Antonio Lynn Fluker, Jr. and Ricky Jones, Jr. v. Daniel Driscoll, Acting Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 4:24-cv-13322
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTONIO LYNN FLUKER, JR. Case No. 24-13322 and RICKY JONES, JR., F. Kay Behm Plaintiffs, United States District Judge v.

DANIEL DRISCOLL, ACTING DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES,

Defendant. ___________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 22)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Antonio Fluker, Jr. (“Fluker”), a prisoner-plaintiff, filed a complaint in this district on October 17, 2024 against Steven Dettelbach, in his official capacity as the (former) director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). ECF No. 1.1 On February 5, 2025, Fluker amended his complaint to join his spouse, Ricky Jones, Jr. (“Jones”). On August 15, Defendant filed a motion to

1 The caption has been updated in this order to reflect the current Acting Director as of the filing of Defendant’s reply. See ECF No. 32. dismiss the complaint as to both Plaintiffs (ECF No. 22). Fluker and

Jones filed a response (ECF No. 28), to which Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 32). The court does not find that oral argument is necessary to resolve

the issues presented. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and closes the case.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In this civil action, two married Plaintiffs, who are each prevented from owning a gun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), seek restoration of their

gun rights. In March 2021, Plaintiff Fluker was indicted for several felonies under federal law, including wire fraud and money laundering, for which Fluker was sentenced, according to him, to one hundred and

thirty five months (135) imprisonment to be followed by three (3) years of supervised release. ECF No. 8, PageID.28. Fluker was previously convicted in 2011 for escape from federal custody; Plaintiff Jones was

likewise convicted that year for forging the document that secured Fluker’s unlawful release and allowed his escape. Id. Both of those convictions were also felonies. Fluker remains incarcerated for his 2021 convictions; Jones was sentenced only to supervision for his 2011

conviction and completed his sentence in 2012. ECF No. 8, PageID.28. In May 2023, Jones went to a local firearm dealer Bullock Guns-n- More located in Flint, MI to purchase a firearm for hunting and

personal self-defense, but was denied after a background check, presumably on grounds of his felony conviction. See id. Fluker and Jones each seek a declaratory judgment that they are

entitled to have their gun rights restored under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). By the fact of their felony

convictions, Fluker and Jones are barred from owning guns for life under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but challenge the constitutionality of that statute as-applied to them under Williams.

Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ claims under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it and can be either a facial or factual attack. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). In

facial attacks, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true; in factual attacks, the court “is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. On a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction.” Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990). When challenged, jurisdictional issues must be resolved first, as

a court cannot proceed without jurisdiction. See id. In deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

[nonmoving party] . . . [and] accept all well-pled factual allegations as true.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d

559, 562 (6th Cir. 2003). The complaint must provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Moreover, the complaint must “contain[] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility” when the nonmoving party pleads facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [moving party] is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The factual allegations “must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United

Latin Am. Citizens, 500 F.3d at 527. In evaluating the allegations in the complaint, the court must be mindful of its limited task when presented with a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not consider whether the factual allegations are probably true; instead the court must accept the factual allegations as true, even when skeptical.

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (a court must proceed “on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does

not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”). Indeed, in assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must determine only whether “‘the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,’ not whether the

plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged.” See United States v. SouthEast Eye Specialists, PLLC, 570 F. Supp. 3d 561, 574 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)).

In general, when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court’s review is limited to the four corners of the pleading at issue. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d); see also Courser v.

Michigan House of Representatives, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1139 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (citing Rondigo, LLC v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 682 (6th Cir. 2011)) (noting that “[i]n general, in deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the court is limited to considering only the pleadings”). Nonetheless, it is well established that, in some circumstances, a court may consider matters beyond the pleadings

without converting the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Examples include “any exhibits attached [to the Complaint], public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached

to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). IV. ANALYSIS

A. Standing The Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Standing “is an essential and

unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly

traceable to the defendant’s challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560–61. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating standing. Id. at 561. An

injury-in-fact must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” as opposed to “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Id. at 560. A plaintiff “cannot sue simply to avoid a ‘possible future injury.’” Saginaw

Cnty. v. STAT Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 951, 954–55 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)) (emphasis in original). Rather, to establish standing for an

alleged future injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the threatened injury is “certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416. Fluker cannot establish “imminent” injury. Fluker is currently

incarcerated and will be for over a decade. ECF No. 8, PageID.28. As an inmate, he cannot possess a firearm, so Fluker cannot establish that § 922(g)(1) is currently harming him in any way. See BOP Program

Statement 5580.08, Inmate Personal Property, § 553.12(b)(1) (2011), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5580_008.pdf (defining contraband to include weapons). Any threat to his Second Amendment rights is not

“concrete and real.” See Turaani v. Wray, 440 F. Supp. 3d 733, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Because Fluker cannot establish “direct injury that is presently effective in fact,” he lacks standing to pursue his claims.

