Antonio Homan v. Milwaukee County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 20, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-01806
StatusUnknown

This text of Antonio Homan v. Milwaukee County Jail (Antonio Homan v. Milwaukee County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Antonio Homan v. Milwaukee County Jail, (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ ANTONIO HOMAN,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1806-pp

MILWAUKEE COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Antonio Homan, who is incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of federal law while confined at the jail. This order resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 21, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $35.03. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on December 30, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff names as a defendant the Milwaukee County Jail. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. He alleges that he suffers from dry skin that is scratchy and irritated, and that his hair is falling out. Id. at 2. The plaintiff states that the jail has denied him access to sunlight “which also has prevented [his] body from receiving the natural nutrients that having access to sunlight provides, such as, Vitamins D & C which are two of the most essential vitamins that a human needs and desires in order for the body to properly grow and reach [his] full potential.” Id. at 2-3. The jail allegedly is aware that it is neglecting and denying him access to sunlight. Id. at 3. The plaintiff states that due to not receiving proper sunlight, he has low calcium which affects his bones, teeth, fingers and toenails. Id. He says that his eyes have begun to take on a dull white color. Id. at 4. The plaintiff says that he has complained to medical staff, but that no action has been taken. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks $5,000,000. Id. at 6. C. Analysis The plaintiff cannot sue the Milwaukee County Jail under §1983. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The Milwaukee County Jail is not a person—it is not an individual subject to suit under §1983. It is true that under some circumstances, a plaintiff may sue a municipality—which is not a person— under §1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv’s of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) says that a defendant in a federal lawsuit must have the legal capacity to be sued. State law determines whether an entity has that capacity. Webb v. Franklin Cnty. Jail, Case No. 16-cv-1284, 2017 WL 914736 at *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2017). In Wisconsin, the jail is an arm of the sheriff’s department and under Wisconsin law, the sheriff’s department is an arm of the county. See Abraham v. Piechowski, 13 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877- 79 (E.D. Wis. 1998). This means that neither the jail nor the sheriff’s department are “legal entit[ies] separable from the county government which [they] serve[] . . . .” Whiting v. Marathon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2004)). Because the Milwaukee County Jail does not have the capacity to be sued, the plaintiff may not proceed against the jail. The court assesses conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017).

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
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452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
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550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
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13 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1998)
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531 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (W.D. Wisconsin, 2008)
Richard v. Reed
49 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Virginia, 1999)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
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Smith v. Dart
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Cesal v. Moats
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Bluebook (online)
Antonio Homan v. Milwaukee County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/antonio-homan-v-milwaukee-county-jail-wied-2026.