Appeals of Pennzoil Co.

69 Pa. D. & C.2d 122
CourtPennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board
DecidedJuly 26, 1974
Docketdocket no. 73-103-B
StatusPublished

This text of 69 Pa. D. & C.2d 122 (Appeals of Pennzoil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Appeals of Pennzoil Co., 69 Pa. D. & C.2d 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).

Opinion

BROUGHTON, Chairman,

This appeal is from spacing order no. 12, dated April 27, 1973, issued by the Oil and Gas Division of the Department of Environmental Resources (department) pursuant to section 7 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Law of July 25, 1961, P.L. 825, 58 PS §407. Natural gas was discovered in the Roaring Run Gas Pool on December 11, 1970, by Pennzoil Company (Pennzoil), at a depth of 7,235 feet in the Onondaga Chert-Oriskany Sandstone formation. Spacing order no. 12 was issued following hearings held on April 16 and 17, 1973. It defines spacing units for the Roaring Run Pool of approximately 320 acres each, as more specifically delineated on a map attached to the order. Appeals were taken by Pennzoil and Westrans Petroleum, Inc. (Westrans). [124]*124Pennzoil appealed from two provisions of the order that (1) divided four 640-units that Pennzoil and its lessors had previously established into eight 320-acre units, (and from a portion of the order that rearranged the boundary lines of the previous 640-acre units), and (2) required that the wells previously drilled on those 640-acre voluntary units be shut in until new wells were drilled on the second set of320-acre units established by the order within the area previously covered by 640-acre voluntary units. Westrans appealed from the order insofar as it added an area of approximately 150 acres to the spacing unit on which Westrans was already operating, a 155-acre tract owned in fee by Canterbury Coal Company, a sister or parent corporation of Westrans.

At a pre-hearing conference, question was raised whether this board was, under law, to serve as the initial decision maker, deciding all questions de novo and ab initio, or to serve as a strictly appellate body.

This board would function as the initial decision maker under the theory that, since section 1921A(b) of The Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended by the Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 275”), 71 PS §510-21(b), gave the Environmental Hearing Board the power to hold hearings that would previously have been held by the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, then the power to make the substantive decisions previously (prior to the enactment of Act 275) made by the Oil and Gas Commission only after hearing must also be given to the Environmental Hearing Board and not to the department. We rejected this argument in an interlocutory ruling of March 1,1974, on the theory that, [125]*125given the technical nature of the duties of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, it was not reasonable to conclude that its duties were intended to be assumed by the Environmental Hearing Board, merely because performance of those duties involved the holding of hearings. It was much more reasonable to conclude that the Oil and Gas Division of the department was intended to perform those duties initially, subject to appeal to this board. We concluded, therefore, that this board was to function in this case in an appellate capacity only.

On further reflection, we would add the following:

Section 31 of the Administrative Agency Law of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, as amended, 71 PS §1710.31, requires that an adjudicatory action by any administrative agency be taken only after hearing. Section 1921A(a) of The Administrative Code of 1929, supra, 71 PS §510-21(c), permits the department to take any action without holding a hearing prior to taking that action, provided that there is opportunity for a hearing before the action becomes final.1 Section 7 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Law merely provides with particular reference to the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission what [126]*126The Administrative Agency Law, supra, provides generally. Taking section 1921A of The Administrative Code of 1929, supra, as a whole, we are convinced that section 1921A(b)2 was not intended necessarily to convey to the board the subject matter jurisdiction to make the initial decision even in cases where a prior agency, such as the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, was given by a particular statute the power to act only after hearing. Such cases would be treated no differently from cases where the requirement for hearing derives from the general requirements of The Administrative Agency Law, unless the subject matter of the decision is so bound into the hearing process itself that even an initial decision made without a hearing might be regarded as legally invalid. The latter is not the case here. It follows that the department, in performing the duties of the former Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, may act with or without a hearing, as it chooses; specifically, it is not required to hold a hearing prior to issuing a spacing order. The hearing on appeal before this board would then be the hearing that would satisfy the hearing requirements of the Oil and Gas Conservation Law, supra.

Question was also raised whether, if we functioned in an appellate capacity, we should receive evidence, relating to the reasonableness of the department’s decision, accumulated or acquired since the date of that decision. We held, since the department had the power to modify its spacing [127]*127order, that if any parties believed that subsequently accumulated evidence called for a different spacing order,3 the proper procedure was to petition the department for a change in spacing order no. 12, based on that evidence. The department’s decision would then be subject to review by this board. In this instance, we, therefore, limit ourselves to adjudicating the reasonableness of the department’s decision as of the date when it was made.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. Findings of fact nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of spacing order no. 12 are hereby affirmed, and we make the same findings of fact, to wit:

1. The testimony indicates that Pennzoil Company is the operator of the Canterbury Coal Well (ARM-1272) (hereinafter referred to as “Pennzoil R. R. #1 Well”) located on the 50-acre Canterbury Coal Lease situate in Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong County, Pa. The well was completed on December 11,1970, to a depth of 7,235 feet, obtaining production in the Onondaga Chert-Oriskany formations wherein the top of the Onondaga Chert is 7,042 feet, and the top of the Oriskany is at 7,194 feet, said well having an open flow of 2.170 MCF after fracture. To date the only production obtained from the Onondaga Chert-Oriskany formation is gas. Rock pressure was 3,915 psig in five days. The discovery of gas in the well has established the existence of an Onondaga Chert-Oriskany gas pool at the location and at the depths described.

[128]*1282. There have been four other wells drilled following the completion of the discovery well, these wells are as follows:

Pennzoil Company #1 ASCS Unit, Permit (ARM-1365), total depth 7,492 feet. Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong County.

J 8c J Enterprises, Inc. #1 Stringer, Permit (ARM-1482), total depth 7,430 feet. Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong County.

J 8c J Enterprises, Inc. #1 Chambers, Permit (ARM-1483), total depth 7,570 feet. Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong County.

Canterbury Coal Company C. C. #1, Fee, Permit (ARM-1453), total depth 7,210 feet. Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong County. (Hereinafter referred to as “Canterbury-Westrans Fee Well”).

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69 Pa. D. & C.2d 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/appeals-of-pennzoil-co-paenvhrbd-1974.