NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0474n.06
Case No. 25-3222 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Oct 17, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) APRIL NORMAN, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN CITY OF CINCINNATI, OH, et al., ) DISTRICT OF OHIO Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION
Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. The Auburn Avenue Corridor Strategic Development Plan
was adopted to guide revitalization of a particular area in Cincinnati’s historic Mt. Auburn
neighborhood. In both developing the Plan and subsequently putting it into action, April Norman
alleges that the City of Cincinnati, Christ Hospital Network, Mt. Auburn Community Development
Corporation, God’s Bible School and College, Grossman Group Design and Planning, and DiSalvo
Development Advisors, LLC, along with dozens of those entities’ employees, violated federal and
state law. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. Because Norman’s claims are
not plausibly alleged, we AFFIRM.
I.
At this stage, we accept the well-pled facts from the complaint as true. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011). No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
104 Valencia Street is a residence located in the Mt. Auburn neighborhood of Cincinnati,
Ohio. In 2016, the then-property owner received a notice of various building code violations,
including deteriorating paint, a damaged chimney, a missing or rotted soffit, and missing or leaking
gutters.1
Several years later, April Norman, an African American woman, purchased the property.
A few months after the title changed hands, Norman received a notice of building code violations
from the City. It identified the same problems as the earlier notice: deteriorating paint, a damaged
chimney, a missing or rotted soffit, and missing or leaking gutters. Norman took steps to make
some repairs. But not all the violations were addressed, so she received several bills for abatement
of fees and at least one additional notice of violations. Norman’s property was also flagged twice
for too-tall grass and excessive weeds. She also received a notice to register her property as a rental
property. Through it all, Norman alleges that her efforts to contest the notices fell on mostly deaf
ears.
Along with the notices, Norman also received dozens of offers from developers to purchase
her property. Those solicitations, she contends, “became more frequent and aggressive coinciding
with the City’s notices.” Compl., R. 1 at PageID 13. In fact, during one interaction, Norman learned
that a developer “had been given a list of properties and was told to make offers for purchase.” Id.
at PageID 15.
1 The district court considered certain documents attached to the motions to dismiss. On appeal, Norman does not object to that consideration, so we consider those documents as well. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.”); Song v. City of Elyria, Ohio, 985 F.2d 840, 842 (6th Cir. 1993). 2 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
But Norman did not sell, and when the building code violations at her property persisted,
the City issued Norman a civil citation. In preparing to dispute that charge, Norman claims that
she first learned of the Auburn Avenue Corridor Strategic Development Plan. According to
Norman, the Plan was developed by Grossman Group Design and Planning, based in part on a
market assessment completed by DiSalvo Development Advisors. The Plan was formally adopted
by the City, and other “stakeholders” include Christ Hospital Network, God’s Bible School and
College, and Mt. Auburn Community Development Corporation. The purpose of the Plan,
according to Norman, is to “[i]dentify and solicit development interests for possible redevelopment
opportunities” along Auburn Avenue. Compl., R. 1 at PageID 18.
As Norman sees it, the Plan is discriminatory. She alleges it “was developed from [a]
review of the [City’s] Department of Building and Inspections records targeting single-family
homes that the City had ordered vacant due to code violations . . . which . . . targeted predominantly
African-American neighborhoods.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). She claims that the
Plan “utiliz[ed] wide-spread and aggressively targeted enforcement and zoning policing,” which
explains why her “property has been the continuing target of harassment and cavalier code
citations.” Id. at PageID 20, 24. She contends that “no comparable plan . . . [was] ever applied to
non-African-American areas of the City.” Id. at PageID 20.
In the end, the civil citation issued to Norman was dismissed, but the orders to remedy her
property were not rescinded. As a result, Norman received several additional notices of building
code violations, some new and some old.
