Apodaca-Benitez v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 10, 2026
Docket23-217
StatusUnpublished

This text of Apodaca-Benitez v. Bondi (Apodaca-Benitez v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Apodaca-Benitez v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ENRIQUE APODACA-BENITEZ, No. 23-217 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-014-735 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BERZON, CALLAHAN, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Jose Enrique Apodaca-Benitez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his

appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s findings of fact and final

discretionary determination as to whether to grant cancellation of removal.

Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Wilkinson v.

Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024)). However, we may review whether the agency

erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a

given set of facts for substantial evidence. Id. “Because the BIA expressed

agreement with the reasoning of the IJ, [we] review[] both the IJ and the BIA’s

decisions.” Hernandez v. Garland, 38 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013)).

To demonstrate the required hardship, a noncitizen must show hardship “that

is substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected

from the deportation of a [noncitizen] with close family members here.” Gonzalez-

Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006 (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65

(BIA 2001)). In making this determination, the agency “evaluates ‘the ages,

health, and circumstances’ of qualifying relatives.” Id. (quoting Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63). We review the agency’s hardship determination

for substantial evidence. See id. at 1005. “Under this standard, we must uphold

the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”

Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).

2 23-217 1. Apodaca first argues that the agency failed to consider all the evidence in

determining whether his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship if he were removed. Specifically, Apodaca argues that

the agency failed to consider: (1) exacerbating factors that support a finding of

hardship, including his children’s ages, financial situation, and academic needs and

aspirations; (2) evidence of immense economic disparity between Mexico and the

United States; and (3) Apodaca’s partner’s ability to adequately provide for their

children on her own.

A review of the record demonstrates that the agency considered all these

exacerbating factors, including Apodaca’s children’s ages, educational aspirations

and challenges, and the family’s financial situation. The agency also considered

evidence of economic disparity between Mexico and the United States,

determining that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that [Apodaca] cannot

obtain work in Mexico to continue to support his family,” and that “there was [] no

evidence presented to establish that [Apodaca] cannot secure employment in

Mexico and continue to provide for his children.” To the extent that Apodaca

challenges this factual finding, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See Wilkinson,

601 U.S. at 225.

Further the agency considered Apodaca’s partner’s ability to provide for

their children, recognizing that Apodaca’s “partner is not employed,” that Apodaca

3 23-217 was the “breadwinner,” and that Apodaca’s absence would result in financial

hardship given his partner’s unemployment. Nonetheless the agency concluded

that Apodaca and his partner “have familial ties in this country who could assist

[with] the [] children.” To the extent Apodaca challenges this factual finding, we

lack jurisdiction to review it. See id. Finally, the record makes clear that the

agency did consider Apodaca’s children’s academic needs and aspirations in its

analysis despite Apodaca’s assertion otherwise.

These findings by the agency regarding educational and financial harm

support with substantial evidence its determination that Apodaca failed to

demonstrate the requisite level of harm for cancellation of removal. In Gonzalez-

Juarez, for example, this court found substantial evidence supported the denial of

cancellation of removal where the agency similarly addressed lost educational

opportunities and financial hardship that would result from the petitioner’s

deportation. 137 F.4th at 1008. Accordingly, we conclude that the agency did not

err in finding that the asserted hardships failed to meet the cancellation of removal

standard.

2. Apodaca next argues that the agency “erred in concluding that the

identified hardships did not meet [the cancellation of removal] standard” because it

did not consider how the permanent bar to re-entry triggered by Apodaca’s

previous entries and departure would prolong his children’s hardship. This

4 23-217 argument, premised on a contention that the agency failed to “conduct a proper

analysis of how Mr. Apodaca’s removal would result in ongoing hardship for his

children,” lacks merit.

The IJ’s thorough analysis of Apodaca’s testimony to determine whether the

hardship standard was met contemplated ongoing and future harm. The IJ noted

that Apodaca’s “absence from the home will mean marked decline in the family’s

ability to take care of expenses.” The IJ’s analysis also contemplated Apodaca’s

continued presence in Mexico, as it noted twice that the record is devoid of

evidence that Apodaca cannot continue to support his family from Mexico. The

BIA adopted this reasoning in its decision dismissing Apodaca’s appeal.

Therefore, we conclude that the agency’s determination that the identified

hardships failed to meet the cancellation of removal standard is supported by

substantial evidence.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1

1 The motion for stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.

5 23-217

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Related

Vijay Kumar v. Eric H. Holder Jr.
728 F.3d 993 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Jose Duran-Rodriguez v. William Barr
918 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
MONREAL
23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2001)
Manuel Hernandez v. Merrick Garland
38 F.4th 785 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi
137 F.4th 996 (Ninth Circuit, 2025)

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