See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 293 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). His claim of injury is not “imminent” but instead rests on “contingent future events.” See Adult Video Ass’n v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Nor can Fluker establish redressability at this time. An injury is redressable if it can at least be partially remedied. See Uzuegbunam v.

Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021). An injury is not redressable if a plaintiff’s desired conduct is still prohibited even after a favorable decision from a court. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). In analyzing redressability, “[t]he relevant standard is likelihood—

whether it is ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 850 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). For Fluker, even if this court were to grant the proposed relief of removing his firearms disability under § 922(g)(1) by a declaratory judgment, his alleged

injury – his inability to purchase a firearm – would persist because there is an independent bar to his owning a gun; he is incarcerated and will remain so for over a decade more. It is speculative at best to say

his alleged injury could be redressed before that time. Because Fluker’s injuries would not be redressed through this action, he separately fails to establish standing on these grounds.

Therefore, Fluker’s claims will be dismissed for lack of standing and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Article III standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction properly decided under 12(b)(1).”

American BioCare, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys, PLLC, 702 F. App’x 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2017). Because this dismissal is under Rule 12(b)(1), it is necessarily without prejudice. See Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) (“A dismissal under

12(b)(1) allows for the possibility of repleading the action to bring it within the subject matter jurisdiction of some court.”). The court therefore must refrain from speaking to the merits of this action as to

Fluker because it lacks jurisdiction to do so. B. Ripeness Even if standing were not at issue – that is, even if it were the

case that Fluker plausibly has alleged that he will attempt to buy a gun when he is released and that a decision by the court would provide redress in that future scenario – Defendant relatedly notes that

Fluker’s claims are not ripe. ECF No. 22, PageID.97. Ripeness is a doctrine of justiciability that concerns when review is appropriate. Ripeness is similar to standing, but whereas standing is concerned with

who is a proper party to litigate a particular civil action, ripeness is concerned with when a proper party may litigate that action. Mich. Wolfdog Ass’n v. St. Clair Cty., 122 F. Supp. 2d 794, 800 (E.D. Mich.

2000); Adult Video Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 71 F.3d 563, 567 (6th Cir. 1995). Ripeness is a question of “jurisdiction” properly raised under Rule 12(b)(1). See New Heights Farm I, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2024); Bigelow v. Mich.

Dep’t of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1992) (“If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed.”).

The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America of Am. v. Magaw,

132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985)). Ripeness becomes an issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or at all. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981). A case is ripe for pre-

enforcement review under the Declaratory Judgment Act only if the probability of the future event occurring is substantial and of “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

judgment.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969); Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 412 (3rd Cir. 1992). Even assuming that Fluker has pleaded concrete plans to

purchase a gun when he is eventually released from prison a decade or more from now (ECF No. 8, PageID.28), his claims are plainly not ripe for adjudication at this time and will be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. The court notes the relative recency of the Williams decision and the probability that the case law surrounding that issue will have developed by the time Fluker’s claims are ripe.

C. Merits Although Fluker lacks standing (or at minimum, his claims are not ripe), the same cannot be said for Jones. Jones is not incarcerated,

as far as the court is aware, and Defendant does not argue that he is. Jones also alleges that he has in fact recently sought to buy a gun but was denied. ECF No. 8, PageID.28-29. He therefore has standing and

his claims are ripe for review, because a favorable decision would immediately remove what appears to be the primary impediment to his purchasing a gun. Defendant instead moves to dismiss Jones’ claims

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him. ECF No. 22, PageID.99-100. In United States v. Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (the federal felon-in-possession law) is “constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people.” 113 F.4th 637, 662-63 (6th Cir. 2024). But every member of that disarmed group must have “an

opportunity to make an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous.” Id. at 663. When one’s crime “pose[d] a significant threat of danger,” that person “will have a very difficult time, to say the

least, of showing” their conduct was not dangerous. See id. For example, the Williams court posited that the crime of burglary “is dangerous because it ‘creates the possibility of a violent confrontation

between the offender and occupant.’” Id. at 659 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990)). Because these types of crimes “put someone’s safety at risk,” they justify a finding of danger.

