Applewhite v. District of Columbia District Attorneys Office

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 30, 2009
DocketCivil Action No. 2009-2439
StatusPublished

This text of Applewhite v. District of Columbia District Attorneys Office (Applewhite v. District of Columbia District Attorneys Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Applewhite v. District of Columbia District Attorneys Office, (D.D.C. 2009).

Opinion

FILED DEC ~ 0 2J09 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts ) Marc Edwin Applewhite, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09 2439 ) District of Columbia District Attorneys ) Office et aI., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is the plaintiff s pro se complaint and application to proceed in forma

pauperis. The application will be granted and the complaint will be dismissed because it seeks

relief that is not available through a civil action.

Plaintiff was indicted by a federal grand jury and convicted on a guilty plea for armed

bank robbery in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. CompI. at 3.

Alleging that he should have been charged with no more than attempted armed bank robbery,

plaintiff filed this action seeking $950,000 in damages and immediate release from his sentence

of imprisonment. Id. at 3-4.

A collateral challenge to a conviction and sentence imposed by a federal court must be

brought by motion made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, lodged with the court that imposed the

judgment and sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The court's docket shows that the plaintiff has

filed such a motion with the sentencing court, which is pending. See Applewhite v. USA., Civil

Action 09-2293 (CKK) (D.D.C.).

1tJ) A suit for damages against the federal prosecutor's office that secured the indictment by a

grand jury is the equivalent ofa suit against the United States itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit and may be

sued only where it has expressly waived its immunity and consented to suit. FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471,475 (1994). The complaint does not identify any federal law or common-law duty that

was allegedly breached. In any case, the United States has not consented to suit for alleged

constitutional violations by its officials, id at 486, or to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act,

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, if the suit arises from the performance ofa discretionary function, 28

U.S.C. § 2680(a), which includes a prosecutor's decision to seek an indictment and prosecute

charges, Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1995). A federal grand jury is not an

entity that may either sue or be sued. In short, the complaint does not identify any defendant as

to which this complaint may be maintained. Therefore, because it seeks damages from

defendants who are immune from suit, the complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(2). /' A separate order accompanies this memor dUJ;nopinion.

Date: 11/J-/ / 07 / United States District Judge

....,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyer
510 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1994)
William G. Moore, Jr. v. Joseph B. Valder
65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Applewhite v. District of Columbia District Attorneys Office, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/applewhite-v-district-of-columbia-district-attorne-dcd-2009.