Antonio Pablo-Ventura v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 25-3071
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0551n.06

No. 25-3071

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 02, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ANTONIO PABLO-VENTURA, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ) AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF v. ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) ) )

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Antonio Pablo-Ventura is a native and

citizen of Mexico who has lived in the United States without legal status since 1999. In 2018, the

Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear charging Pablo-Ventura as removable.

Pablo-Ventura sought cancellation of removal on the basis of exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to qualifying relatives, namely, his two United States-citizen children. An Immigration

Judge (IJ) denied Pablo-Ventura’s application for cancellation of removal, and the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Pablo-Ventura now petitions this court for review.

For the reasons that follow, we DENY the petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Pablo-Ventura is a native and citizen of Mexico. He first entered the United States in 1999;

he left once in 2005 to visit family in Mexico and returned to the United States in 2006. Admin.

R. (AR) at 55 (IJ Order). He was not admitted or paroled when he entered the United States. Id. No. 25-3071, Pablo-Ventura v. Bondi

at 54. On January 10, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security issued Pablo-Ventura a Notice

to Appear charging him as removable. AR at 359–60 (Notice to Appear). Pablo-Ventura sought

cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Under that statute, “[t]he Attorney

General may cancel removal of” a noncitizen who has been continuously, physically present in the

United States for at least ten years; “has been a person of good moral character” in that time; has

not been convicted of certain federal offenses; and “establishes that removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen

of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Two of Pablo-Ventura’s children, ages 10 and 12 at

the time of Pablo-Ventura’s application, are United States citizens. AR at 55, 61 (IJ Order).

An IJ in Cleveland, Ohio, held a hearing on Pablo-Ventura’s removability on March 17,

2022. Id. at 54. Pablo-Ventura testified that he earned approximately $1,300 to $1,400 per week

in the United States and was the sole breadwinner for his wife and three children. If he were

removed from the United States, his family would likely return to Mexico with him. He expressed

concern about his family living in Mexico because of violence in the area where he is from.

Although it would be difficult to find a good job in Mexico, he thought he might be able to work

with his father’s construction business and that his welding experience might assist him in locating

employment. He emphasized that there would be lots of expenses for his family, including

enrolling the children in school. He also stated that relocating to Mexico would be difficult for his

children because of their limited Spanish proficiency. Id. at 56–58.

Pablo-Ventura’s wife testified that whether she and the children would go to Mexico with

Pablo-Ventura would be a difficult decision. Although Mexico is dangerous and there are different

opportunities for the children, she might be unable to stay in the United States without Pablo-

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Ventura because she does not work. The couple’s two United States-citizen children had never

been to Mexico. The youngest child may be unable to attend school in Mexico owing to her limited

Spanish language abilities, but she was practicing. Pablo-Ventura’s wife expressed fear about the

dangerousness of her and Pablo-Ventura’s hometown. Id. at 58–60.

The IJ found both Pablo-Ventura and his wife to be credible witnesses. Id. at 60.

Examining the evidence, the IJ concluded that Pablo-Ventura had not established that the hardship

his qualifying children would face upon his removal would rise to the level of exceptional and

extremely unusual. Id. at 61. The IJ reasoned that although Pablo-Ventura had expressed concern

about the financial and life-adjustment hardship that his children would experience in Mexico, he

had some potential for employment with his father or using his welding skills. Pablo-Ventura had

not himself researched jobs that may be available to him in Mexico. The family also had about

$34,000 in assets that could help offset the costs of relocation. Id. at 61–62. Additionally, he

stated that his children did not have any educational or health issues. Id. at 61. Although there

were safety concerns with his hometown, Pablo-Ventura acknowledged his family could live

elsewhere. Id. at 62. Pablo-Ventura’s children could speak some Spanish and were working to

improve their language skills. Id. Insofar as Pablo-Ventura’s wife and children remained in the

United States, the IJ found that, although Pablo-Ventura’s wife does not currently work, she

acknowledged that she would need to gain employment to support her family if Pablo-Ventura

were removed. Furthermore, the IJ determined that the separation hardships that Pablo-Ventura’s

children would experience did not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. Id. at

63.

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Based on these findings, the IJ denied Pablo-Ventura’s application for cancellation of

removal and granted him post-conclusion voluntary departure. Id. at 63–64. Pablo-Ventura timely

appealed to the BIA. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Pablo-Ventura had not established that his

removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two U.S.-citizen children.

AR at 3 (BIA Order). The BIA highlighted the IJ’s findings as to Pablo-Ventura’s job skills and

employment prospects in Mexico, the family’s assets, and the ability to move somewhere other

than Pablo-Ventura’s hometown in order to address safety concerns. Id. at 4. The BIA reasoned

that although Pablo-Ventura’s children “face a lowered standard of living and reduced economic

opportunities” in Mexico, that “is often a natural consequence of the removal of a family member,

and the evidence submitted does not otherwise establish that the impact on the qualifying relatives

would be unusually acute in this case.” Id. The BIA thus dismissed the appeal.

