April Guy v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 19, 2025
• Docket: 02-25-00132-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00132-CR ___________________________

APRIL GUY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1838652

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant April Guy attempts to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion

for continuance. Because there is no final judgment and the trial court’s denial of her

continuance is an interlocutory order, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.1

The right to appeal in a criminal case is a statutorily created right. Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002). Generally, a criminal defendant may only appeal from a final judgment. State v.

Sellers, 790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see McKown v. State,

915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (per curiam).

We do not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders in a criminal appeal

absent express statutory authority. See Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (noting that the standard for determining jurisdiction in a criminal

case is not whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is

authorized by law); Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(holding that courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders

absent express statutory authority); see also Everett v. State, 91 S.W.3d 386, 386 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (stating that an appellate court

has jurisdiction over criminal appeals only when expressly granted by law). The denial

1 Guy’s notice of appeal contains the trial court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal. But this certification does not reflect that Guy has the right to appeal; rather, it reflects that trial court’s recognition that “the [d]enial of a [m]otion for [c]ontinuance is not an appealable order.”

2 of a motion for continuance is not a separately appealable order. See Apolinar,

820 S.W.2d at 794.

Because the trial court had not entered any appealable orders, we were

concerned that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We sent Guy a letter and warned

that unless she or any party desiring to continue the appeal files with this court on or

before May 19, 2025, a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, the

appeal may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); 44.3.

We received no response.

Accordingly, we dismiss Guy’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.

P. 43.2(f); Abbott, 271 S.W.3d at 696–97; Apolinar, 820 S.W.2d at 794.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 19, 2025