MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 26 2018, 8:35 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE A. David Hutson Clay A. Edwards HUTSON LEGAL Rachel K. Dalton Jeffersonville, Indiana O’BRYAN, BROWN & TONER, PLLC Louisville, Kentucky
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
April L. Tipton, et al., December 26, 2018 Appellants-Plaintiffs, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-1749 v. Appeal from the Floyd Circuit Court Physicians Medical Center, LLC, The Honorable Maria D. Granger, Appellee-Defendant. Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 22C01-1801-PL-128
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] April L. Tipton (“April”) and Maurice A. Tipton (collectively, the “Tiptons”)
filed a lawsuit alleging that Physicians Medical Center, LLC (“Provider”)
committed medical malpractice. The Tiptons now appeal the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Provider, arguing only that Provider failed to properly
authenticate certain designated evidence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In 2017, the Tiptons filed a Proposed Complaint for Damages with the Indiana
Department of Insurance, alleging that Provider—and others—had committed
medical malpractice in treating April, and that the Tiptons had been injured as
a result. During the pendency of that proceeding, the Tiptons filed a lawsuit in
Floyd County as pro-se litigants. They sued only Provider and made the same
allegations of medical malpractice, alleging that April sustained a spinal injury
as a result of a medical procedure. The trial court held the lawsuit in abeyance
pending the issuance of an opinion by the Medical Review Panel (the “Panel”).
[3] On May 15, 2018, the Panel issued a unanimous opinion that the defendants
had complied with the applicable standard of care. Provider then moved for
summary judgment in the Floyd County action, designating the opinion. The
Tiptons moved to dismiss Provider’s motion for summary judgment. They
asserted—inter alia—that the opinion of the Panel “was irrelevant because the
Panel was not allowed to see but a minor part of [the] claim” and that “[a]ll
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 2 of 7 evidence can and will be a part of [the] case in state court.” Appellants’ App.
Vol. 2 at 51. The Tiptons also asserted that “Summary Judgment is proper only
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with affidavits have been submitted. . . . This case has had no
pleadings, no depositions, no answers to interrogatories, no admissions and or
[sic] affidavits. Discovery in this case is just beginning.” Id.
[4] On June 8, 2018, the trial court entered an order treating the Tiptons’ motion as
a request for additional time to respond to Provider’s motion for summary
judgment. The court observed that the request was “not supported by affidavit
and, therefore, [did] not comply with Indiana Trial Rule 56(F).” Id. at 57. The
court ordered “that Plaintiffs shall file a timely response to Defendant[’s]
motion for summary judgment that complies with Indiana Trial Rule 56, or else
summary judgment will likely be granted in Defendant’s favor.” Id.
[5] On June 13, 2018, the Tiptons filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
alleging that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “makes a prima facie case.” Id. at
59. In support of their motion, the Tiptons designated certain medical records,
discharge instructions, and insurance claims. The Tiptons did not designate the
opinion of the Panel or any other expert medical opinion. Rather, the Tiptons
again asserted that “the Panel’s opinion is irrelevant to [their] claim.” Id. at 60.
[6] On June 27, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting Provider’s motion
for summary judgment. The Tiptons now appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 3 of 7 Discussion and Decision [7] Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We
review de novo whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment,
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Moreover, “Indiana’s
distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the
movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at
least one element of the claim.” Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d
1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016). Summary judgment is inappropriate if the movant fails
to carry this burden. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013).
However, if the movant succeeds, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
designate contrary evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. In conducting our review, we look only to the designated
evidence, T.R. 56(H), and construe all factual inferences in favor of the party
who did not seek summary judgment, Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 673.
[8] To prevail on a claim of medical malpractice, the plaintiff must show: “(1) duty
owed to plaintiff by defendant, (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall
below the applicable standard of care, and (3) compensable injury proximately
caused by defendant’s breach of duty.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1217
(Ind. 2000). In moving for summary judgment, Provider focused on the
element of breach, designating the unanimous opinion that it had complied
with the applicable standard of care. “When the medical review panel issues a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 4 of 7 unanimous opinion that no negligence occurred, that is usually enough to show
that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and to entitle the [provider] to
summary judgment.” Slease v. Hughbanks, 684 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); see also Boston v. GYN, Ltd., 785 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who “must present expert
testimony to show that there is a dispute concerning whether the [provider]
breached the applicable duty of care. In the absence of this testimony, there is
no genuine issue of material fact.” Slease, 684 N.E.2d at 499.
[9] The Tiptons assert that Provider failed to negate the element of breach—and so
the burden never shifted—because Provider failed to properly authenticate the
opinion of the Panel with an appropriate affidavit. According to the Tiptons,
“[t]he trial court’s judgment must be reversed because absent the panel opinion,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 26 2018, 8:35 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE A. David Hutson Clay A. Edwards HUTSON LEGAL Rachel K. Dalton Jeffersonville, Indiana O’BRYAN, BROWN & TONER, PLLC Louisville, Kentucky
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
April L. Tipton, et al., December 26, 2018 Appellants-Plaintiffs, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-1749 v. Appeal from the Floyd Circuit Court Physicians Medical Center, LLC, The Honorable Maria D. Granger, Appellee-Defendant. Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 22C01-1801-PL-128
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] April L. Tipton (“April”) and Maurice A. Tipton (collectively, the “Tiptons”)
filed a lawsuit alleging that Physicians Medical Center, LLC (“Provider”)
committed medical malpractice. The Tiptons now appeal the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Provider, arguing only that Provider failed to properly
authenticate certain designated evidence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In 2017, the Tiptons filed a Proposed Complaint for Damages with the Indiana
Department of Insurance, alleging that Provider—and others—had committed
medical malpractice in treating April, and that the Tiptons had been injured as
a result. During the pendency of that proceeding, the Tiptons filed a lawsuit in
Floyd County as pro-se litigants. They sued only Provider and made the same
allegations of medical malpractice, alleging that April sustained a spinal injury
as a result of a medical procedure. The trial court held the lawsuit in abeyance
pending the issuance of an opinion by the Medical Review Panel (the “Panel”).
