Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.

255 F. Supp. 3d 604
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided June 8, 2017·No. CIVIL ACTION No. 2:06-cv-2768, CIVIL ACTION No. 2:10-cv-5164, CIVIL ACTION No. 2:09-cv-3956, CIVIL ACTION No. 2:09-cv-3820·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Goldberg, District Judge

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 186 L.Ed.2d 343 (2013), the Supreme Court wrestled .with the complexities of how a reverse-payment patent litigation settle[607]*607ment fits within an antitrust context. Ultimately concluding that a rule of reason analysis applies, the - Court stressed that the “structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation” must be left to the trial court. This Opinion sets forth such a structure where the relevant patent is found to be invalid and not infringed several years after the reverse-payment settlement agreements were executed.

After careful consideration and noting that there is no precedential guidance on this issue, T conclude that prior findings of patent invalidity "and non-infringement made after the reverse-payment settlement agreements are irrelevant to a rule of reason analysis. However, I conclude that the prior patent ruling is relevant to Plaintiffs’ antitrust causation showing and, in this context, the ruling is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The case before me involves allegations that four reverse-payment settlement agreements entered into by a brand-name drug manufacturer, Cephalon, Inc., and four generic drug companies constitute antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.1 Plaintiffs claim that these settlement agreements were executed for the purpose of delaying competition from generic versions of the brand-name pharmaceutical, Provigil. Defendants, signatories to the settlement agreements, maintain that the agreements were pro-competitive and legitimate settlements of litigation involving Provigil and its related patent.

As a result of various settlements and the procedural postures of other related cases, the only plaintiffs who will participate in the upcoming trial are Apotex, Inc,, a generic competitor, and a group of owners and operators of retail pharmacies. Over the course of this litigation, these plaintiffs have been referred to as “Individual Plaintiffs,” “Retailer Plaintiffs,” “Opt-Out Plaintiffs” and “Merchant Plaintiffs.” The only defendants in the upcoming trial are. generic manufacturers Mylan and Ranbaxy.2

a. Relevant Regulatory Background

Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxraan Act, generic manufacturers are permitted to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) when seeking approval from the Food and Drug Administration to market a generic version of an approved drug. .An ANDA filer is able to adopt the safety and efficacy studies that the FDA previously approved in connection with a brand-name drug’s New Drug Application. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

In filing an ANDA, a generic manufacturer must demonstrate that,its generic product and the approved brand-name drug share the same active ingredients and are bioequivalent. As to any patents covering the brand-name drug, the generic [608]*608manufacturer must certify: (1) that the relevant patent information has not been filed with the FDA; (2) that any such patent has expired; (3) the date that such patent will expire; or (4) “that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by , the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.” Id. at 1282-83 ■ (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)). If a generic manufacturer seeks to market a generic drug prior to the expiration of patents covering the brand drug, it must file a certification under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) — i.e., a “Paragraph IV certification.” Id. at 1283. The filing of a Paragraph IV ANDA constitutes an act of patent infringement, often prompting’ the patent holder to file a lawsuit. Actavis 133 S.Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)).

If the patent holder files an infringement lawsuit, within forty-five days of á generic manufacturer’s,ANDA filing, the FDA is barred from approving the generic’s ANDA for a period of thirty months. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If the case is resolved during the thirty month stay, the FDA will take action on the ANDA consistent with the court’s judgment. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2228. However, if the case is not resolved during that period, the FDA may approve the ANDA, at which point the generic company decides whether to sell its product “at-risk” of incurring damages should the infringement case result in a judgment in favor of the patent holder. Id.

b. Relevant Factual Background

■ Cephalon held U.S. Reissue Patent No. 37,516 (RE ’516) claiming a specific formulation of modafinil — a molecule with wakefulness-promoting properties. The RE ’516 patent covered Cephalon’s drug, Provigil, and, when combined with a number of FDA regulatory exclusivity periods Ce-phalon had obtained, it had the potential to protect Provigil from generic competition through April 6,2015.

On December 24, 2002, the first day allowed by law, the Generic- Defendants sought permission from the FDA to market generic versions of Provigil. In doing so, the four generic drug manufacturers filed Paragraph IV certifications attesting that the RE ’516 patent was either invalid or not infringed by their proposed generic Provigil products. In response to these certifications, Cephalon filed suit against the Generic Defendants for patent infringement. The parties have referred to these lawsuits as the “Paragraph IV litigation.” ,,.

Between December 2005 and February 2006, the Paragraph IV litigation settled, with Cephalon paying the Generic Defendants millions of dollars in return for various business arrangements and, most importantly for purposes of this case, promises from each of the Generic Defendants to drop their respective invalidity contentions and not market a generic version of Provigil until April 6, 2012.

Pursuant to another provision of the Hatch-Waxmari Act, no other company could sell generic Provigil until six months after the settling Generic Defendants began to market their versions. Thus, in order to be allowed to enter the market sooner, a competing generic — here, Apo-tex — would need to receive a court determination that the RE ’516 patent was invalid or not infringed.

In the cases before me, the Federal Trade Commission, two putative classes of plaintiffs, the Retailer Plaintiffs and Apo-tex brought Actavis antitrust claims against all Defendants. Apotex also brought claims for Walker Process fraud and sham litigation against Cephalon and also sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the RE ’516 Patent.

[609]*609Appreciating that resolution of the antitrust claims could take many years, I commenced a patent trial in 2011.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 604 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

255 F. Supp. 3d 604 (Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related