Appeal of the City of Portsmouth

855 A.2d 483, 151 N.H. 170, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 111
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire
DecidedJune 25, 2004
DocketNo. 2003-547
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 855 A.2d 483 (Appeal of the City of Portsmouth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Appeal of the City of Portsmouth, 855 A.2d 483, 151 N.H. 170, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 111 (N.H. 2004).

Opinion

Dalianis, J.

The City of Portsmouth (Portsmouth) appeals the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (Board) decision upholding the department of revenue administration’s (DRA) determination that approximately $1.2 million in revenue received by Portsmouth from the Pease Development Authority (PDA) airport district is a “payment in lieu of taxes” (PILOT) and, therefore, is includable in the calculation of Portsmouth’s 2002 total equalized valuation. We reverse.

The New Hampshire legislature established the PDA to convert and redevelop the former Pease Air Force Base, which is located in Portsmouth and the towns of Newington and Greenland, “for the benefit of the affected communities, the seacoast region, and the state.” RSA 12-G:1, III (2003); see RSA ch. 12-G (Supp. 2003). The federal government transferred title of Pease Air Force Base to the PDA pursuant to the Federal Surplus Property Act of 1944. See RSA 12-G:2, I(a); see also 49 U.S.C.§ 47107 (2003).

A portion of the property transferred to the PDA is identified as the airport district. See RSA 12-G:2, I. The airport district is located in both Portsmouth and Newington and is exempt from State and local property taxation. See RSA 12-G:14, I. Portsmouth began providing police, fire and public works services to the airport district in 1993; since that time, the PDA has paid Portsmouth for those services.

Initially, the PDA paid a flat rate per square foot of building area for the services. In 1998, the PDA and Portsmouth entered into a written Municipal Services Agreement (Agreement), which contained a new method of calculating payment for the services. The Agreement states that Portsmouth provides certain municipal services to the PDA airport district and, in return, the PDA “eompensate[s] [Portsmouth] fairly, for providing the [services].” The Agreement provides for the PDA to pay a municipal services fee to Portsmouth in “an amount equal to the amount that would have been paid annually as ad valorem taxes but excluding any school tax component in respect to such property.” Newington provides police services to the portion of the airport district that is located within its boundaries, although the PDA makes payments only to Portsmouth for the services. Portsmouth then reimburses Newington based upon the time [172]*172Newington police spend in the airport district. Portsmouth provides all other services to the entire airport district.

From the inception of the PDA until 2002, Portsmouth, the PDA and the DRA treated money paid by the PDA to Portsmouth for municipal services in the airport district as revenue not included in the calculation of Portsmouth’s total equalized valuation. Thus, payments made pursuant to the Agreement were not considered PILOTs, because PILOTs are included in a municipality’s total equalized valuation. The revenue Portsmouth collected from the PDA for the non-airport district property, however, was consistently reported to the DRA as a PILOT and considered in its total equalized valuation.

By notice dated May 22, 2003, the DRA revised and increased Portsmouth’s 2002 total equalized valuation by $67,614,510. The DRA increased the total equalized valuation upon determination, for the first time, that approximately $1.2 million in revenue paid to Portsmouth by the PDA airport district should be considered a PILOT within the meaning of RSA 21-J:3, XIII (Supp. 2003). RSA 21-J:3 directs the DRA to include “payments in lieu of taxes as may be equitable and just” when equalizing the valuation of the property assessed. The statute does not provide a definition of PILOTs, however, and the DRA concedes that there “is no general definition for ‘payment in lieu of taxes.’” This term and similar terms are used in other legislation to refer to payments to municipalities for tax-exempt property made instead of real property taxes. See RSA 72:11 (2003); RSA 72:23-n (2003); RSA 203:22 (2000); RSA 162-A:24 (2002); RSA 374-B:14 (1995). We have upheld agreements and statutes authorizing PILOTs. See Lower Village Hydroelectric Assocs. v. City of Claremont, 147 N.H. 73 (2001); Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Elec. Util. Personal Prop., 144 N.H. 374 (1999).

Portsmouth appealed the DRA’s determination to the Board, arguing that the airport district revenue is not a PILOT and, therefore, should not be included in its total equalized valuation.

The Board reviewed whether the revenue from the PDA airport district is a PILOT or, in the alternative, a payment for services pursuant to a contract between Portsmouth and the PDA. The Board based its decision upon the premise that “PILOTs ... generally refer to sums paid by an otherwise tax exempt property owner ... to a municipality to compensate for the burdens of providing basic municipal services such as police and fire protection.” Additionally, the Board found that RSA 12-G:14, Ill’s references to the airport district revenue reveal that it is “more indicative of a PILOT than some alternative form of municipal revenue,” such as a contractual payment. The Board affirmed the DRA’s determination that the airport district revenue should be treated as a PILOT, except that the [173]*173amount Portsmouth paid to Newington for police services should be excluded.

On appeal, Portsmouth argues that the DRA erred by including the airport district revenue in the total equalized valuation because that revenue is not a PILOT, but rather a municipal services fee pursuant to a contract for services voluntarily entered into by the PDA and Portsmouth.

Portsmouth has the burden of showing that the Board’s decision is clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of the Board upon questions of fact shall be deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable. See Appeal of Land Acquisition, 145 N.H. 492, 496 (2000).

We first address the Board’s recognition of PILOTs as “sums paid by an otherwise tax exempt property owner ... to a municipality to compensate for the burdens of providing basic municipal services such as police and fire protection.” We find this general definition of PILOTs persuasive.

PILOTs, within the meaning of RSA 21-J:3, XIII, involve tax-exempt property for which a municipality must provide basic municipal services. The municipality necessarily incurs the costs of providing such services without receiving compensation through payment of real estate taxes. PILOTs offset the losses incurred by the municipality. Cf. RSA 72:23-j, :23-k (2003) (the owner of the tax exempt property “shall enter into an agreement with the municipality in which the property is situated to pay the municipality ... a sum in lieu of taxes to defray the costs of municipal, non-utility, services”); RSA 162-A.-24 (tenants of tax exempt property shall pay “in lieu of such taxes ... to the municipality in which the property is located, for its just share of the public expense, including, but not limited to, education, highway maintenance, fire and police protection and other similar public expenses and governmental services”).

PILOTs may be equivalent to a “sum representing ten percent of the shelter rent received by the owner,” RSA 72:23-d to :23-k (2003); an amount consistent with the maintenance of the property, see RSA 203:22; an agreed upon amount between the property owner and the municipality, see Lower Village Hydroelectric Assocs., 147 N.H.

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855 A.2d 483, 151 N.H. 170, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/appeal-of-the-city-of-portsmouth-nh-2004.