Appeals of Monty

• Court: Vermont Superior Court
• Decided: January 24, 2006
• Docket: 7-01-04 Vtec
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} Appeal of Monty } Docket Nos. 7‐1‐04 Vtec } 47‐3‐04 Vtec }

Decision and Order on pending Motion

Appellant‐Applicant Al Monty appealed from two decisions of the Town of

Barre (Town) Planning Commission denying Appellant‐Applicant’s two subdivision

permit applications. Appellant‐Applicant is represented by L. Brooke Dingledine, Esq.;

the Town as Appellee is represented by Bruce Bjornlund, Esq.; Interested Persons

Ronald Tremblay, Paula Tremblay, W. Scott Child, Sarah Child, Reginald Orvis, Nedra

Orvis, Robert Boulanger, Amy Boulanger, and Amy B. Boulanger (collectively

hereinafter referred to as “Interested Persons”) are represented by Robert Halpert, Esq.;

Interested Person Charles Desmarais represents himself.

Mr. Monty has moved for summary judgment on Question 1 of the Statement of

Questions in both appeals: “Whether the Town of Barre Planning Commission has

jurisdiction to deny a subdivision permit based upon the claim that the Applicant does

not have the right to install utilities in his 50’ private right‐of‐way?” No other pre‐trial

motions are now pending before this Court.

Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

1. By deed dated August 30, 1991, Appellant‐Applicant bought two of three

lots owned by a Mr. Giroux. The two lots bought by Appellant‐Applicant did not have

1 road frontage on Richardson Road.1 The August 30, 1991 deed reserved a fifty‐foot

easement across the lot retained by Giroux, which fronted on Richardson Road, in favor

of the two lots purchased by Appellant‐Applicant. The easement in this deed included

the right to lay utilities, but did not speak to access.

2. On September 24, 1991, a second deed was recorded, clarifying that

vehicular traffic was permitted across the fifty‐foot easement, and that the access was

limited for use by no more than two single‐family residences.

3. On September 1, 1994, Appellant‐Applicant purchased the remaining

third lot, adjacent to Richardson Road, from Giroux. Appellant‐Applicant now owned

the lot previously encumbered by the fifty‐foot easements that provided for both

vehicular and utility accesses to the two lots Appellant‐Applicant previously

purchased.

4. On January 12, 2000, Appellant‐Applicant received Planning Commission

approval to subdivide the lot with road frontage (i.e.: the lot he purchased on

September 1, 1994) into six lots.

5. Appellant‐Applicant sold the newly created Lot 10, containing the original

fifty‐foot easement, to Paula and Ronald Tremblay on June 7, 2001. The deed conveying

the land to the Tremblays contained the following language:

Said LOT #10 is conveyed subject to a fifty (50) foot wide right‐of‐way easement along the common boundary line between said LOT #10 and lands now or formerly owned by Orvis. Said right‐of‐way easement shall be for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian traffic from Richardson Road, so‐called, in the Town of Barre, to other lands and premises of the grantor herein.

6. This easement reservation made no mention regarding utilities.

The northerly‐most of the two lots purchased by Appellant‐Applicant has road frontage on School 1

Road. 2 7. On June 7, 2001, Appellant‐Applicant received Planning Commission

preliminary approval for his “Phase 4” subdivision permit application to subdivide the

two lots without road frontage on Richardson Road into four lots. Two of the new lots,

labeled Lots 17 and 18 on the “Phase 4 Site Plan” map with the handwritten date

“6/7/01”, were to be accessed via the fifty‐foot easement across the Tremblays’ parcel,

and the third, northerly‐most lot, labeled Lot 16 on the “Phase 4 Site Plan” map, had

direct access to School Road. Lot 16 was granted preliminary approval for

development, but Lots 17 and 18 had deferrals placed on them, pending the submission

of site plans for those two lots.

8. On July 23, 2001, the Planning Commission issued conditional final

approval to Appellant‐Applicant for his “Phase 4” four‐lot subdivision.

9. On August 5, 2003, Appellant‐Applicant filed his application (No.

P‐03‐08‐24) to create a new four‐lot subdivision, by further subdividing Lots 17 and 18

(i.e.: the two lots accessed by the fifty‐foot easement). The Planning Commission

deemed this application substantially complete on August 8, 2003.