[3] On May 15, 2018, the Panel issued a unanimous opinion that the defendants
had complied with the applicable standard of care. Provider then moved for
summary judgment in the Floyd County action, designating the opinion. The
Tiptons moved to dismiss Provider’s motion for summary judgment. They
asserted—inter alia—that the opinion of the Panel “was irrelevant because the
Panel was not allowed to see but a minor part of [the] claim” and that “[a]ll
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 2 of 7 evidence can and will be a part of [the] case in state court.” Appellants’ App.
Vol. 2 at 51. The Tiptons also asserted that “Summary Judgment is proper only
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with affidavits have been submitted. . . . This case has had no
pleadings, no depositions, no answers to interrogatories, no admissions and or
[sic] affidavits. Discovery in this case is just beginning.” Id.
[4] On June 8, 2018, the trial court entered an order treating the Tiptons’ motion as
a request for additional time to respond to Provider’s motion for summary
judgment. The court observed that the request was “not supported by affidavit
and, therefore, [did] not comply with Indiana Trial Rule 56(F).” Id. at 57. The
court ordered “that Plaintiffs shall file a timely response to Defendant[’s]
motion for summary judgment that complies with Indiana Trial Rule 56, or else
summary judgment will likely be granted in Defendant’s favor.” Id.
[5] On June 13, 2018, the Tiptons filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
alleging that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “makes a prima facie case.” Id. at
59. In support of their motion, the Tiptons designated certain medical records,
discharge instructions, and insurance claims. The Tiptons did not designate the
opinion of the Panel or any other expert medical opinion. Rather, the Tiptons
again asserted that “the Panel’s opinion is irrelevant to [their] claim.” Id. at 60.
[6] On June 27, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting Provider’s motion
for summary judgment. The Tiptons now appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 3 of 7 Discussion and Decision [7] Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated evidentiary matter
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We
review de novo whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment,
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Moreover, “Indiana’s
distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the
movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at
least one element of the claim.” Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d
1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016). Summary judgment is inappropriate if the movant fails
to carry this burden. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013).
However, if the movant succeeds, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
designate contrary evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. In conducting our review, we look only to the designated
evidence, T.R. 56(H), and construe all factual inferences in favor of the party
who did not seek summary judgment, Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 673.
[8] To prevail on a claim of medical malpractice, the plaintiff must show: “(1) duty
owed to plaintiff by defendant, (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall
below the applicable standard of care, and (3) compensable injury proximately
caused by defendant’s breach of duty.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1217
(Ind. 2000). In moving for summary judgment, Provider focused on the
element of breach, designating the unanimous opinion that it had complied
with the applicable standard of care. “When the medical review panel issues a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 4 of 7 unanimous opinion that no negligence occurred, that is usually enough to show
that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and to entitle the [provider] to
summary judgment.” Slease v. Hughbanks, 684 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); see also Boston v. GYN, Ltd., 785 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who “must present expert
testimony to show that there is a dispute concerning whether the [provider]
breached the applicable duty of care. In the absence of this testimony, there is
no genuine issue of material fact.” Slease, 684 N.E.2d at 499.
[9] The Tiptons assert that Provider failed to negate the element of breach—and so
the burden never shifted—because Provider failed to properly authenticate the
opinion of the Panel with an appropriate affidavit. According to the Tiptons,
“[t]he trial court’s judgment must be reversed because absent the panel opinion,
which should not be considered, there is no basis for summary judgment.” Br.
of the Appellants at 11. Yet, assuming arguendo that the opinion was not
properly authenticated, the Tiptons cannot present this challenge for the first
time on appeal. Jordan v. Deery, 609 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. 1993) (concluding
that the appellants waived a similar challenge in a medical-malpractice action).
[10] The Tiptons anticipate the issue of waiver, asserting that they “objected to
consideration of the panel opinion in their responses to [Provider’s] motion for
summary judgment.” Br. of the Appellants at 12. They rely on these references
to affidavits in their motion to dismiss: “Summary Judgment is proper only
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with affidavits have been submitted. . . . This case has had no
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 5 of 7 pleadings, no depositions, no answers to interrogatories, no admissions and or
[sic] affidavits. Discovery in this case is just beginning.” Appellants’ App. Vol.
2 at 51. The Tiptons also point out that, in their cross-motion, they argued “the
panel opinion was irrelevant to their claim.” Br. of the Appellants at 12.
[11] Yet, in their motion to dismiss, the Tiptons focused on the amount of discovery
that had been conducted—referring to several types of discovery tools—and
they made no attempt to clarify or renew those arguments after the trial court
treated their motion as seeking additional time to respond. Further, in that
initial motion, the Tiptons did not argue that the opinion was “irrelevant”
because it could not be considered. Rather, they argued about the amount of
evidence that was before the Panel, asserting that “[a]ll evidence can and will be
a part of [the] case in state court.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 50. Moreover, in
support of their subsequent cross-motion for summary judgment, the Tiptons
mentioned relevance but failed to articulate a specific evidentiary challenge.
[12] The Tiptons point out that they were pro-se litigants who “walked into what
would be, under the best of circumstances, a minefield.” Br. of the Appellants
at 13. Yet, their status as pro-se litigants has no bearing on the preservation of
appellate issues. See, e.g., Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)
(“[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is
afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.”).
[13] We conclude that the Tiptons have waived their argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 6 of 7 [14] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-1749 | December 26, 2018 Page 7 of 7