Antwain Porter v. Alfred Alonzo Scott, Jr.

• Court: District Court, M.D. North Carolina
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00550
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ANTWAIN PORTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:24CV550 ) ALFRED ALONZO SCOTT, JR., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this civil rights cause of action, motion and his right to respond. The Antwain Porter alleges that Alfred letter warned Porter that if he failed to Alonzo Scott, Jr. used excessive force respond to the motion, the Court may against him when he was a pre-trial “conclude that the defendant[‘s] detainee in the Forsyth County Law contentions are undisputed” and Enforcement and Detention Center grant judgment in favor of Scott. (“FCLEDC”). The parties have Docket Entry 30. See also M.D.N.C. conducted discovery and this matter Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no response brief is before the Court on Scott’s motion is filed within the time required by for summary judgment. Docket Entry this rule, the motion will be 25. Because there is no genuine considered and decided as an dispute about any material fact, and uncontested motion, and ordinarily those uncontroverted facts will be granted without further demonstrate Scott did not use notice.”). Despite the Court’s excessive force in the incident at issue, warning, Porter has not responded to the Court should grant Scott’s motion. the motion,1 nor did he verify the factual allegations in his Complaint, I. FAILURE TO RESPOND see Docket Entry 2, such that they could be considered as more than Upon Scott’s filing of the instant mere allegations, see Gowen v. motion for summary judgment, the Clerk mailed Porter the standard Roseboro letter informing him of the

1 There is also no entry on the docket of undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed the Roseboro letter being returned as that Porter received it. Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th took things, and then followed Porter, Cir. 2025). calling him names. Compl. § IV.D. Scott then allegedly charged Porter, Nevertheless, the Court cannot held him down on the table, punched summarily grant Scott’s motion him over five times in the face and because Porter’s failure to respond head, and then slammed him to the “does not fulfill the burdens imposed ground, all while Porter was on moving parties by Rule 56 [of the handcuffed. Id. Porter claims he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].” suffered a swollen temple, bruised Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 jaw, and bruised face. Compl. § V. He F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993). “Rule filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 56 requires that the moving party § 1983 claiming that Scott used establish, in addition to the absence of excessive force. a dispute over any material fact, that it is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter In support of summary judgment, of law.’” Id. Thus, although Porter’s Scott, a detention officer at FCLEDC failure to respond may leave Scott’s at all relevant times, submitted his facts uncontroverted, Scott “must still own affidavit. See Alfred Alonzo Scott, show that the uncontroverted facts Jr. Affidavit (Sept. 25, 2025), Docket entitle [him] to ‘a judgment as a Entry 26. He avers that, on August 17, matter of law.’” Id. See also Campbell 2022, he was assigned to the 8C and v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 8D Housing Units, each of which has F.3d 52, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting two levels that are connected by two that, even if the absence of a response, flights of stairs. Id. ¶ 5. Inmates with “the court should look at the movant’s special needs were housed in the 8 own papers . . . [and] determine if the Housing Unit (“8 South”). Id. “8 record of filed depositions, answers to South is separate from the general interrogatories, admissions, and population and houses inmates in affidavits[] demonstrates that a administrative segregation, genuine issue exists as to any material disciplinary segregation, direct fact”). deposits, and those with behavior problems and/or mental deficiencies, II. FACTS or inmates in protective custody.”2 Id. Porter alleges that in 2022 when he Porter was housed in 8 South “after was a pre-trial detainee in the eighth being formally disciplined for 1) floor C pod, Scott went inside his cell, threatening a staff member, 2) being

