UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
APOLLO D. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-10324
v. Honorable Susan K. DeClercq United States District Judge SCHAEFFER, et al.,
Defendants. _____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
In this case, Plaintiff Apollo D. Johnson, presently confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility in Lenox Township, Michigan in 2025, several Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officers verbally harassed him and retaliated against him. ECF No. 1. Johnson names MDOC Officers Schaeffer and Perry (first names unknown), Deputy Warden Robin Howard, and Warden Jeff Tanner as defendants in this case. Id. Johnson sues Schaeffer and Perry in their individual capacities and sues Howard and Tanner in their official capacities, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from each of them. Id. This Court granted Johnson leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). ECF No. 4. I. LEGAL STANDARD Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), a federal district
court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Because Johnson proceeds pro se, his pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and are liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even so, Johnson is not immune from compliance with the Civil Rules.
His complaint must still set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), one that would “give the defendant[s] fair notice” of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Further, his complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (holding that the Civil Rule 12(b)(6) standard also applies to dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). II. DISCUSSION
A. Verbal Harassment Claims Johnson’s complaint contains allegations of verbal harassment and threats by one or more of the defendants. See ECF No. 1. But any§ 1983 claims based on these allegations must be dismissed because verbal harassment is not a constitutional
violation and thus cannot be the basis for a §1983 claim. See Wingo v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Verbal harassment or idle threats by a state actor do not create a constitutional violation and are insufficient to support
a section 1983 claim.”); Montgomery v. Harper, No. 5:14-CV-P38-R, 2014 WL 4104163, *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2014) (“[H]arassing or degrading language by a prison official, while unprofessional and despicable, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). In this way, Johnson’s § 1983 claims based upon verbal
harassment and threats do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so these claims must be dismissed. B. Claims Against Howard and Tanner
Some of Johnson’s remaining claims must also be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Johnson sues Deputy Warden Howard and Warden Tanner, who are both employees of the State of Michigan, in their official capacities and
seeks only monetary damages as relief. See ECF No. 1. But the Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights actions against a State and its agencies and departments unless the State has waived its immunity and consented to suit or Congress has
abrogated that immunity. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state employees who are sued in their official capacities. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)).“The State of Michigan . . .
has not consented to being sued in civil rights actions in the federal courts,” Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986)), and Congress did not abrogate state sovereign
immunity when it passed § 1983. Chaz Const., LLC v. Codell, 137 F. App’x 735, 743 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief against a state and its agencies,” McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thiokol
Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993)), but does not preclude prospective injunctive relief. McCormick, 693 F.3d at 662 (citing McKey v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Because Howard and Tanner are employees of the State of Michigan who are only sued in their official capacities for monetary damages, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Johnson, 357 F.3d at 545. Johnson’s
allegations against Howard and Tanner must therefore be dismissed. C. Remaining Claims Johnson’s remaining claims against Corrections Officers Schaeffer and Perry
alleging retaliation (in various forms), construed liberally, state potential, plausible claims for relief under § 1983.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
APOLLO D. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-10324
v. Honorable Susan K. DeClercq United States District Judge SCHAEFFER, et al.,
Defendants. _____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
In this case, Plaintiff Apollo D. Johnson, presently confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility in Lenox Township, Michigan in 2025, several Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officers verbally harassed him and retaliated against him. ECF No. 1. Johnson names MDOC Officers Schaeffer and Perry (first names unknown), Deputy Warden Robin Howard, and Warden Jeff Tanner as defendants in this case. Id. Johnson sues Schaeffer and Perry in their individual capacities and sues Howard and Tanner in their official capacities, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from each of them. Id. This Court granted Johnson leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). ECF No. 4. I. LEGAL STANDARD Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), a federal district
court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Because Johnson proceeds pro se, his pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and are liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even so, Johnson is not immune from compliance with the Civil Rules.
His complaint must still set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), one that would “give the defendant[s] fair notice” of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Further, his complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (holding that the Civil Rule 12(b)(6) standard also applies to dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). II. DISCUSSION
A. Verbal Harassment Claims Johnson’s complaint contains allegations of verbal harassment and threats by one or more of the defendants. See ECF No. 1. But any§ 1983 claims based on these allegations must be dismissed because verbal harassment is not a constitutional
violation and thus cannot be the basis for a §1983 claim. See Wingo v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Verbal harassment or idle threats by a state actor do not create a constitutional violation and are insufficient to support
a section 1983 claim.”); Montgomery v. Harper, No. 5:14-CV-P38-R, 2014 WL 4104163, *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2014) (“[H]arassing or degrading language by a prison official, while unprofessional and despicable, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). In this way, Johnson’s § 1983 claims based upon verbal
harassment and threats do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so these claims must be dismissed. B. Claims Against Howard and Tanner
Some of Johnson’s remaining claims must also be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Johnson sues Deputy Warden Howard and Warden Tanner, who are both employees of the State of Michigan, in their official capacities and
seeks only monetary damages as relief. See ECF No. 1. But the Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights actions against a State and its agencies and departments unless the State has waived its immunity and consented to suit or Congress has
abrogated that immunity. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state employees who are sued in their official capacities. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)).“The State of Michigan . . .
has not consented to being sued in civil rights actions in the federal courts,” Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986)), and Congress did not abrogate state sovereign
immunity when it passed § 1983. Chaz Const., LLC v. Codell, 137 F. App’x 735, 743 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief against a state and its agencies,” McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thiokol
Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993)), but does not preclude prospective injunctive relief. McCormick, 693 F.3d at 662 (citing McKey v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Because Howard and Tanner are employees of the State of Michigan who are only sued in their official capacities for monetary damages, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Johnson, 357 F.3d at 545. Johnson’s
allegations against Howard and Tanner must therefore be dismissed. C. Remaining Claims Johnson’s remaining claims against Corrections Officers Schaeffer and Perry
alleging retaliation (in various forms), construed liberally, state potential, plausible claims for relief under § 1983. Consequently, those claims against those two defendants survive the Court’s initial screening process and are not subject to dismissal at this time.
III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Johnson’s § 1983 claims against Defendants based upon allegations of verbal harassment and threats are
SUMMARILY DISMISSED. Further, it is ORDERED that Johnson’s claims against Defendant Howard and Defendant Tanner are SUMMARILY DISMISSED. This is not a final order and does not close the above-captioned case.
/s/Susan K. DeClercq SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ United States District Judge Dated: May 8, 2026