10. The Planning Commission held a warned public hearing on subdivision

application No. P‐03‐08‐24 on November 12, 2003, at which time the Planning

Commission voted unanimously to deny the application. The Planning Commission

stated in its written decision of December 10, 2003 that the lots being proposed did not

conform with the Town’s Code of Ordinances, specifically Subdivision Regulations

§§ 202, § 401, and § 406(A); Zoning Ordinance Art. III, § 3.4(B) and Art. IV, § 4.7; and

Chapter 8, Article III, § 8‐82 of the Town Code. The basis of all these nonconformities

was the ambiguity or absence of an explicit right to lay sewer and utility lines from the

land‐locked lots to Richardson Road.

3 11. On January 8, 2004, Appellant‐Applicant appealed to this Court the

Planning Commission’s denial of his application for a four‐lot subdivision. This appeal

was assigned Docket No. 7‐1‐04 Vtec.

12. On December 24, 2003, Appellant‐Applicant filed an application, No.

P‐03‐12‐34, for revised final approval of the previously approved two‐lot subdivision.

The purpose of the request for revised final approval was to lift the deferral placed on

the two lots accessed by the fifty‐foot easement as part of the previous preliminary and

final approvals of the “Phase 4” subdivision.

13. On January 14, 2004, the Planning Commission held a warned public

hearing on Appellant‐Applicant’s application for revised final approval of the

previously approved two‐lot subdivision, No. P‐03‐12‐34. The Planning Commission

voted unanimously to deny the application and issued its written decision on February

11, 2004. The Planning Commission again provided as explanation for its denial that

the lots proposed for development would be nonconforming, due to the ambiguity

concerning the easement.

14. On March 12, 2004, Appellant‐Applicant appealed the Planning

Commission’s denial of his application for revised final approval of a two‐lot

subdivision to this Court. This appeal was assigned Docket No. 47‐3‐04 Vtec.

Discussion

On December 10, 2003, in Docket No. 7‐1‐04 Vtec, the Planning Commission

denied Appellant‐Applicant’s application for a four‐lot subdivision of two lots (Lots 17

and 18 in the “Phase 4” site plan map), located south‐easterly of the intersection of

Richardson Road and School Road in Barre. On February 11, 2004, the Planning

Commission denied Appellant‐Applicant’s application for revised final approval to

develop Lots 17 and 18, which had deferrals placed on them at earlier stages of the

permitting process. None of these lots have road frontage. 4 Appellant‐Applicant proposes that access to the lots for vehicular and pedestrian

traffic and for sewage and utility lines will travel across the fifty‐foot right‐of‐way

easement Appellant‐Applicant retained when he sold the land lying between the lots

and Richardson Road to Interested Persons Ronald and Paula Tremblay. In its denial of

both applications, the Planning Commission found that there was “ambiguity as to

sewer service” and that therefore Appellant‐Applicant had not met his burden of

showing compliance with the Town’s subdivision regulations.

It appears that Appellant‐Applicant has created his own quandary by selling the

land between his proposed subdivision and Richardson Road, without retaining a clear

right to lay utilities and sewer lines across the sold land. In fact, Appellant‐Applicant

does not appear to offer any specific evidence to support his apparent assertion that he

has the right to lay the proposed utilities in the right of way he retained when he

conveyed the encumbered parcel to the Tremblays. In drafting the easement he

retained, he made specific mention of access, but no mention of the right to lay sewer or

utility lines. Given the history of this easement, and the previous specific reference to

sewer and utility line usage within it, we cannot disregard the omission in Appellant’s

present applications of any specific authority to lay sewer and utility lines over

property owned by an abutter.

Appellant‐Applicant offers no authority to use the retained right of way as he

proposes. His position does not appear to this Court to be much different than that of

an applicant who proposes to develop property that he does not own, and to which he

has no other right.

Any applicant bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the Town’s

Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations, including Subdivision Regulations

§ 415(A), which states that “[w]here inclusion of utilities are not to be in the street right‐

of‐way, a perpetual, unobstructed easement shall be provided with satisfactory access

5 to the street.” Regulations § 415(A). The Planning Commission based both denials on a

finding that the plans submitted by Appellant‐Applicant were ambiguous as to sewer

service. The Commission therefore concluded that Appellant‐Applicant had not carried

his burden of showing compliance with the applicable regulations.

