Appian Corporation v. Pegasystems

Supreme Court of Virginia·Decided January 8, 2026·No. 240736·Published

Opinion

PRESENT: Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, Chafin, and Russell, JJ., and Millette and Mims, S.JJ.

APPIAN CORPORATION OPINION BY

v. Record No. 240736 JUSTICE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR.

JANUARY 8, 2026

PEGASYSTEMS, INC.

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Appian Corporation (“Appian”) appeals from a judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing a jury verdict in its favor against Pegasystems Inc. (“Pega”). Specifically, Appian asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court’s decisions regarding two jury instructions and several discovery/evidentiary issues. In addition to defending the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the errors alleged by Appian, Pega asserts cross-error, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of its motions to strike and set aside the verdict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Appian and Pega are software companies that create and sell business process management (“BPM”) platforms, “low-code” software that automates complex multi-step processes for businesses. Appian and Pega are “aggressively direct competitors[,]” often finding themselves competing for the same customers.

Although Pega had entered the BPM marketplace nearly two decades before Appian, by 2012, Appian had achieved higher rankings in certain industry ratings. Alan Trefler, Pega’s

1 Portions of the record below were sealed by the circuit court. “To the extent that we mention facts found only in the sealed record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to our decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 560 n.3 (2016).

CEO, conceded that Appian’s ascent in the ratings was upsetting, with other Pega employees contemporaneously describing the news as “catastrophic and unexpected.” A. Pega engages in corporate espionage In February 2012, Pega’s then-head of competitive intelligence, John Petronio, sought to improve Pega’s industry standing vis-a-vis Appian. Petronio hired the professional staffing and solutions firm KForce to find and hire an “Appian Developer who has extensive experience with BPM Tools” to aid in a “competitive analysis project[.]” The prospective developer needed “access to [Appian’s] systems” but “should not have worked directly for Appian.” KForce’s notes also included instructions from Petronio that KForce was to “make sure” that the developer was not “loyal” to Appian “because [Petronio] doesn’t want it getting back to Appian that Pega is doing this work.”

These recruitment efforts led Pega to Youyong Zou, a software developer employed at the time by Serco, a government contractor. Critically, Zou’s role within Serco gave him access to Appian’s BPM platform, which Serco licensed from Appian. As an employee of an Appian business partner, Zou also had access to Appian Forum, a password-protected website where Appian employees, customers, and business partners could access Appian product documentation, download Appian software, and participate in discussion threads regarding Appian products.

Zou started moonlighting as a consultant for Pega in early 2012. The purpose of his work for Pega was to get access to Appian’s “software [and] documentation” and then pressure-test and conduct experiments within the platform in order to identify its strengths and weaknesses. Zou’s status as an expert in Appian software, and more importantly his status as someone with access to Appian’s documentation and software, made him valuable to Pega.

Zou’s role as an outside contractor was key: Appian had no interest in sharing information regarding its platform with a direct competitor. Pega employees repeatedly acknowledged in depositions and at trial that Appian’s “internal workings” were a “black box,” Appian was “very guarded about their technology,” and the company “would not have sold [Pega] a license” to use its software. As a result, in its internal communications, Pega characterized Zou as its Appian “spy.”

Zou provided intelligence to Pega in three primary ways: (1) preparing video tutorials of himself building applications in Appian to assist Pega in “find[ing] weaknesses [Pega] can exploit” and strengths to incorporate in its products; (2) participating in live presentations with Pega employees to the same effect; and (3) downloading and sharing confidential Appian documentation saved in Appian Forum with Pega.

Appian identified numerous tutorial videos created by Zou to assist Pega. Zou’s video presentations to Pega employees were geared toward demonstrating user experience and answering Pega employee questions, including by describing the architecture of Appian’s social interface. Zou’s presentations also involved visiting Pega’s headquarters in Massachusetts twice to meet with senior leadership and other employees.

Pega went to great lengths to conceal Zou’s identity during his presentations to Pega employees. Pega leadership “spent hours and hours removing (blurring) [Zou’s] name from the videos” he had prepared and requested that he “change his name on the screen and the ownership of the assets (within Appian)” ahead of a presentation to keep himself anonymous. In fact, Pega employees often referred to Zou as “Matt” or “the other ‘Matt’” internally—a tongue-in-cheek reference to Matt Calkins, Appian’s CEO—to keep him from being “outed” as Pega’s “spy.”

The documentation Zou shared with Pega included Appian’s “High Availability and Disaster Recovery Configurations,” architecture diagrams that “reveal[ed] how Appian handle[d] high performance[,]” as well as key documentation relating to Appian’s mobile and social features. Petronio testified that “the information from Mr. Zou was folded into documents for sales, including internal strategy documents and external documents that they could . . . use with a customer or give to the customer.” Zou’s tutorials and Appian’s documents were “used to educate [Pega’s] sales teams and help them form competitive strategies[,]” and multiple Pega employees testified to the way Zou’s insights were parlayed into briefs deployed by Pega when competing against Appian.

Between 2013 and 2021, Pega was in direct competition with Appian over 200 times. A member of Pega’s sales team told others in 2013 that, “[i]f your team is competing against Appian anywhere, please get in touch with . . . John Petronio ASAP to get a briefing on where you should attack Appian[.]” Evidence at trial also established that Pega incorporated Appian’s internal information and processes into its own platform in order to improve it. As a result, Appian’s product change expert, Dr. Richard Marshall, identified “striking similarities” between the two companies’ products.

Zou continued his work for Pega until he lost access to Appian’s server in 2014. Despite the loss of its “spy,” Pega continued to attempt to access Appian’s systems surreptitiously. Specifically, Pega employees used aliases and non-Pega credentials to try to access Appian’s free trials. Pega’s own Chief Technology Officer conceded that such efforts were not appropriate and regretted his failure to take steps that would have prevented the activities.

Appian learned of Pega’s attempts at corporate espionage in 2020 from an ironic source.

Petronio, who had been laid off by Pega in 2015, was hired by Appian, eventually becoming its

Senior Director of Market Intelligence and Strategy. In 2020, Petronio disclosed the work he had done at Pega with Zou to Appian’s counsel. Appian subsequently filed several claims against Pega and Zou, including claims for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“VUTSA”), Code § 59.1-336 et seq.2 B. The fruits of Pega’s corporate espionage Dr. Marshall, Appian’s product change expert, identified “five illustrative improvements”

in Pega’s platform that he traced back to information supplied to the company by Zou:

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Appian Corporation v. Pegasystems, (Va. 2026).

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