Appeals of Wood

Vermont Superior Court·Decided April 14, 2006·No. 185-10-04 Vtec·Published

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

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Appeal of Wood } Docket Nos. 185‐10‐04 Vtec } 174‐8‐05 Vtec }

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Decision Order on Pending Motions Marc and Susan Wood (Appellants) initially appealed from the September 8, 2004 decision of the Town of Hartford (Town) Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), upholding the Town Zoning Administrative Officer’s (ZAO) determination that Appellants’ application to amend their previously‐issued zoning permit and site plan approvals, or alternatively, for a new permit, were incomplete and could not be approved. This initial appeal is the subject of Docket No. 185‐10‐04 Vtec. In Docket No. 174‐8‐05 Vtec, Appellants appealed from the July 20, 2005 decision of the ZBA, also upholding a similar determination by the ZAO on Appellants’ subsequent applications. Appellants represent themselves; the Town is represented by William F. Ellis, Esq.

Preliminary Procedural Issues There are many motions now pending for the Court’s consideration. The parties’

protracted history of litigation and multiple filings, including motions, memoranda, complaints and accusations, have caused the parties and the Court to already invest a considerable amount of time in these two pending appeals, neither of which has yet gone to trial and both of which represent only the most recent chapters in a multi‐ chapter course of combative litigation. While the Court is not as familiar as the parties with the facts that have caused such filings to be made, it appears to the Court that neither party is wholly responsible or innocent. Our intent in this Decision is to address the relevant material facts and applicable law in a fair and dispassionate manner.

A. Town’s Motion to Dismiss.

The motion most appropriate to first address is the Town’s motion to dismiss both of the pending appeals because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such a motion may be raised at any time under the applicable rules. V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).

In Docket No. 185‐10‐04 Vtec, Appellants filed their notice of appeal of the ZBA’s September 8, 2004 decision with the Town on October 6, 2004; the notice of appeal was received at the Environmental Court on October 13, 2004. Because Appellants filed their appeal before the February 21, 20051 effective date of this Court’s own procedural rules, the Vermont Rules for Environmental Court Proceedings (V.R.E.C.P.), the applicable procedural rules are contained in the Vermont Rules for Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.). Pursuant to V.R.C.P. 76(e) and the time provided in V.R.A.P. 4, Appellants had thirty (30) days from the ZBA’s decision to file their notice of appeal “with the clerk of the board or commission from which appeal is taken.” V.R.C.P. 76(e)(2) (2004). Appellants filed their notice of appeal with the town clerk on October 6, 2004, which is within the thirty day period allowed. Therefore, the Town’s motion to dismiss Docket No. 185‐10‐04 Vtec for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter must be DENIED.

The Town also moves to dismiss Docket No. 174‐8‐05 Vtec for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Appellants filed their notice of appeal of the ZBA’s July 20, 2005 decision with this Court on August 22, 2005. By the time of Appellants’ second appeal, our own procedural rules were promulgated and therefore apply. V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1) requires the notice of appeal to be filed within thirty (30) days of the ZBA decision appealed from. Appellants’ notice of appeal was filed on August 22, two days after the thirty day period allowed.

Appellants argue that the provisions of V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2), particularly when read in conjunction with the extra three days allowed by V.R.C.P. 6(e) for service on another

1 The Vermont Supreme Court promulgated Emergency Rules to guide this Court’s operation between the effective date of the V.R.E.C.P. on February 21, 2005, and the abrogation of V.R.C.P. 76 on January 31, 2005.

party by mail, allow thirty‐three days to file a notice of appeal. Appellants offer no legal precedent for their interpretation of how appeal deadlines are calculated under our Rules.

Rule 6(e) does not apply here for two reasons. First, the time extension permitted by V.R.C.P. 6(e) expressly applies only to filings served on another party by mail. Nothing in Rule 6(e) speaks to filings mailed to a court. Second, V.R.E.C.P. 5(b)(1) expressly speaks to and modifies the procedure under our Rules for filing a notice of appeal with this Court. V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2) explicitly states that the provisions of the Vermont Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure govern all proceedings in this Court, “[e]xcept as modified” by our Rule 5. Thus if Appellants’ notice of appeal is to be judged as timely filed, its filing must comply with the specific provisions of our Rules. V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2).

Even if mailed prior to August 20, 2005, Appellants’ notice of appeal was filed late because a notice of appeal is filed on the date that it is received and not the date it was mailed. See City Bank & Trust v. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 157 Vt. 666, 666 (1991); see also In re Appeal of Frederick LeBlanc, Docket No. 2005‐179 (Vt. Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 2005) (unreported mem.). We therefore must conclude that Appellants’ appeal in Docket No. 174‐8‐05 Vtec was untimely filed. This Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear Appellants second appeal; it is therefore DISMISSED, and the Town’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.

B. Appellants’ Motion for Protective Order.

Appellants have also recently filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the Town from harassing and embarrassing Appellants. The relief Appellants seek cannot be found using a protective order. Protective orders under our Rules are a tool used during discovery, which “permits the court in its discretion to order that access to relevant information not be had, or that the discovery may be had only on specified

terms and conditions, or that its dissemination be limited.” Schmitt v. Lalancette, 2003 VT 24, ¶ 10; V.R.C.P. 26(c). “[P]rotective orders allow courts to limit the broad discovery rights established under Rule 26(a) and (b) if such rights are being abused to limit access to particular evidence, testimony, or witnesses.” Schmitt, at ¶ 10. Appellants are not seeking a protective order for discovery, as no disputes relating to discovery are referenced by Appellants in their motion. Because it is a discovery tool, a protective order has no relationship to the type of relief Appellants request. Therefore, their motion for a protective order is DENIED.2

C. Town’s Motion for Stay of Construction.

We next address the Town’s motion for a stay of all construction work being conducted at Appellants’ property until Appellants obtain approval for all such work. The Town asserts that its motion is in the interest of public health and safety.

By an Entry Order on May 2, 2005, this Court stayed the expiration of Appellants’ Permit #99‐1180, pending Appellants’ submission of zoning permit and site plan applications, including engineered site and retaining wall plans, to the ZBA and Planning Commission for the changes to the retaining wall and for any other changes, including to the concrete slabs, in Appellants’ project from what was approved in Permit #99‐1180.

While it is somewhat unfair to the Town that Appellants continue working on their site while their permit’s expiration is stayed, that reality is not dispositive of this

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