2 In his Memorandum of Law in Support examples of detainees with special needs of Defendant’s Motion for Summary or whether the term special needs has its Judgment (“Mem. in Supp.”), Scott uses own meaning. Compare Mem. in Supp. these categories as examples of detainees at 2-3, Docket Entry 28 with Scott Aff. with “special needs,” but it is unclear ¶ 5, Docket Entry 26. from his affidavit whether they are in an unauthorized area, and 3) cells for sanitary and safety reasons. interfering or preventing a staff Id. member from performing official duties.” Id. (citing Scott Aff. Ex. 2, FCLEDC video footage from inside Disciplinary Hearing for Inmate (July Porter’s two-story dorm in 8 South 7, 2022)).3 captured what follows but without audio. See Scott Aff. Ex. 1.4 After Scott At approximately 8:30 p.m., while saw the trays in Porter’s cell, he conducting his security round, Scott entered the room while Scott was on “noticed that Porter’s cell contained his mandatory one hour outside his numerous used disposable food trays cell. Scott Aff. ¶ 7. Scott began and cups, and at least one of the trays discarding the trash onto the floor had Porter’s feces in it,” id. ¶ 6, despite below. Id. But “[o]nce [he] entered there being a toilet in each cell, id. n.2. Porter’s cell, [Porter] rushed back FCLEDC used disposable food towards [Scott] and said he ‘would products in 8 South for the safety of spit on [Scott] and beat [his] ass if inmates and others, and, when an [he] entered [Porter’s] room again.’” inmate worker came to collect the Id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 2). Scott ignored trash from each cell three times a day, the comment and continued his the inmate was supposed to provide security rounds “while Porter stood by his trash through his cell’s food pass his cell and continued to make door. Id. Inmates were not allowed to threats.” Id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 2). hoard used food trays or cups in their “When [Scott] began walking down the stairs, Porter followed [him] and