Appellant‐Applicant argues that the Planning Commission exceeded its

jurisdiction when it went beyond an uncritical acceptance of his plans by questioning

whether utilities and sewer lines could in fact be located in the fifty‐foot right‐of‐way

easement. Appellant‐Applicant attempts to distinguish our holding in Appeal of Cole,

Docket No. 174‐10‐01 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., May 12, 2003), on the ground that while the

subdivision regulations at issue in Cole “required access by a private street, permanent

easement or right‐of‐way. . . .[n]o such right‐of‐way requirement exists in the Barre

Town Ordinances.” Appellant‐Applicant’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3. However, as noted

above, the Barre Town Subdivision Regulations require at § 415(A) that “[w]here

inclusion of utilities are not to be in the street right‐of‐way, a perpetual, unobstructed

easement shall be provided with satisfactory access to the street.” As Lots 17 and 18 do

not have street frontage, the easement requirement for utility access in § 415(A) applies.

This Court has previously addressed the delicate balance between assuring that

applicants meet their threshold burden of proving compliance with the applicable

municipal regulations and our lack of jurisdiction over property rights disputes. In

addition to the Cole case, this Court has recently commented on this same legal issue in

the following two appeals: Appeal of Van Nostrand, Docket Nos. 209‐11‐04 Vtec and

101‐5‐05 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Jan. 13, 2006) (“[T]he Environmental Court is not vested

with the jurisdiction to determine the parties’ respective private property rights to land

or easements that benefit or encroach upon their property, including the extent of the

right‐of‐way’s use. We intend only to determine whether Appellant‐Applicants have

met their threshold burden of evidencing their interest and right in the property for

6 their proposed development. Any further claims to title, or claims attacking the same,

must be presented to the appropriate Superior Court for adjudication.”); and Appeal of

Bowman, Docket No. 70‐5‐90 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., June 21, 2005) (“Although the

Environmental Court does have jurisdiction to determine whether a permit applicant

has met all the requirements of the zoning ordinance, including whether the permit

applicants have met their burden of proof that they have access to their property over

an easement of a certain minimum width, it does not have jurisdiction to determine the

underlying property rights of the affected parties.”). We see no reason in these appeals

to differ in our analysis.

In the present appeals, neither the Planning Commission, nor this Court, has

jurisdiction to determine the attributes of Appellant‐Applicant’s right‐of‐way easement,

including whether Appellant‐Applicant has the right to lay utility and sewer lines to his

proposed development. In the proceedings below, the Planning Commission did not

determine that Appellant‐Applicant lacked the right to lay utility and sewer lines in his

right‐of‐way easement. Rather, the Planning Commission based its denials on

Appellant‐Applicant’s failure to show that his lots had the sewer and utility access

required by Regulations § 415(A).

A determination that an applicant has not demonstrated the existence of the

required access is not a determination no such access exists. Because the Planning

Commission did not determine the property rights of Appellant‐Applicant in relation to

abutters, but rather determined that Appellant‐Applicant had not carried his threshold

burden of showing compliance with the Subdivision Regulations, the Planning

Commission acted within its jurisdiction.

Based upon the evidence presented in this proceeding, we have made our own

independent determination that Appellant‐Applicant has thus far failed to meet his

threshold burden of presenting evidence that his proposed subdivision complies with

7 the dictates of Regulations § 415(A). We therefore determine that Appellant‐

Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied by answering his first

Question in the affirmative: an appropriate municipal panel does have the authority to

deny an application based upon a determination that an applicant has not met their

threshold burden of showing compliance with applicable ordinance provisions.

There remains some question as to how Appellant‐Applicant intends to meet his

threshold burden at a de novo merits hearing before this Court. To the extent that

Appellant‐Applicant does not intend to present further evidence of his proposed

development’s compliance with Regulations § 415(A), we ask that he immediately give

notice of the same to all parties and this Court. In the event that no new evidence will

be presented, the Court will entertain a motion to dismiss these appeals.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED

that the Appellant‐Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This matter

shall now proceed to a hearing on the merits, which shall be scheduled pursuant to

separate notice by the Court Manager.

Done at Berlin, Vermont, this 24th day of January, 2006.

__________________________________________ Thomas S. Durkin, Environmental Judge