Anyie B. v. Bronx Lebanon Hospital

128 A.D.3d 1, 5 N.Y.S.3d 92
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 26, 2015
Docket85962/07 23852/05 14154
StatusPublished
Cited by178 cases

This text of 128 A.D.3d 1 (Anyie B. v. Bronx Lebanon Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anyie B. v. Bronx Lebanon Hospital, 128 A.D.3d 1, 5 N.Y.S.3d 92 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Acosta, J.P.

This medical malpractice action stems from alleged injuries caused during plaintiffs labor and delivery at defendant hospital. Specifically plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendant Bronx Lebanon Hospital failed to, among other things, *3 monitor the fetal heart rate (FHR) in light of plaintiffs oligohydramnios (low amniotic fluid), and perform a timely cesarean section. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of defendant’s departures, her infant daughter Kailen sustained ischemic hypoxia (a loss of oxygen), resulting in severe neurological injuries, including irreparable brain damage, profound retardation, speech difficulties, cerebral palsy, microcephaly, left hemiparesis (weakness), motor and language delays, and cognitive impairment.

Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In support thereof, it submitted the affirmed report of Adiel Fleischer, M.D. and the affidavit of Michelle R. Lasker, M.D. Defendant argued that there was no evidence of hypoxia during the labor and delivery, nor was there any causal connection between any alleged departure and Kailen’s current injuries, since Kailen was healthy at birth. The motion court ultimately dismissed the complaint finding that although “plaintiff may have established a question of fact regarding the existence of hypoxia,” she failed to raise triable issues of fact regarding causation (2013 NY Slip Op 33871[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2013]). We disagree and reverse.

A defendant in a medical malpractice action establishes prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing that in treating the plaintiff, he or she did not depart from good and accepted medical practice, or that any such departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries (see Scalisi v Oberlander, 96 AD3d 106, 120 [1st Dept 2012]). Once a defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must rebut the prima facie showing via medical evidence attesting that the defendant departed from accepted medical practice and that such departure was a proximate cause of the injuries alleged (see id.).

Generally, “the opinion of a qualified expert that a plaintiffs injuries were caused by a deviation from relevant industry standards would preclude a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants” (Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542, 544 [2002]). To defeat summary judgment, the expert’s opinion “must demonstrate ‘the requisite nexus between the malpractice allegedly committed’ and the harm suffered” (Dallas-Stephenson v Waisman, 39 AD3d 303, 307 [1st Dept 2007], quoting Ferrara v South Shore Orthopedic Assoc., 178 AD2d 364, 366 [1st Dept 1991]).

Here, in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to both departure *4 from good and accepted medical practice and causation. Plaintiff submitted a redacted report from her expert, a doctor board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, who opined that defendant departed from the standard of care by failing to properly monitor the FHR strips, which would have revealed hypoxia caused by oligohydramnios (insufficient amniotic fluid); failing to perform resuscitative efforts once the FHR tracings were flat, by providing oxygen and performing an amnioinfusion; and failing to perform a cesarean section hours prior to the vaginal delivery. The expert opined that these departures caused Kailen to suffer intrapartum asphyxia and hypoxia, resulting in brain damage and other injuries.

Specifically, plaintiffs expert observed that on December 15, 1995, when plaintiff (41 weeks’ gestation) went to defendant Morris Heights Health Clinic, a sonogram noted an amniotic fluid index (AFI) of 2.3 cm., indicating oligohydramnios. The expert stated that the median AFI at 40 weeks is about 12.3 cm. and at 42 weeks is about 11 cm. Oligohydramnios is diagnosed when the AFI is less than 5.0 cm. As a result of the decreased AFI, defendant clinic sent plaintiff to defendant hospital where she arrived at approximately 10:55 p.m.

Plaintiffs expert opined that, while the fetal monitoring strips were initially reassuring during the overnight hours, at about 5:00 a.m. on December 16th, the strips started to show a decrease in the fetal heart rate baseline, with “prolonged decelerations” and “late decelerations” during the night. The tracings then became non-reassuring (abnormal), which was the result of a lack of oxygen or hypoxia to the fetus, who was not tolerating labor with reduced amniotic fluid. Once the tracings became flat, good and accepted standards of practice required oxygen administration to plaintiff, placing her in the left lateral position, and starting an amnioinfusion, which defendant did not do at that time.

Plaintiffs expert further opined that changes observed in the FHR, including a prolonged deceleration manifested as a drop in baseline from 150-155 beats per minute at 5:15 a.m., and at about 6:20 a.m., followed by a decrease in beat-to-beat variability though 6:33 a.m., were indicative of potential hypoxia. The expert stated that defendant also departed from the standard of care by failing to perform a cesarean section between about 11:45 a.m. and 2:10 p.m. on December 16th, during which time period there were long stretches where defendant failed to monitor fetal status and no fetal heartbeat was picked up on *5 the tracings. When the tracings did pick up at about 2:10 p.m., they were flat. The expert asserted that defendant made no effort to insert an internal fetal heart monitor (an electronic transducer connected to the fetal scalp) during this time and failed to undertake efforts to resuscitate the infant.

The expert noted that plaintiffs membranes ruptured spontaneously at 5:00 p.m., at which time defendant applied an internal heart monitor and the fetal heart tracing appeared reassuring with mild variables and good recovery to baseline. However, at about 5:40 p.m., there was a prolonged deceleration, a slow return to baseline and a loss of beat-to-beat variability. Another late deceleration occurred at about 6:20 p.m., and, it was at this time that defendant began administering oxygen and started an amnioinfusion. Plaintiffs expert stated that, despite these efforts, the fetal heart tracing continued to be flat and non-reassuring until about 9:30 p.m., when a cesarean section should have been performed.

Plaintiffs expert asserted that from 9:30 p.m. (on Dec. 16th) until 1:40 a.m. (on Dec. 17th), the fetus continued to be in distress and continued to suffer from a lack of oxygenation and hypoxia resulting in the infant sustaining the subject brain injuries. The expert further asserted that the fetal monitoring strips showed multiple instances of decelerations, and decreased or minimal beat-to-beat variability for extended periods of time. The expert opined that the decreased variability could not be merely evidence of a fetal sleep cycle, since there were too many instances thereof throughout the strips. The strips were indicative of a fetus in distress and defendant failed to timely undertake proper resuscitative efforts. The expert also asserted that the fetal strips were indicative of hypoxia due to a low amniotic fluid level, which was “2.9,” and that the strips were non-reassuring.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
128 A.D.3d 1, 5 N.Y.S.3d 92, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anyie-b-v-bronx-lebanon-hospital-nyappdiv-2015.