This lawsuit followed. As we read Norman’s complaint, she claims that the Plan and
notices of building code violations were all an effort to force her (and other African American
residents) out of the Mt. Auburn neighborhood in the name of redevelopment. She claims the
3 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
defendants violated her equal protection rights and conspired to violate her rights, and that the City
extorted her. Some defendants moved to dismiss, and others moved for judgment on the pleadings.
In a thorough opinion, the district court found that Norman’s claims were both time barred and
inadequately pled. Norman appealed.
II.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The same
standard applies to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n,
958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020). While detailed factual allegations are not required at this stage,
“a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). In other words, pleaded facts
that “are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” will not do. Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). At bottom, a plaintiff’s factual allegations must “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. We review the
sufficiency of a complaint de novo. Napolitano, 648 F.3d at 369.
III.
A.
1.
Norman labels her first claim as one for deprivation of equal protection. At a high level, it
is clear Norman takes issue with the Plan and the City’s building code enforcement practices.
Beyond that, however, her precise theory is hard to pin down. Reading the complaint liberally, as
4 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
best we can tell, Norman alleges that the defendants (1) developed and adopted the Plan with the
nefarious purpose of driving African American residents out of the Mt. Auburn neighborhood, and
(2) selectively targeted her property for code violations to further that goal.
As the district court did, we construe Norman’s equal protection claim as arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a government entity
from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. That clause, in effect, is a directive “‘that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.’” Lathfield Invs., LLC v. City of Lathrup Vill., 136 F.4th 282, 303 (6th Cir. 2025)
(quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). As a result, to state
a meritorious equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must adequately plead that the government treated
the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated persons.” Napolitano, 648 F.3d at
379 (citation modified).
No matter her precise theory, Norman has not alleged a plausible equal protection claim.
As the district court and defendants point out, the property received a notice of code violations in
late 2016—years before Norman ever owned the property and prior to the Plan being adopted.
That timeline alone undermines the plausibility of Norman’s allegation that code enforcement was
targeted at her or used to further the goals of the Plan.
But even putting that issue aside, pleading deficiencies exist as to Norman’s claim that the
defendants unlawfully targeted her property for code violations. “In order to make out an equal
protection claim on the basis of selective enforcement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that someone
similarly situated—but for the illegitimate classification used by the government actor—was
treated differently.” Bah v. Att’y Gen. of Tenn., 610 F. App’x 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation
modified); Straser v. City of Athens, 951 F.3d 424, 426 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, as the district court
5 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
concluded, Norman’s complaint does not allege that the City failed to issue code violations to
similarly situated, non-African American property owners in Mt. Auburn. And, on appeal, Norman
does not argue otherwise. See Doe v. Michigan State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 425 (6th Cir. 2021) (“An
appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.” (citation
modified)).
Instead, Norman looks more broadly. She points to her allegation that “wide-spread and
aggressively targeted enforcement and zoning policing by the City” were not “applied to non-
African-American areas of the City.” Compl., R. 1 at PageID 20. But that broader allegation suffers
the same flaw: Norman does not identify a similarly situated neighborhood that received more
favorable treatment. And her conclusory allegation “that a hypothetical . . . comparator would have
received more favorable treatment [is] not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Reynolds
v. Szczesniak, No. 21-2732, 2022 WL 3500191, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022); Daniels v. City of
Wyoming, No. 17-3133, 2017 WL 7661477, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017) (affirming dismissal when
plaintiff alleged in only “a conclusory manner that [the defendant] issued a relatively high number
of traffic citations on a two mile stretch, to a relatively high number of nonwhites” (quotation
marks omitted)); Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2013)
(affirming dismissal when plaintiffs “allege[d] no facts that allow[ed] a reasonable inference that
[an] ordinance was not enforced against other persons or groups in similar situations and have thus
failed to state a claim”). Nor does the complaint make any effort to allege how other areas of the
city are similarly situated. Bah, 610 F. App’x at 554 (affirming dismissal because, among other
flaws, plaintiffs “failed to state how they are similarly situated” to a potential comparator).