3 Both in his affidavit and Memorandum 4 Exhibit 1 is a compact disc with three in Support, Scott states that, “[a]part unedited clips of FCLEDC security from his disciplinary actions, Porter was camera footage from different points of also in 8 South because he was under a view depicting the “August 17, 2022 use- SAM’s [Special Administrative of-force incident.” Scott Aff. ¶ 4. Scott is Measures] Order for continually familiar with FCLEDC records and threatening staff” and, when out of his knows they “were created and compiled cell, was required to be fully restrained in the regular practice, and in the regular and with no other detainees. Scott Aff. course of business, at the FCLEDC, by ¶ 5. See also Mem. in Supp. at 4 n.6. In persons with knowledge of such events support of that statement, Scott cites and transactions made at the time such Exhibit 3 to his affidavit. Exhibit 3 is, events and transactions occurred.” Id. indeed, a SAMs form for Porter. But it is ¶ 4. In addition, detention officer and dated July 2, 2023, nearly one year after Special Response Team member Jemar the incident at the heart of this lawsuit. Russell “reviewed these recordings and Exhibit 3 does not provide support for they fairly and accurately depict the this additional reason Porter was in 8 August 17, 2022 use-of-force incident.” South. Jemar Russell Aff. ¶ 3 (Sept. 28, 2025), Docket Entry 27. continued making threats. Id. (citing and/or potentially high-risk Ex. 1, Clip 2). situations within the FCLEDC,” id. n.4, responded and “secured Porter,” Scott reached the first floor and id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 3). “kicked the food trays into a pile” and tried to leave the 8C dorm. Id. ¶ 8 Jemar Russell, a detention officer at (citing Ex. 1, Clip 1). Because the the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office at control room officer would only open the time, was one of the SRT members the door if an inmate were behind the who responded. Jemar Russell Aff. red line, he did not open the door for ¶¶ 2, 4 (Sept. 28, 2025), Docket Entry Scott to leave because Porter was 27. When he arrived, he saw Scott and inside the red line. Id. (citing Ex. 1, another detention officer “were Clip 1). Porter then spit on Scott. Id. subduing” Porter behind the unit (citing Ex. 1, Clip 1). officer’s desk. Id. ¶ 4. Russell switched positions with Scott who Afterwards, Scott “went to grab then “removed himself from the Porter’s jump suit [sic] to forcefully scene.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. Russell and the restrain him so he could be served other officer helped Porter to his feet with a disciplinary infraction and be and sat him on the table. Id. ¶ 5. charged with malicious conduct by a Russell “saw a small abrasion of prisoner.” Id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 3). Porter’s hand, but did not see any other injuries.” Id. The EMT who But Scott’s “attempt to grab [Porter’s] assessed Porter for injuries did not jumpsuit was unsuccessful, and recommend treatment or a hospital [Porter] struck [Scott] in the face,” id. visit. Id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 3), while handcuffed, see id. Ex. 1, Clip 3. Scott Russell and other SRT members took “then re-engaged and grabbed Porter back to his cell. Id. ¶ 6. When Porter’s jumpsuit and attempted to they reached the second floor, “Porter secure him against the housing unit’s spit in the direction of Captain officer desk.” Id. (citing Ex. 1, Clip 3). Loveland and Lt. Kivette.” Id. (citing Scott “tried to keep him on the desk, Ex. 1 to Scott Aff., Clip 2). “Other but he continued to resist and fight so detention officers ran up the stairs [Scott] struck him multiple times and and [they] drove Porter to the back of told him to stop resisting.” Id. (citing his cell” where they “placed him on Ex. 1, Clip 3). the floor on top of a mattress.” Id. He “continued resisting and crawled “Once Porter stopped resisting and under a desk.” Id. They “pulled Porter fighting, [Scott] stopped striking him from under the desk as he continued and took him to the floor.” Id. (citing resisting and eventually placed him Ex. 1, Clip 3). The Special Response on his stomach” to remove his Team (“SRT”), “a group of specially handcuffs before they left. Id. He trained detention officers that stopped resisting but then spit at the respond to and contain emergencies deputy trying to remove his dispute of material fact by handcuffs. Id. “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to Once they had removed Porter’s interrogatories, and admissions on handcuffs, they had him remain on file, together with the affidavits, if any’ his stomach with his hands behind his which it believes demonstrates the back as they exited. Id. Russell absence of a genuine issue of material unholstered his taser and ordered fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 Porter to stay where he was until U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule Russell told him otherwise “so that 56). everyone could exit the cell safely.” Id. Porter complied without Russell A party cannot rely on statements in a deploying his taser. Id. brief to support a motion for summary judgment, because they are A paramedic also assessed Scott for not evidence. City of Greensboro v. injuries because Porter struck him in Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. the head with handcuffs. Scott Aff. ¶ 9. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 He was taken to the hospital for n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017) further evaluation for concussion, but (collecting cases); see also Hill v. he did not have a concussion or any Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 other injuries. Id. WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2022). