Appeal of Stuart L. Richards (Decision and Order after Remand)

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedNovember 7, 2003
Docket236-12-99 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Appeal of Stuart L. Richards (Decision and Order after Remand) (Appeal of Stuart L. Richards (Decision and Order after Remand)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Appeal of Stuart L. Richards (Decision and Order after Remand), (Vt. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

Appeal of Stuart L. Richards } } } Docket No. 236-12-99 Vtec } }

Decision and Order after Remand

Appellant Stuart L. Richards appealed from a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Norwich, granting a permit to Paul Nowicki for the construction of a single-family residence at 84 Elm Street. In the proceedings after the partial remand resulting from the Vermont Supreme Court= s decision in In re Appeal of Richards, 13 Vt.L.W. 265 (2002), Appellant is represented by John D. Hansen, Esq.; Appellee-Applicant Paul Nowicki is represented by John C. Candon, Esq. and Laura O= Connor Shepard, Esq.; and the Town of Norwich is represented by Gary R. Wieland, Esq. Sixteen individuals had entered their appearance in the original proceedings as interested parties in opposition to the grant of the permit, but these interested parties did not participate in the proceedings after remand and were removed as parties.

The only issue in the proceedings after remand is whether the parcels of property with the addresses of 76 Elm Street and 84 Elm Street in the Town of Norwich are functionally separated by the right-of-way running to Appellant= s property at 82 Elm Street, so that they A cannot be used in the ordinary manner as a single lot@ under the analysis in Wilcox v. Town of Manchester, 159 Vt. 193, 197 (1992). Wilcox discussed that the common ownership of two contiguous lots does not necessarily merge them, nor does separation of two contiguous lots by a right-of-way necessarily make them separate lots. Rather, it must be a case-by-case determination on the facts of the particular case.

An evidentiary hearing was held on that issue before Merideth Wright, Environmental Judge, who also took a new site visit alone, by agreement of the parties. The parties were given the opportunity to submit written requests for findings and memoranda of law. Upon consideration of the evidence, the site visit, and the proposed findings and memoranda, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

Appellee-Applicant= s property at 76 Elm Street (also referred to in prior litigation as Parcel 1) is a preexisting undersized parcel that contains an existing old house, remodeled under a zoning permit not at issue in the present case, with frontage on and direct access to Elm Street.

Appellee-Applicant= s property at 84 Elm Street (also referred to in prior litigation as Parcel 2) is a conforming lot that formerly had contained a house (demolished in 1967) and now contains the house at issue in the present permit litigation. It was vacant at the time the permit application was made. The 84 Elm Street property has frontage on Elm Street and has access to Elm Street by a driveway or private road running on its property along the boundary with the 76 Elm Street property. As the other boundary of 84 Elm Street is Blood Brook, and as Elm Street slopes steeply downward from the driveway to Blood Brook, it would not be possible to relocate the driveway to run near the brook boundary of the 84 Elm Street property (even if state laws regarding streams would allow such a relocation).

Appellant= s property at 82 Elm Street lies behind the 76 and 84 Elm Street properties and has no frontage on Elm Street. It has access to Elm Street by the right-of-way running on the 84 Elm Street property. The 76 Elm Street property adjoins the right-of-way running along the 84 Elm Street property along the complete length of their common boundary.

The 76 Elm Street property belonged to an unrelated owner in 1943 when the Watermans, who owned the remaining property, created the 82 Elm Street parcel and reserved for themselves the 84 Elm Street property, creating the right-of-way over their > front= property to the 82 Elm Street > back= parcel.

In 1967, when the house on the 84 Elm Street property was demolished, the then-owner of the 76 Elm Street parcel (Macdonald) and the then-owner of the 82 Elm Street parcel (Smith) owned the 84 Elm Street parcel in common. They conveyed the 84 Elm Street parcel solely to Macdonald, subject to several conditions, including Macdonald= s agreement that she would not convey the 84 Elm Street parcel separately from conveying the 76 Elm Street parcel, without first offering the 84 Elm Street parcel for sale to Smith or her successors in title, and that she could build a new house on the 84 Elm Street parcel. However, she had not done so by the time Appellee-Applicant acquired both parcels, and that deeded right is unrelated to the respective rights of the parties under the zoning regulations.

The right-of-way is described in Appellant= s 1984 deed as A a certain right-of-way for every purpose, supposedly dedicated to public use,@ although the right-of-way remains a private road or driveway and has not been dedicated to the Town.

The right-of-way was the subject of litigation between the parties, which settled it as 20 feet in width, of which an approximately 10-foot-wide driveway is paved, plus a paved backing-up area (also referred to in the evidence as a > turnaround= ) near Elm Street. Appellant= s property has rights to use the paved portion of right-of-way for ingress and egress, plus the right to use the so- called turnaround for A overflow, secondary parking, or ancillary uses.@ Vehicular access to the rear basement entrance and rear yard of the 76 Elm Street property1 is much more convenient with access from the right-of-way than through the 8-foot-wide side setback on the other side of the 76 Elm Street house, but access for propane deliveries and moving trucks would be adequate by use of the front parking area and front entrances to the 76 Elm Street house. That is, while occasional use of the right-of-way is convenient for the management and use of the 76 Elm Street parcel, it is not necessary or essential.

The three properties generally slope from the height of land at the 76 Elm Street property down across the 84 Elm Street property towards Blood Brook, an elevation difference of approximately eighteen feet, and also slope down more gently away from Elm Street towards Appellant= s property, which is also bounded by Blood Brook. The ground floor of the 76 Elm Street house is at an elevation well above the elevation of the right-of-way and is supported by an approximately three-foot high stone retaining wall extending back from Elm Street to behind the house. The rear basement door of the house opens out at approximately the same elevation as the right-of- way.

The right-of-way formerly had a > hump= in it, near the rear of the 76 Elm Street house, that prevented good visibility down to Appellant= s end of it for vehicles and pedestrians turning onto it from Elm Street or crossing it from the 76 Elm Street house. Appellee-Applicant had material removed from the right-of-way to minimize this > hump= and improve visibility, and then repaved the right-of-way so that the driveway remained in the same plan-view location, but at a somewhat lower elevation and more gradual slope. That driveway work was the subject of superior court litigation between the parties that resulted in a consent order governing the location, pavement quality and width, upkeep, future maintenance, and use of the driveway for vehicular traffic and as an easement for a municipal water line.

In the present case, the parties focused their evidence on whether the 76 Elm Street parcel could or could not be used for its intended residential purposes without using the right-of-way on the 84 Elm Street parcel. We find that it can be used without the use of the right-of-way. However, under the Wilcox analysis, the question is not whether the parcels are capable of being used separately, but whether they are incapable of being used together, A in the ordinary manner as a single > lot,= @ due to the existence of the driveway and right-of-way.

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Related

Wilcox v. Village of Manchester Zoning Board of Adjustment
616 A.2d 1137 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1992)

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