Norman’s allegations about the Plan fare no better. She points to several paragraphs of the
complaint and argues that the defendants “jointly developed a plan for the gentrification of
6 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
specifically delineated and targeted African-American areas of the City.” Appellant Br. at 21. But
Norman’s complaint does not back up that sweeping conclusion with factual allegations. Of
course, in some cases “a neutral law [that] has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial
minority” can form the basis of an equal protection claim, but only if the plaintiff alleges that
such an impact “can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” See Pers. Adm’r of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900, 912 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“[O]nly intentional, purposeful discrimination violates the equal protection clause.”).
We agree with the district court that Norman does not clear that hurdle. True, she alleges
that the “Plan was developed from [a] review of the [City’s] records targeting single-family homes
that the City had ordered vacant due to code violations, which again targeted predominantly
African American neighborhoods.” Compl., R. 1, at PageID 18 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). But that conclusory statement seems to acknowledge that the Auburn Avenue Corridor
was selected for redevelopment based on a variety of benign factors, including its vacant
properties. Even if there are high vacancy rates in predominantly African American
neighborhoods, Norman does not allege any facts to support the conclusion that defendants were
motivated by that correlation in developing and adopting the Plan. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681
(recognizing that when “bare assertions . . . amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that [defendants] adopted a policy
because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,” those “allegations
are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true” (citation modified)); Robinson v. Amble, No.
18-2176, 2019 WL 5152775, at *2 (6th Cir. July 17, 2019) (“A complaint that sets forth conclusory
allegations of discriminatory intent without additional supporting details is insufficient to support
relief.”). Norman, for example, fails to identify a similarly situated neighborhood where a
7 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
development plan was not adopted. Once again, her “conclusory and unadorned assertion[]” is
“not well-pleaded, and not entitled to a presumption of truth at this stage in the litigation.”
Napolitano, 648 F.3d at 379; Reynolds, 2022 WL 3500191, at *7; Daniels, 2017 WL 7661477, at
*3; Faith Baptist Church, 522 F. App’x at 329; see also Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Township of Richmond,
641 F.3d 673, 684 (2011) (reversing and directing dismissal when “[n]othing but legal conclusions
suggest[ed] that [the defendants] acted with unlawful discriminatory animus”).2
To be sure, at this early stage, Norman is not required to offer “detailed factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). But she must make more than “conclusory allegations
bereft of supporting details.” Reynolds, 2022 WL 3500191, at *8. Because Norman has not backed
up her conclusions with pleaded facts to plausibly suggest that the defendants developed and
adopted the Plan with a discriminatory motive or singled out her property for code violations, she
has not plausibly alleged an equal protection claim.
2.
Norman’s invocation of federal statutes does not save her claim. In her complaint, Norman
somewhat confusingly cites 42 U.S.C. § 5302, the Housing and Community Development Act’s
definitional provision. Perhaps recognizing that oddity, the district court analyzed Norman’s
2 Norman’s equal protection claim seems to lack plausibility for other reasons as well. For example, it is not clear that her Valenica Street property falls in the specific development areas contemplated by the Plan. To be sure, the plan includes maps of the Mt. Auburn and Over-the-Rhine neighborhoods. And Norman’s property, along with a host of others in the Mt. Auburn neighborhood, are identified on a map of vacant and condemned properties, as well as maps indicating current property usage and zoning. But, as we read the Plan, it calls for rezoning of only two parts of Mt. Auburn and flags four “key” areas for potential redevelopment: the City View Zone, the Historic Five Points Zone, the Medical/Cultural Zone, and the Northern Historic Gateway Zone. The Plan also identifies two specific Concept Sites and several other Opportunity Sites. Yet none of those areas encompass Norman’s property. It is unclear, then, how Norman alleges the Plan impacts her property. Perhaps, she believes the planned development—even if limited to a particular corridor of Mt. Auburn—will have spillover effects and negatively impact her property. If so, she does not allege as much in her complaint. 8 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
statutory claim under 42 U.S.C. § 5309, a neighboring provision that prohibits certain types of
discrimination by entities receiving government funding. Nonetheless, it concluded that § 5309
did not create a private right of action. On appeal, Norman does not take issue with that conclusion.
