Aoun v. City of Las Vegas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 7, 2025
• Docket: 24-1537
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VANESSA AOUN, No. 24-1537 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-01751-GMN-EJY v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF LAS VEGAS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 2, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Vanessa Aoun (“Aoun”) appeals the grant of summary judgment in

favor of the City of Las Vegas (“City”) in her Title VII action alleging gender

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). discrimination and retaliation.1 We review the summary judgment grant de novo,

Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.

Aoun claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her

gender. To establish a prima facie case, Aoun was required to show (1) she was

subject to verbal or physical harassment because of her gender, (2) the conduct was

objectively and subjectively offensive, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe

or pervasive “to alter the conditions of employment.” Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter.,

Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc.,

147 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998)). However, Aoun’s list of complaints about the

City being “nit-picky,” “unjustly critical,” and supervising her more closely than

warranted fail to demonstrate that her disciplinary actions had anything to do with

her gender. She claims she was treated more harshly than her co-workers but

identifies no male co-worker who was treated differently. She points to a single

comment a co-worker made before March 2020 that a male Administrative Support

Assistant (“ASA”) could do the job better than her. As the district court held, this

single comment was “not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

Plaintiff’s employment and was made before the relevant time period in this

litigation.”

1 Although Aoun initially also brought claims alleging age and disability discrimination, in her opening brief she expressly waives any argument regarding these claims.

2 24-1537 Aoun also claims her lateral transfer to the Floyd Lamb Gatehouse was an

adverse employment action in retaliation for making complaints about a hostile work

environment and expressing fear she would be retaliated against for taking medical

leave. To show retaliation, Aoun needed to establish (1) she engaged in protected

activity, (2) her employer subjected her to adverse employment action and (3) there

was a causal link between the activity and the employer’s action. See Payne v.

Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997). The burden then shifts to the

employer to present a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action, and if it

does, then the plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

reason advanced was a pretext for retaliation. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,

1240 (9th Cir. 2000).

Even assuming without deciding that the transfer was an adverse employment

action, Aoun proffered no evidence to suggest the City’s stated legitimate business

purpose was pretextual. The City explained that Aoun was the only ASA in the

department that handled parks and would be eligible for the opening, and that the

transfer was also designed to reduce Aoun’s timesheet errors by giving her fewer to

process. Indeed, the supervisor of whom she complained (Quintana) was not the

same individual who decided to transfer her the following spring (Radke). The

evidence does not “directly . . . persuad[e] the court that a discriminatory reason

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly . . . show[] that the employer’s

3 24-1537 proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-1537