RABINOWITZ, Justice.
This case comes before us on Thomas B. Payne’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association which held that petitioner was ineligible for admission without examination. We are of the opinion that petitioner’s showing before the Board demonstrated that he was eligible for admission
by reciprocity to practice law in Alaska. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Board of Governors.
Reciprocity, as a basis for eligibility, is established by AS 08.08.140 of the Alaska Integrated Bar Act. This statute provides that:
An attorney in good standing in the bar of another state * * * which admits members of the Alaska Bar to the practice of law shall be admitted without examination and otherwise upon substantially the same terms and conditions as are fixed in the jurisdiction from which he has come for the admission of attorneys from this state. As a prerequisite to admission to the Alaska Bar the board shall require an attorney to take and pass an examination, unless the applicant (1) has passed a state bar examination, (2) has engaged in the active practice of law for at least five out of the previous six years before filing the application, excluding time spent in the military service of the United States, (3) is a graduate of a law school accredited by the American Bar Association or has been engaged in the active practice of the law for at least 10 years, and (4) meets the character requirements established by the board.
The crux of the controversy in this appeal concerns whether petitioner proved that he had been “engaged in the active practice of law for at least five out of the previous six years” prior to the filing of his application for admittance to the Bar of Alaska.
The record discloses that petitioner was born in 1910; graduated from Gonzaga High School; and subsequently received his B.A. from Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington in 1933. Petitioner attended Gonzaga University Law School from 1933 until 1937 and was awarded an LL.B. in 1937. After successfully completing a written bar examination, petitioner was admitted to the practice of law in Idaho on May 28, 1951. From the date of his admission until January 1962, petitioner was engaged in the private practice of law at Wallace and Cottonwood, Idaho.
From January 3, 1962, until the time his application came before the Board of Governors, petitioner had been employed on a full-time basis by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.
For the first ten months of this employment, petitioner worked for the Corps of Engineers at Great Falls, Montana. From October 1963 until the present, petitioner has been employed by the Corps of Engineers at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska.
In the conclusions of law which the Board of Governors filed in this matter, it was determined, in part, that petitioner had “not engaged in the active practice of law for five out of the previous six years” (i. e., since 1961). In reaching this conclusion, the Board further determined that petitioner had failed to prove that he had engaged in the active practice of law during his employment by the Corps of Engineers.
Also of significance to this case is the fact that in 1965 our legislature amended the Alaska Integrated Bar Act by defining the phrase “active practice of the law.”
Subsection (3) of AS 08.08.245 defined
“active practice of the law” as including' the
rendering legal services to an agency, branch, or department of a civil government in the United States or a state or territory of the United States, in an elective, appointive or employed capacity * * *
The Board of Governors does not dispute that the services rendered by petitioner to the Corps of Engineers during the period in question were rendered “to an agency, branch or department of a civil government in the United States in an employed capacity.”
On the other hand, the Board did conclude that the nature of the work performed by petitioner “for the U. S. Corps of Engineers does not constitute ‘rendering legal services’ within the meaning of AS 08.08.245(3).” And, as indicated previously, our study of the record has convinced us that this latter conclusion of law by the Board is erroneous.
Application of Babcock
involved review proceedings from the Board of Governors’ denial of admission to Babcock by reciprocity. In that case we said in part:
Since the Board of Governors has not defined the term ‘practice of law’ by rule or otherwise, and since the term ‘active practice of law’ as used in section 9(a) (2) and (3) of the Alaska Integrated Bar Act is not so plain as to leave nothing for interpretation, we find it necessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction in order to determine the scope and intent of the section in question.
After our decision in
Application of Babcock
was rendered, the legislature enacted AS 08.08.245 which contained five separate definitions of “active practice of the law.”
The primary thrust of the Board of Governors’ position in this case is that the legal services performed by petitioner for the Corps of Engineers were too narrow- in scope and frequency to constitute “active practice of the law.”
We believe that the legislature’s enactment of AS 08.08.245(3) after our decision in
Application of Babcock
is, in part, controlling here. Under the principle articulated in
Application of
Houston,
we have determined that the criteria established by AS 08.08.245(3) is an acceptable standard for determination of eligibility for admission to the Bar of Alaska.
Taking a somewhat parallel approach to that used in
Application of Babcock}
.we note that the term “legal services” as used in AS 08.08.245(3) “is not so plain as to leave nothing for interpretation”. Our construction of this term differs from that which the Board of Governors urges us to adopt. In short, in order to qualify as “active practice of the law” under AS 08.08.140, the character of a petitioner’s legal services rendered to a government agency in his employed capacity, under AS 08.08.245(3), does not require that the totality of such services exclude the rendering of any other type of services. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that a reasonable construction of AS 08.-08.245(3) is one that requires an applicant to have devoted a substantial portion of his time and energies to the rendering of legal services (extensive in scope) in his employed capacity to the government agency.
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RABINOWITZ, Justice.
This case comes before us on Thomas B. Payne’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association which held that petitioner was ineligible for admission without examination. We are of the opinion that petitioner’s showing before the Board demonstrated that he was eligible for admission
by reciprocity to practice law in Alaska. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Board of Governors.
Reciprocity, as a basis for eligibility, is established by AS 08.08.140 of the Alaska Integrated Bar Act. This statute provides that:
An attorney in good standing in the bar of another state * * * which admits members of the Alaska Bar to the practice of law shall be admitted without examination and otherwise upon substantially the same terms and conditions as are fixed in the jurisdiction from which he has come for the admission of attorneys from this state. As a prerequisite to admission to the Alaska Bar the board shall require an attorney to take and pass an examination, unless the applicant (1) has passed a state bar examination, (2) has engaged in the active practice of law for at least five out of the previous six years before filing the application, excluding time spent in the military service of the United States, (3) is a graduate of a law school accredited by the American Bar Association or has been engaged in the active practice of the law for at least 10 years, and (4) meets the character requirements established by the board.