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “An affidavit or declaration used to A court “shall grant summary support [summary judgment] must judgment if the movant shows that be made on personal knowledge, set there is no genuine dispute as to any out facts that would be admissible in material fact and the movant is evidence, and show that the affiant or entitled to judgment as a matter of declarant is competent to testify on law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. dispute of material fact exists “if the 56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. evidence is such that a reasonable jury Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, could return a verdict for the 962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 1991)). (1986). In analyzing a summary judgment motion, courts In addition, “even an unchallenged “must construe all facts and video must be taken in the light most reasonable inferences in the light favorable to [the non-moving party] most favorable to the nonmoving . . . if it does not blatantly contradict party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 his account of the facts.” Simmons v. F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). The Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 385 (4th Cir. moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine 2024) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. Simmons, 106 F.4th at 387 (quoting 372, 378-80 (2007)). Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97). IV. DISCUSSION “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each Title 42, United States Code, Section particular case.’” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy 397 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at available to those deprived of rights 396). “A court must make this secured to them by the Constitution determination from the perspective of and, in a more sharply limited way, a reasonable officer on the scene, the statutory laws of the United including what the officer knew at the States” by persons acting under color time . . . .” Id. (citing Graham, 490 of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l U.S. at 396). Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit In so doing, the court “must also pursuant to Section 1983 must show account for the ‘legitimate interests that a person acting under color of that stem from [the government’s] state law violated a Constitutional or need to manage the facility in which other federal legal right. West v. the individual is detained,’ Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ Here, the Constitutional right at issue of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve is the right to be free from an officer’s internal order and discipline and to use of excessive force, a right provided maintain institutional security.’” Id. to a pre-trial detainee in the Due (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, Process Clause of the Fourteenth 540, 547 (1979)). Amendment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 As the Kingsley Court acknowledged, (2015); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately 386, 395 n.10 (1989). “‘[T]he Due difficult undertaking,” where “safety Process Clause protects a pretrial and order . . . requires the expertise of detainee from the use of excessive correctional officials, who must have force that amounts to punishment.’” substantial discretion to devise Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397-98 (quoting reasonable solutions to the problems Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10). they face.” Id. at 399 (internal quotations omitted). “Officers facing To succeed on a claim of excessive disturbances ‘are often forced to make force as a pre-trial detainee, the split-second judgments – in plaintiff must show that “‘the force circumstances that are tense, purposely or knowingly used against uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Id. him was objectively unreasonable.’” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Thus, “a court must judge the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the allowed Porter the time to strike Scott. knowledge of the defendant officer.” Scott was then able to hold on to Id. And, in so doing, a court must Porter’s jumpsuit and ordered him to review the force used in “full context” comply. The two men stayed upright to avoid “miss[ing] the forest for the as Scott tried pushing Porter towards trees.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 the nearby empty desk, all the while (4th Cir. 2015). telling Porter to stop resisting. Once they reached the desk, Porter The United States Supreme Court continued to resist and fight. It was recently reiterated that “the totality of only at this point that Scott struck circumstances inquiry into a use of Porter. He continued striking Porter force has no time limit.” Barnes v. multiple times but only until Porter Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025). While finally complied with Scott’s repeated “the situation at the precise time of orders to stop resisting. In other the [use of force] will often be what words, only after Porter assaulted matters most, . . . earlier facts and Scott and thereafter refused to comply circumstances may bear on how a with Scott’s orders did Scott strike reasonable officer would have Porter multiple times. And he understood and responded to later stopped doing so once Porter stopped ones.” Id. resisting.

