Application of Norman B. Christensen

330 F.2d 652, 51 C.C.P.A. 1236
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 16, 1964
DocketPatent Appeal 7084
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 330 F.2d 652 (Application of Norman B. Christensen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Application of Norman B. Christensen, 330 F.2d 652, 51 C.C.P.A. 1236 (ccpa 1964).

Opinion

SMITH, Judge.

The Board of Appeals sustained the examiner’s rejection of appealed claims 18 and 19 of appellant’s application 1 as “patentably indistinct” from the claims of appellant’s own previously issued patent. 2 The application upon which the patent issued was a continuation-in-part 3 *653 of the instant application and was co-pending with it. Thus, the issue raised by the rejection is one of pure “double patenting,” i. e., whether appellant is seeking more than one patent for but one patentable invention.

Appellant’s invention relates generally to a suspension system for vehicles, wherein a bellows type air spring is positioned between the vehicle frame and the axle and supports the frame at a constant level with respect to the axle. When an increase or decrease in the vehicle load tends to cause a corresponding change in the riding level of the vehicle, air may be added to or removed from the bellows, thereby causing the riding level to remain constant. Since this suspension system is designed to compensate only for static vehicle loads, it is necessary for the air regulating control device to be relatively insensitive to short term or momentary changes in load such as occur when the wheels pass over bumps or dips in the road surface or when the vehicle is driven through a banked turn. Appellant accomplishes this by incorporating damping means and a resilient torsion member. Since the entire controversy in this case centers around the resilient torsion member, it will be described in detail, while a generalized functional description will suffice for the remainder of the system.

As described in the specification and defined in the appealed claims, appellant’s system functions in the following manner : A mechanical means senses changes in the distance between the vehicle frame and the axle housing and transmits this information to the control device in the form of torque. In the control device this torque is applied to a member which in turn rotates a plug. Attached to the plug is a valve actuating member which is positioned such that any substantial rotation of the plug will cause the valve actuating member to open either one of two valves which serve to supply or exhaust air to and from the bellows. Thus the desired constant distance between the vehicle frame and the axle housing is automatically maintained.

The necessary damping or time delay is partially accomplished by providing opposed hydraulic or mechanical pistons at one end of the valve actuating member. Appellant further decreases the sensitivity of the control system to sharp bumps and ruts by providing, in the words of the claims, a “resilient torsion member” as the member which receives the applied torque and rotates the plug. In one embodiment, the specification simply describes this element as a “torsion bar,” which we assume means a bar or rod which is.,formed from a suitably resilient material and capable of storing and gradually releasing torsional energy (much like a twisted rubber band). A second pertinent embodiment is shown in Fig. 7, reproduced below. In this construction the “resilient torsion member” consists of shaft 126 in combination with a. coiled spring 125 and four pins.

*654 One end of the shaft is attached to control rod 30 and the other is rotatably journaled in end wall 133 of plug 128, to which is attached valve actuating member 58. When the applied torque from control rod 30 causes rotation of shaft 126, shaft pin 138a will contact spring end 125a and begin to uncoil the spring. The spring end 1256 is restrained from a corresponding movement by contact with plug pin 1406. However, after a momentary delay, and if the rotation of the shaft 126 persists, the torsional energy in the spring will urge the spring end 1256 to its original position in contact with the shaft pin 1386, applying a rotative force to the plug pin 1406, the plug 128 and thus ultimately to the valve actuating member 58.

It should be noted that the broad term “resilient torsion member” clearly embraces both a “torsion bar” and the shaft-pin-spring combination shown in Fig. 7.

Since we are faced with, in the words of the board, “a rejection on double patenting,” we are required to determine whether the appealed claims define a “patentably distinct invention” over that claimed in appellant’s patent. In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 50 CCPA 1529. Such a determination necessarily requires a careful analysis with respect to what, precisely, is claimed in both the patent and the appealed claims, and then a close comparison of the two inventions.

Both appellant and the solicitor devote much of their bxfiefs to the question of whether the various claims in the patent and in the instant application are “specific” or “generic.” Apparently the position of the solicitor is that appealed claims 18 and 19 and patent claim 1 are all “generic” and therefore, as' stated by the board:

“The law is clear. Where the. same applicant presents two or more co- . pending applications disclosing different embodiments generic claims may be allowed in but a single one of the patents. If present in two or more of the patents, the generic claims in the later issued patent are void. When one patent has issued with generic claims, the generic claims in the still pending application should be rejected (as has been done herein) on the ground of double patenting. * * * ”

Like so many “rules” of law, however, the above statement is not a nxle at all but merely a generalized test which has occasionally been found helpful in certain fact situations. And like so many such rules, its statement confuses and obscures the real issue, and thus is apt to do more harm than good. As we recently indicated in In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 51 CCPA — , the term “generic” has only relative significance. The further question always arises: To what is the pax-ticular claim “generic” or “specific?” The solicitor and, to some extent at least, the appellant would have us dispose of this case merely by deciding whether or not patent claim 1 and appealed claims 18 and 19 ax-e all “generic.” But characterizing the claims in this manner does not resolve the issue, nor does it further the analysis of the problem. The other apparently simple (and therefore deceptively dangerous) “rules” with which the double patenting field seems to abound, such as the “crisscross readability test,” likewise obscure the real issue. Instead, the correct procedure for double patenting cases is to analyze the claims to determine the inventions defined therein, and then decide whether such inventions, as claimed, are patentably distinct and therefore qualified to be claimed in separate patents. Accordingly, appealed claim 19 and pat *655 ent claim 1, the two most pertinent of those here involved, 4 are set forth element by element in parallel columns for ease of comparison:

Christensen — Ser. No.

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Bluebook (online)
330 F.2d 652, 51 C.C.P.A. 1236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/application-of-norman-b-christensen-ccpa-1964.