Pablo-Ventura now petitions for review in this court. He contends that both the IJ and the

BIA “committed multiple legal errors in applying the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship’ standard.” D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 10). Specifically, he argues that “[t]he IJ failed to conduct

a cumulative and aggregate analysis of the hardship factors,” id. at 11, and instead erroneously

considered certain hardships in isolation while also neglecting hardships owing to a lack of

immigration options and a language barrier for his ten-year-old daughter, id. at 12–13. Pablo-

Ventura also claims that “[t]he IJ inadequately analyzed” the hardship to his children if they were

to relocate to Mexico. Id. at 13–14. Moreover, according to Pablo-Ventura, the IJ overemphasized

Pablo-Ventura’s children’s lack of medical issues. Id. at 13. Finally, Pablo-Ventura argues that

his case must be remanded for the IJ to “reach the discretionary issue of whether to grant

cancellation of removal” after a proper hardship analysis. Id. at 16–17.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review the question of whether Pablo-Ventura has established

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as a mixed question of law and fact. Moctezuma-

Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209,

222 (2024)); see also, e.g., Ceniceros v. Bondi, No. 24-3345, 2025 WL 1012712, at *3 (6th Cir.

Mar. 31, 2025) (same). “Where, as here, the BIA issues its own decision rather than summarily

affirming the IJ, the BIA decision is reviewed as the final agency decision, but the IJ’s decision is

also reviewed to the extent that the BIA adopted it.” Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th

Cir. 2014); see also Skripkov v. Barr, 966 F.3d 480, 486 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Where the Board affirms

the IJ’s ruling but adds its own comments, we review both the IJ’s decision and the Board’s

additional remarks.” (quoting Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2009))). Our

review is deferential because the hardship inquiry is “primarily factual.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at

225; see also Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1154 (6th Cir. 2021).

The parties quibble over the precise standard of review we ought to employ here. Pablo-

Ventura urges us to review de novo the hardship determination as a mixed question of law and

fact. D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 8–9). The Government, on the other hand, argues at length that “the

appropriate standard of review is the ‘compelling evidence’ standard outlined in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).” D. 21 (Resp’t Br. at 10–15). We need not resolve this question here because

“under any level of deference, the IJ and BIA adequately supported the conclusion that [Pablo-

Ventura] failed to establish that [his children] will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual

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hardship.” Garcia Contreras v. Bondi, No. 24-4051, 2025 WL 3094136, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 4,

2025); Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 423.

B. Analysis

We agree with the BIA and the IJ that Pablo-Ventura has failed to make the required

showing for cancellation of removal. Under our precedents, “‘exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship’ means hardship sustained by a deported alien’s qualifying relatives that’s significantly

different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.”

Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. This standard is a “difficult” one for a petitioner to meet—

“many severe hardships resulting from deportation aren’t rare, but expected.” Id. Put slightly

differently, a petitioner must “establish that his qualifying relatives would suffer hardship that is

substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the

deportation of an alien with close family members here.” Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56,

65 (B.I.A. 2001) (cited in Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422).

Pablo-Ventura’s argument that the IJ and BIA failed to analyze the hardship factors in the

aggregate is plainly unsupported by the record. Indeed, both the IJ and BIA explicitly stated that

they had done so. AR at 62 (IJ Order) (“[T]he record here does not establish that the hardships

[Pablo-Ventura’s children] would experience in the cumulative would amount to the exceptional

and extremely and [sic] unusual hardship level.”); AR at 4 (BIA Order) (“Considering all relevant

factors in the aggregate . . . the respondent did not demonstrate that his children’s hardship would

be substantially beyond the hardships that family members commonly experience when a loved

one is removed from the United States.”); see also AR at 52 (IJ Order Addendum) (“All relevant

factors, even if not extreme individually, must be considered in the aggregate in determining

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whether exceptional and extremely unusual hardship exists.”). It is clear from the orders that the

IJ and BIA properly analyzed the factors taken as a whole, not in isolation.

As to Pablo-Ventura’s contention that the IJ failed to consider certain facts, those

arguments either were not presented to the IJ or were evidently considered and addressed. Before

this court, Pablo-Ventura argues that the IJ did not consider “[l]ack of [i]mmigration [o]ptions,”

i.e. “absence of visa pathways.” D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 13). The record reveals, however, that Pablo-

Ventura did not advance this argument before the IJ. It was not improper for the IJ not to consider

an unraised issue. See Fernandez-Villafan v. Garland, No. 23-3223, 2023 WL 8651267, at *6 (6th

Cir. Dec. 14, 2023) (“[Petitioner] did not raise whether he could legally immigrate before the IJ,

so he should not have expected the IJ to consider it.”); Tolentino-Hernandez v. Garland, No. 20-

4021, 2021 WL 4782689, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021) (“[Petitioner] argues that the IJ failed to

address the fact that [he] has no other lawful means of immigrating to the United States. Our

review of the record, however, shows that [Petitioner] did not raise this issue before the IJ.