To determine the reasonableness of B. The effort made by the officer to an officer’s actions, courts assess “the temper or limit the amount of relationship between the need for the force. use of force and the amount of force

used; the extent of the plaintiff’s Next, from the beginning of his injury; any effort made by the officer interaction with Porter, Scott to temper or to limit the amount of attempted to limit the amount of force force; the severity of the security he used. He ignored Porter’s repeated problem at issue; the threat threats, including his threat to beat reasonably perceived by the officer; Scott’s “ass,” continued his security and whether the plaintiff was actively rounds, and proceeded towards the resisting,” among other exit. After Porter spit on Scott, Scott circumstances. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at tried to grab Porter’s jumpsuit to gain 397 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). control of him. Even after Porter struck Scott, Scott held on to Porter’s A. The relationship between the jumpsuit, and the two remained on need for the use of force and the their feet as Scott repeatedly ordered amount of force used. Porter to stop resisting. Only when Here, after Porter spit on Scott, Scott they arrived at the empty desk and tried to grab Porter’s jumpsuit to Porter fought and continued resisting detain and charge him for malicious did Scott strike Porter. And he conduct. Missing Porter’s jumpsuit stopped striking him once Porter security.” Id. at 113 (internal stopped resisting. quotation omitted).

C. The extent of the plaintiff’s E. The threat reasonably injury. perceived by the officer.

Russell, who saw Porter immediately Related, the uncontroverted facts after the encounter with Scott, saw a support Scott’s reasonable perception small abrasion on Porter’s hand and of a threat. He was in 8 South where no other injuries. And while Porter detainees were housed away from the alleges that he had a swollen temple, general population. He was the sole bruised jaw, and bruised face, see officer in that dorm at the time. And Compl. § V, he did not verify his Porter’s restraints did not stop his Complaint or respond to Scott’s assaultive conduct or continued motion for summary judgment. Thus, resistance. Cf. McKelvey v. W. Reg’l Scott’s evidence that Porter only Jail, No. 3:13-cv-22206, 2016 WL suffered an abrasion to his hand is 11483647, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 6, uncontested. And the EMT who 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1090619 evaluated Porter minutes after the (Mar. 21, 2016) (listing cases where an incident neither recommended officer’s use of force was excessive treatment nor referral to a hospital. where the detainee was restrained and posed little possibility of danger D. The severity of the security to the officer). A reasonable officer in problem at issue. Scott’s place would have acted accordingly. The uncontroverted facts evince the serious security problem Porter F. Qualified Immunity. created. He struck Scott, the only detention officer in that dorm at the Scott also argues, in the alternative, time. And Scott could not leave that he is entitled to qualified because the exit door would not open immunity. Mem. in Supp. at 12. “The while Porter remained close to it. doctrine of qualified immunity “[C]orrections officers . . . are entitled ‘balances two important interests,’ to use appropriate force to maintain namely, the need to hold accountable or restore discipline.” Brooks v. public officials who exercise power Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 110-11, 113 irresponsibly, and the need to shield (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation officials who perform their duties and citation omitted). “[W]e owe responsibly from ‘harassment, officers wide-ranging deference in distraction, and liability.’” Byers v. their determinations that force is Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir. required to induce compliance with 2026) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, policies important to institutional 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Scott is “entitled to qualified immunity if he showed either: (1) that the alleged detainee in handcuffs, who strikes a constitutional violation did not occur, lone detention officer in segregated or (2) that any such violation was not housing and resists and fights the ‘clearly established’ at the time the officer, to be free from the officer’s incident occurred.” Id. (citing Aleman strikes. See id. at 506 (explaining that v. City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, “the clearly established right must be 284-85 (4th Cir. 2023)). viewed with reference to the particular facts of the case”). Scott argues that, assuming arguendo that he violated Porter’s right to be Having defined that right, “the key free from the use of excessive force, inquiry is whether ‘the law provided “the state of the law is unclear insofar “fair warning” that [Scott’s] conduct as to whether [Scott] violated a clearly was unconstitutional.’” Id. (quoting established right.” Mem. in Supp. at Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 14. Scott distinguishes the facts here 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017)). On August from those in Anderson v. Beeman, 17, 2022, the law was clearly No. 21-0683-BAH, 2024 WL established that a correctional officer 5008052, at *12-13 (D. Md. Dec. 6, could not strike a pre-trial detainee in 2024), where correctional officers handcuffs who posed no risk to the were not entitled to summary officer and was not actively resisting judgment on qualified immunity. the officer. The law was clearly And, indeed, the facts here are established that a correctional officer distinguishable from those in was allowed to use force to maintain Anderson, but the analysis for or restore discipline. But the law was qualified immunity does not end not sufficiently clear to put Scott on there. notice that it was unlawful for him to use force to strike a pre-trial detainee Scott contends that “the state of the in handcuffs who had struck Scott law is unclear as to whether [he] first, refused to cooperate, and violated a clearly established right,” continued resisting and fighting, all Mem. in Supp. at 14, but he does not while Scott was the only detention define the right at issue except to say officer in the dorm of a housing unit that Porter has a right to be free from with segregated detainees. Therefore, excessive force, id. at 13. That right, even assuming Scott violated Porter’s however, is clearly established. right, that right was not clearly established on August 17, 2022. Scott The court is required to define the is entitled to qualified immunity. right at a “‘high level of particularity.’” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, Considering Scott’s facts as 505 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ewards uncontested because of Porter’s v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, failure to respond to Scott’s motion, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999)). Here, the Scott is entitled to summary right would be the right of a pre-trial judgment. Scott, Jr.s Motion for Summary V. © CONCLUSION Judgment and dismiss the case with prejudice. IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Alfred Alonzo C| f lod nna Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge

May 15, 2026