NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-947
ANTONIO MEDEROS, petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Between 1989 and 2000, the petitioner, Antonio Mederos, was
convicted of numerous sexual offenses and subsequently was
committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) as a
sexually dangerous person. He has filed two prior petitions for
discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, which were not
successful.1 The petition underlying this appeal was filed on
December 5, 2018. Following a trial in the Superior Court, a
jury found that the petitioner remained sexually dangerous. On
appeal, the petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence and claims that the Commonwealth failed to meet its
burden of proof to establish that he suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that produces in him a
1Two panels of this court affirmed those judgments in unpublished decisions. See Mederos, petitioner, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2015), and 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1142 (2021). The Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on both matters. See 473 Mass. 1110 (2016), and 488 Mass. 1106 (2021). general lack of ability to control his sexual impulses.
However, because the petitioner did not file a motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case or at
the close of all the evidence on this ground, the issue is
waived. See McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass 143, 157 (2005).
Thus, we review the petitioner's claim under the substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. See R.B.,
petitioner, 479 Mass. 712, 717-718 (2018). We have conducted a
careful review of the record and conclude that there was ample
evidence to support the jury's verdict. We therefore affirm the
judgment.2
Background. We need not provide a detailed description of
the petitioner's history of sexual offenses and misconduct as
that history has been adequately described by the parties and in
prior unpublished memorandum and orders issued by different
panels of this court.3 It suffices to note that the petitioner
was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen
year old girl in 1989, three female children in 1992, his
fourteen year old son in 1997, and an adult woman in 1999. Upon
concluding his last term of incarceration, the petitioner was
2 We note that our conclusion would be the same even if the petitioner had preserved his claim by moving for a directed verdict.
3 See footnote one.
2 determined to be a sexually dangerous person and was civilly
committed to the MTC.
As required by G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the petitioner was
examined by two qualified examiners in connection with his
petition, Dr. Kaitlyn Peretti, Psy.D., and Dr. Katrina Colistra,
Psy.D., both of whom testified at trial and opined that the
petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. In addition,
Dr. Gregg Belle, Ph.D., who testified as a member of the
Community Access Board (CAB), offered his expert opinion that
the petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Belle
also related that the other four psychologists who are members
of the CAB unanimously agreed that the petitioner remained a
sexually dangerous person. All three experts testified that the
petitioner met the criteria for a statutorily defined
personality disorder as that term is defined by G. L. c. 123A,
§ 1. Doctors Peretti and Colistra diagnosed the petitioner with
antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Belle and the four members
of CAB diagnosed the petitioner with other specified personality
disorder with antisocial traits. As explained by the experts at
trial, the presence of antisocial personality disorder and
antisocial traits is a risk factor for sexual offense
recidivism. Dr. Belle further testified that he and the other
CAB members unanimously opined that the petitioner has a
statutory mental abnormality and a clinical diagnosis of
3 unspecified paraphilic disorder as defined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.).
The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the
petitioner has exhibited antisocial traits in a variety of
circumstances throughout his childhood and as an adult as
demonstrated by his extensive nonsexual criminal history, which
includes convictions for various motor vehicle violations,
assault and battery on a police officer, and assault by means of
a dangerous weapon. In addition, around the time of filing his
§ 9 petition, the petitioner was accused, and later convicted,
of crimes related to his manufacturing a knife and providing it
to another MTC patient, who intended to commit murder and
escape. The petitioner also exhibited antisocial behaviors at
the MTC and received a number of behavioral reports for
fighting, aggressiveness, possessing sexualized pictures, and
touching another male MTC patient. At the time of trial, the
petitioner had not progressed in sex offender treatment and, at
one point, was suspended from treatment altogether due to his
lack of participation and negative behavior.
The petitioner called two expert witnesses, Dr. Eric Brown,
Psy.D., and Dr. Leonard Bard, Ph.D., both of whom opined that
the petitioner was not sexually dangerous. An immigration
attorney, a probation officer, and two released sex offenders
4 testified on the petitioner's behalf with regard to his plans
for re-entry into the community.
Discussion. At a trial on a § 9 petition for discharge,
the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the petitioner
continues to be a sexually dangerous person. See Hill,
petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 156, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867
(1996). A "sexually dangerous person" is defined as follows:
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-947
ANTONIO MEDEROS, petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Between 1989 and 2000, the petitioner, Antonio Mederos, was
convicted of numerous sexual offenses and subsequently was
committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) as a
sexually dangerous person. He has filed two prior petitions for
discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, which were not
successful.1 The petition underlying this appeal was filed on
December 5, 2018. Following a trial in the Superior Court, a
jury found that the petitioner remained sexually dangerous. On
appeal, the petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence and claims that the Commonwealth failed to meet its
burden of proof to establish that he suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that produces in him a
1Two panels of this court affirmed those judgments in unpublished decisions. See Mederos, petitioner, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2015), and 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1142 (2021). The Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on both matters. See 473 Mass. 1110 (2016), and 488 Mass. 1106 (2021). general lack of ability to control his sexual impulses.