The crux of the controversy in this appeal concerns whether petitioner proved that he had been “engaged in the active practice of law for at least five out of the previous six years” prior to the filing of his application for admittance to the Bar of Alaska.
The record discloses that petitioner was born in 1910; graduated from Gonzaga High School; and subsequently received his B.A. from Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington in 1933. Petitioner attended Gonzaga University Law School from 1933 until 1937 and was awarded an LL.B. in 1937. After successfully completing a written bar examination, petitioner was admitted to the practice of law in Idaho on May 28, 1951. From the date of his admission until January 1962, petitioner was engaged in the private practice of law at Wallace and Cottonwood, Idaho.
From January 3, 1962, until the time his application came before the Board of Governors, petitioner had been employed on a full-time basis by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.
For the first ten months of this employment, petitioner worked for the Corps of Engineers at Great Falls, Montana. From October 1963 until the present, petitioner has been employed by the Corps of Engineers at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska.
In the conclusions of law which the Board of Governors filed in this matter, it was determined, in part, that petitioner had “not engaged in the active practice of law for five out of the previous six years” (i. e., since 1961). In reaching this conclusion, the Board further determined that petitioner had failed to prove that he had engaged in the active practice of law during his employment by the Corps of Engineers.
Also of significance to this case is the fact that in 1965 our legislature amended the Alaska Integrated Bar Act by defining the phrase “active practice of the law.”
Subsection (3) of AS 08.08.245 defined
“active practice of the law” as including' the
rendering legal services to an agency, branch, or department of a civil government in the United States or a state or territory of the United States, in an elective, appointive or employed capacity * * *
The Board of Governors does not dispute that the services rendered by petitioner to the Corps of Engineers during the period in question were rendered “to an agency, branch or department of a civil government in the United States in an employed capacity.”
On the other hand, the Board did conclude that the nature of the work performed by petitioner “for the U. S. Corps of Engineers does not constitute ‘rendering legal services’ within the meaning of AS 08.08.245(3).” And, as indicated previously, our study of the record has convinced us that this latter conclusion of law by the Board is erroneous.
Application of Babcock
involved review proceedings from the Board of Governors’ denial of admission to Babcock by reciprocity. In that case we said in part:
Since the Board of Governors has not defined the term ‘practice of law’ by rule or otherwise, and since the term ‘active practice of law’ as used in section 9(a) (2) and (3) of the Alaska Integrated Bar Act is not so plain as to leave nothing for interpretation, we find it necessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction in order to determine the scope and intent of the section in question.
After our decision in
Application of Babcock
was rendered, the legislature enacted AS 08.08.245 which contained five separate definitions of “active practice of the law.”
The primary thrust of the Board of Governors’ position in this case is that the legal services performed by petitioner for the Corps of Engineers were too narrow- in scope and frequency to constitute “active practice of the law.”
We believe that the legislature’s enactment of AS 08.08.245(3) after our decision in
Application of Babcock
is, in part, controlling here. Under the principle articulated in
Application of
Houston,
we have determined that the criteria established by AS 08.08.245(3) is an acceptable standard for determination of eligibility for admission to the Bar of Alaska.
Taking a somewhat parallel approach to that used in
Application of Babcock}
.we note that the term “legal services” as used in AS 08.08.245(3) “is not so plain as to leave nothing for interpretation”. Our construction of this term differs from that which the Board of Governors urges us to adopt. In short, in order to qualify as “active practice of the law” under AS 08.08.140, the character of a petitioner’s legal services rendered to a government agency in his employed capacity, under AS 08.08.245(3), does not require that the totality of such services exclude the rendering of any other type of services. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that a reasonable construction of AS 08.-08.245(3) is one that requires an applicant to have devoted a substantial portion of his time and energies to the rendering of legal services (extensive in scope) in his employed capacity to the government agency. Here petitioner claims that in the course of his employment by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 65 percent of the services which he rendered, during the period of time in question, were legal services. Our examination of the record has convinced us that petitioner’s proof demonstrates he met the burden of showing that a substantial portion of the duties which he performed for the Corps of Engineers consisted of the rendering of legal services.
We are of the further view that petitioner’s proof discloses that the scope of the legal services which he performed was not so “narrow” as to be disqualified from constituting the rendering of “legal services” under AS 08.08.245(3) or “active practice of law” under the reciprocity provisions of AS 08.08.140
In his petition for review, which was filed in this court, petitioner asserts that:
In the performance of [his] duties as an attorney for the U. S. Army, Corps of Engineers, [the petitioner is] engaged in the general practice of law handling contract claims, torts claims, real estate transactions, condemnation cases, quiet title proceedings, and numerous other legal problems of a general and advisory nature.
Review of the record has led us to the conclusion that petitioner’s proof sustains these assertions.
Petitioner’s job description, which was filed with the Board, discloses the varied scope and substantial extent of the legal services that petitioner was required to render to the Corps of Engineers in his job position as “Attorney Adviser (Real Property).”
In addition to the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the numerous exhibits filed by petitioner before the Board show that he was rendering legal services to the Corps of Engineers during the period in question.
On the basis of the entire record in this case, we hold that petitioner is entitled to admission to the Alaska Bar Association under the reciprocity provisions of AS 08.-
08.140. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alaska is therefore directed to prepare a certificate of admission for delivery to petitioner upon his taking the required oath.