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review this alleged hardship.”). Pablo-Ventura’s argument

that the IJ failed to consider the “language barrier” for the children, “particularly the 10-year-old’s

limited Spanish proficiency,” D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 12), is also belied by the record. The IJ found

that although Pablo-Ventura “expressed concern with at least one of his children’s limited Spanish

proficiency,” Pablo-Ventura’s wife testified that “all of the children can speak some Spanish and

that they have been practicing to improve.” AR at 62 (IJ Order). Pablo-Ventura additionally

maintains that the IJ failed to consider Pablo-Ventura’s own mental health and risk for suicide,

citing a psychotherapist report that he submitted as evidence before the IJ. D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 12,

15). But the IJ in fact addressed that report in his decision. AR at 62 (IJ Order) (“The Respondent

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also submitted a psychotherapist report addressing concerns with the family losing their current

community and stability.”).

Contrary to Pablo-Ventura’s assertion, the IJ also addressed at some length additional

possible hardships Pablo-Ventura’s family might face if they were to relocate to Mexico with him.

See id. at 61–62. The IJ discussed, among other things, Pablo-Ventura’s possible employment

options, his and his wife’s assets, the educational options for his children in Mexico, and the

stability and adjustment difficulties that his children would face. After canvassing these

considerations, the IJ concluded that although “there would be a level of hardship experienced by

[Pablo-Ventura’s] family,” such hardship would not “rise to the level of exceptional and extremely

and [sic] unusual.” Id. at 62. The BIA “agree[d]” with the IJ, likewise recognizing the potential

hardships of Pablo-Ventura’s family’s relocation. AR at 3–4 (BIA Order) (noting Pablo-Ventura’s

argument on appeal that “schooling in Mexico is expensive and the children risk having to quit

school to assist the family economically”).

Pablo-Ventura’s argument that the IJ “applied an impermissible ‘unconscionable’

standard” is also unavailing. D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 14). Neither the IJ nor the BIA used that term,

and the record does not suggest that either one applied such a test. In fact, the IJ’s recitation of

law explicitly stated that “an applicant need not show that . . . hardship would be unconscionable.”

AR at 52 (IJ Order Addendum). The IJ balanced the appropriate hardships, which analysis the

BIA affirmed. See Pinales-Salas v. Garland, No. 23-3675, 2024 WL 1510662, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr.

8, 2024); Diaz-Roblero v. Garland, No. 23-3873, 2024 WL 3596873, at *3 (6th Cir. July 31, 2024).

Pablo-Ventura seizes on the IJ’s reference to his children’s lack of health issues. D. 15 (Pet’r Br.

at 14). The record shows, however, that the IJ mentioned Pablo-Ventura’s children’s general good

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health only briefly, as one of the factors the IJ was weighing in his determination. See AR at 61–

62 (IJ Order).

Neither the IJ nor the BIA misapplied the hardship standard to the facts in this case. To be

sure, Pablo-Ventura’s removal would present hardship to his U.S.-citizen children. But he has not

demonstrated that the hardship would be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” “Diminished

employment opportunities and financial hardship are typical results of removal and do not

generally support a finding of requisite hardship.” Garcia Contreras, 2025 WL 3094136, at *6.

Likewise, Pablo-Ventura has not shown that his children’s “difficulties adjusting to . . . their . . .

life in a new country,” AR at 62 (IJ Order), would be outside of the norm as compared with other

removals, see, e.g., Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 423 (“[E]motional strains are the typical results

of removal; they aren’t rare.”); Trinidad-Contreras v. Bondi, No. 22-3352, 2025 WL 2732495, at

*5 (6th Cir. Sep. 25, 2025) (“[A]djustment is not unusual; it attends most moves to a foreign

country.”). Nor does the potential cost of his children’s further education in Mexico suffice to

meet the standard.

Finally, Pablo-Ventura briefly asserts a due-process argument, in which he essentially

restates the contentions considered and rejected above. “[W]e reject attempts to ‘repackage[]’ a

merits disagreement with the Board as a constitutional argument.” Fernandez-Villafan, 2023 WL

8651267, at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting Araujo-Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646, 652

(6th Cir. 2021)). Accordingly, this argument fails.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Pablo-Ventura failed to establish that his removal would cause “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying family member, the petition for review is DENIED.