminating her parental rights and stripping her of
custody. See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260; Liedel, 891 F.2d at 1545–46. Therefore, her
allegations are inextricably intertwined with the underlying state-court dispute
concerning the termination of her parental rights.
In addition, Fox had a reasonable opportunity to present her constitutional
claims during the TPR proceeding before the state court. Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260.
Fox referenced the TPR petition and trial proceeding that terminated her parental
rights several times throughout her complaint and acknowledged her participation in
those proceedings. As in Goodman, Fox had a reasonable opportunity to bring her
constitutional challenges in the state-court proceedings. 259 F.3d at 1334.
To the extent Fox argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “fails on its face”
because family court is a “court of the [e]xecutive [b]ranch that may not hear
7 Case: 20-11387 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 8 of 8
constitutional issues,” the Florida Legislature has codified that the state’s circuit
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over TPR proceedings. Fla. Stat. §
39.801. Florida’s statutory scheme also permitted Fox to appeal the TPR order to
the state’s appellate courts. Fla. Stat. § 39.815; Fla. R. App. P. 9.146. And we’ve
previously upheld the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to child custody
proceedings. See Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1332–34; Liedel, 891 F.2d at 1545; Staley,
837 F.2d at 1017–18. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not prohibited by the
underlying nature of Fox’s state-court proceeding.
Finally, the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Fox’s remaining state claims because her federal anchor claims
were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, we affirm.2
AFFIRMED.
2 We add that as for Fox’s argument in her reply brief that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because she is suing for a violation of her constitutional rights so the Supremacy Clause controls, we will not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 8