Although Plaintiffs do not point the court to any decision finding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as-applied under Williams, that court theorized that there exists “[a] more difficult category [that] involves

crimes that pose no threat of physical danger, like mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements.” Id.; see also Range v. AG United States, No. 21-2835, 124 F.4th 218, (3d Cir. 2024) (on remand) (finding that a person convicted of food-stamp fraud and who had completed his

sentence could not be permanently disarmed). Jones was convicted for assisting Fluker escape federal custody by forging a court order and transmitting it to the jail where Fluker was

held. ECF No. 8, PageID.28; United States v. Jones, No. 11-20048, ECF No. 11, PageID.43–44 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2011). (Fluker was convicted for that same escape from jail. United States v. Fluker, No. 11-20631,

ECF No. 10, PageID.9–10 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2012). He was rearrested and placed back in custody. Jones, No. 11-cr-20048, ECF No. 1, PageID.2).2

The government correctly points out that an escape from jail poses a danger to the community. Just as burglary is a dangerous crime because it creates the possibility of a violent confrontation with an

occupant or law enforcement, “[h]elping someone break out of custody involves the possibility of various violent confrontations, including with

2 Because these are publicly available documents, the court can consider them in resolving Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f public records refute a plaintiff's claim, a defendant may attach those documents to its motion to dismiss, and a court can then consider them in resolving the Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.”). Further, in evaluating a § 922(g)(1) challenge, “a court may consider a defendant’s entire criminal record.” United States v. Williams, 113 F. 4th 637, 659–60 (6th Cir. 2024). jail staff, law enforcement, and members of the public.” ECF No. 22,

PageID.99. And assisting in an act of escape shows Jones’ “clear unwillingness to comply with legal obligations and law enforcement and justify a finding of dangerousness.” See United States v. Poe, No. 24-

6014, 2025 LX 50143, at *7, 2025 WL 1342340, at *3 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025). Jones colorfully refers to this conclusion as “unhinged,” because in

his view, his and Fluker’s actions merely “resemble[d] a non-violent walkaway escape.” ECF No. 28, PageID.123. The court disagrees, and finds that Jones’ crime, even if his own physical acts were limited

document forgery, in effect and intent posed a danger to others by fraudulently and unlawfully securing Fluker’s release from federal custody. Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Jones, and his

claims will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. D. Three Strikes Rule A note is warranted on Fluker specifically, who proceeded in

forma pauperis in this case. ECF No. 11. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner is precluded from proceeding with in forma pauperis status in a civil case if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, filed a complaint that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. 595, 598 (2020); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Fitts v. Burt, No. 05-73112, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107269, at *12 (E.D.

Mich. Jan. 24, 2008). The court notes that, because of the date this action was filed, the three strikes rule did not appear to have applied to this case. But

Fluker is at this point out of strikes (this court counts at least four cases that appear to invoke the relevant rule), and at least on this court’s reading should not be permitted to file another action without

prepaying fees and costs while he is incarcerated. See Fluker v. Ison, No. 25-cv-10587, ECF No. 7 (dismissed under § 1915(e) for frivolousness and failure to state a claim); Fluker v. Transunion, LLC, No. 24-cv-

12738, ECF No. 15 (dismissed under § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim);3 Fluker v. Ally Financial, No. 22-cv-12536, ECF No. 19 (dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); Fluker v.

Hemingway, No. 23-cv-10842, ECF No. 37 (dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

3 Though that decision was also labeled a dismissal for lack of standing. V. CONCLUSION

Therefore, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) under Rule 12(b)(1) as to Plaintiff Fluker and under Rule 12(b)(6) as to Plaintiff Jones. Fluker’s claims are therefore

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction, while Jones’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This opinion adjudicates all claims in this case and an order of judgment dismissing this case will follow. SO ORDERED.

Date: January 22, 2026 s/F. Kay Behm F. Kay Behm United States District Judge