However, because the petitioner did not file a motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case or at
the close of all the evidence on this ground, the issue is
waived. See McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass 143, 157 (2005).
Thus, we review the petitioner's claim under the substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. See R.B.,
petitioner, 479 Mass. 712, 717-718 (2018). We have conducted a
careful review of the record and conclude that there was ample
evidence to support the jury's verdict. We therefore affirm the
judgment.2
Background. We need not provide a detailed description of
the petitioner's history of sexual offenses and misconduct as
that history has been adequately described by the parties and in
prior unpublished memorandum and orders issued by different
panels of this court.3 It suffices to note that the petitioner
was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen
year old girl in 1989, three female children in 1992, his
fourteen year old son in 1997, and an adult woman in 1999. Upon
concluding his last term of incarceration, the petitioner was
2 We note that our conclusion would be the same even if the petitioner had preserved his claim by moving for a directed verdict.
3 See footnote one.
2 determined to be a sexually dangerous person and was civilly
committed to the MTC.
As required by G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the petitioner was
examined by two qualified examiners in connection with his
petition, Dr. Kaitlyn Peretti, Psy.D., and Dr. Katrina Colistra,
Psy.D., both of whom testified at trial and opined that the
petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. In addition,
Dr. Gregg Belle, Ph.D., who testified as a member of the
Community Access Board (CAB), offered his expert opinion that
the petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Belle
also related that the other four psychologists who are members
of the CAB unanimously agreed that the petitioner remained a
sexually dangerous person. All three experts testified that the
petitioner met the criteria for a statutorily defined
personality disorder as that term is defined by G. L. c. 123A,
§ 1. Doctors Peretti and Colistra diagnosed the petitioner with
antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Belle and the four members
of CAB diagnosed the petitioner with other specified personality
disorder with antisocial traits. As explained by the experts at
trial, the presence of antisocial personality disorder and
antisocial traits is a risk factor for sexual offense
recidivism. Dr. Belle further testified that he and the other
CAB members unanimously opined that the petitioner has a
statutory mental abnormality and a clinical diagnosis of
3 unspecified paraphilic disorder as defined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.).
The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the
petitioner has exhibited antisocial traits in a variety of
circumstances throughout his childhood and as an adult as
demonstrated by his extensive nonsexual criminal history, which
includes convictions for various motor vehicle violations,
assault and battery on a police officer, and assault by means of
a dangerous weapon. In addition, around the time of filing his
§ 9 petition, the petitioner was accused, and later convicted,
of crimes related to his manufacturing a knife and providing it
to another MTC patient, who intended to commit murder and
escape. The petitioner also exhibited antisocial behaviors at
the MTC and received a number of behavioral reports for
fighting, aggressiveness, possessing sexualized pictures, and
touching another male MTC patient. At the time of trial, the
petitioner had not progressed in sex offender treatment and, at
one point, was suspended from treatment altogether due to his
lack of participation and negative behavior.
The petitioner called two expert witnesses, Dr. Eric Brown,
Psy.D., and Dr. Leonard Bard, Ph.D., both of whom opined that
the petitioner was not sexually dangerous. An immigration
attorney, a probation officer, and two released sex offenders
4 testified on the petitioner's behalf with regard to his plans
for re-entry into the community.
Discussion. At a trial on a § 9 petition for discharge,
the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the petitioner
continues to be a sexually dangerous person. See Hill,
petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 156, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867
(1996). A "sexually dangerous person" is defined as follows:
"[A]ny person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes such person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously adjudicated as such by a court of the commonwealth and whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression against any victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires."
G. L. c. 123A, § 1.
The petitioner does not dispute that he committed several
sexual offenses against multiple victims, including his son,
that he was previously adjudicated a sexually dangerous person,
or that he has a history of nonsexual criminal offenses. He
claims that, despite his prior conduct, the Commonwealth failed
to prove that he suffers from a "'mental illness, abnormality,
5 or disorder' that causes [him] to have 'serious difficulty in
controlling [his] behavior'" (citation omitted). Johnstone,
petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 549 (2009).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see
Miller, petitioner, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 635 (2008), the
testimony of the Commonwealth's experts coupled with their
reports were sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner suffers from
a disorder such that he lacks control over his behavior and
therefore is likely to reoffend sexually if released. In
addition, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the fact that
he offered contrary expert opinions is of no consequence in
determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden. Nor is it
significant that some evidence -- including his age at the time
of trial, sixty-five years old, or his relatively low score of a
five on the Static-99R, "an actuarial tool, designed to predict
the recidivism risk of sexual offenses," Commonwealth v. George,
477 Mass. 331, 335 n.2 (2017) -- established a reduced risk to
reoffend sexually if released. Although the jury were entitled
to consider this evidence, it could also disregard it. See
Commonwealth v. Sargeant, 449 Mass. 576, 583 (2007) ("Weighing
and crediting the testimony of witnesses during proceedings
under G. L. c. 123A are for the trier of fact, and we will not
6 substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact"
[quotation and citations omitted]).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Shin & Smyth, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: April 6, 2026.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.