As a result, she has abandoned that claim. See Doe, 989 F.3d at 425.
Instead, Norman argues, for the first time, that her complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613—a provision of the Fair Housing Act. Invoking that section, Norman asserts that the district
court “is wrong” and “a private right does exist.” Appellant Br. at 25. To be sure, private persons
can enforce their rights under the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (“An aggrieved person may
commence a civil action” challenging an “alleged discriminatory housing practice”). But there is
no mention of § 3613 or the Fair Housing Act anywhere in the complaint. And, in opposing
defendants’ motions to dismiss, Norman did not argue that § 3613 was the basis for her claims.
Quite the opposite, Norman seemed to suggest her equal protection claims do not arise under
statute at all. See R. 37 at PageID 722. As a result, Norman has forfeited any argument that § 3613
applies. Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that “arguments
raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited” as are “issues not raised in response to dispositive
motions” (citation modified)).
***
All told, Norman has not alleged a plausible equal protection claim against any of the
defendants.
B.
Norman also makes a host of conspiracy allegations. Here again, there is some confusion
about the source of her claims. If they arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985, they are
inadequately pled because, as we discussed above, Norman has not plausibly alleged that any of
9 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
the defendants violated her equal protection rights or acted with discriminatory animus. See
Montgomery v. Ferentino, No. 20-3114, 2021 WL 3204843, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2021) (“In the
absence of a viable underlying constitutional claim, the district court did not err by dismissing [the
plaintiff’s] claim of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.”); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc.
v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tennessee ex rel. Traffic & Parking Comm’n, 805
F. App’x 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2020) (“§ 1985 claims must allege ‘class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.’” (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). And Norman
has offered no factual allegations to support a conclusion that any defendant violated Ohio law, so
her state law conspiracy claim likewise fails. Sal’s Heating & Cooling Inc. v. BERS Acquisition
Co, 192 N.E.3d 537, 544 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (“[A]n action for civil conspiracy [under Ohio law]
cannot be maintained unless an underlying unlawful act is committed.”). More to the point,
Norman’s allegations that the non-City defendants were “stakeholders” or “collaborator[s]” fall
woefully short of plausibly alleging a conspiracy. Compl., R. 1 at Page ID 11-12, 19. As do the
slightly more specific allegations concerning Grossman Group’s role in leading development of
the Plan and DiSalvo Development Advisor’s role in conducting a market assessment. Id. Beyond
those high-level assertions, Norman does not “set forth any additional factual allegations indicating
when, where, or how the defendants conspired” to harm her. Perry v. Se. Boll Weevil Eradication
Found., 154 F. App’x 467, 477 (6th Cir. 2005). “Conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree
of specificity and vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be
sufficient to state such a claim.” Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 368 (6th Cir.
2012) (citation modified).
On appeal, Norman attempts to bolster her minimal allegations, for example, by arguing
that the “City collaborated with the other sponsors of the [Plan], supplied information and targets
10 No. 25-3222, Norman v. City of Cincinnati, OH, et al.
to the other collaborators, gave tax incentives,” “met [with the defendants] on more than one
occasion,” and “prepared and supplied documents in concert.” Appellant Br. at 28-29. But Norman
cannot use her brief to amend her complaint. Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289, 300 (6th Cir. 2022).
As a result, her conspiracy claims were properly dismissed.
C.
Finally, Norman brings a state law extortion claim against the City. Having dismissed
Norman’s federal claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claim. Bah, 610 F. App’x at 555 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
IV.
Because Norman did not plausibly allege any of her claims, the district court did not err in
dismissing Norman’s complaint. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.