Antonio Ates v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 15, 2009
Docket12-08-00376-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Antonio Ates v. State (Antonio Ates v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Antonio Ates v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

NO. 12-08-00376-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ANTONIO ATES, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Antonio Ates appeals his conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. In one issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND On September 8, 2007, Christopher Ervin and his daughter attended a high school football game at Rose Stadium in Tyler, Texas. As the two attempted to exit the stadium parking lot by car, they came upon a group of people standing in the roadway. Ervin exited his car and asked the group to move so they could pass. In response, a young man shouted an obscenity at Ervin. Ervin pointed at the young man and told him he should “not be talking like that.” A verbal confrontation ensued between the two. As the confrontation escalated, someone struck Ervin, rendering him unconscious. Thereafter, a group of fifteen to twenty young men hit and kicked Ervin repeatedly while he lay unconscious on the ground. During the assault, Ervin’s daughter attempted to protect Ervin by laying on top of him. As the onslaught continued, Ervin’s daughter sustained a broken arm. Ervin’s injuries were extensive and included swelling of his eyes and face, head injuries, and loss of his ability to smell or taste. Appellant was charged with engaging in organized criminal activity in connection with the assault on Ervin and pleaded “not guilty.” The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant “guilty” as charged. Following a trial on punishment, the jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for life. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support that (1) he was the person who assaulted Ervin, (2) he was present when the assault occurred, (3) he committed an overt act that would constitute his promoting or assisting in the commission of the assault, or that (4) he was a party to the commission of the assault. Legal Sufficiency Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982). The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.” Id. The use of the hypothetically correct jury charge applies to review for both legal and factual sufficiency. See Wooley v. State, 273 S.W.3d 260, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In the case at hand, to support Appellant’s conviction for engaging in organized criminal

2 activity, the State was required to prove that Appellant committed or conspired to commit aggravated assault as a member of a criminal street gang. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . 71.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by the conduct of another for which he is “criminally responsible.” See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003). A person is “criminally responsible” for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, while acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 7.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Here, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that he was a member of a criminal street gang. As such, we will focus our analysis primarily on evidence pertaining to Appellant’s involvement in Ervin’s assault. Evidence Pertaining to Appellant’s Involvement in the Assault on Ervin The State’s first witness, Tyler Police Department Officer Judson Moore, testified that he arrived at the scene following the assault on Ervin. Moore further testified that he sought to gather information about what had happened to Ervin. Moore stated that two people came forward to provide information to another officer at the scene. Moore further stated that in a gang related situation such as this, people’s unwillingness to assist police is not uncommon because they fear retaliation. Ervin testified next on the State’s behalf. Ervin described how he attended the football game with his daughter on the night in question. Ervin further described how the two were attempting to exit the Rose Stadium parking lot in his vehicle that night. Ervin stated that he engaged in a verbal altercation with the young man who had yelled an obscenity at him and that, as the verbal jousting between the two of them continued, he became surrounded by a number of people and was suddenly “knocked out.” Ervin testified that he had no further memory of the events in question after he was knocked out. Ervin further testified concerning his injuries. Specifically, Ervin stated that his eyes were swollen completely shut, the back of his head was split, which required staples and resulted in his suffering headaches, and he lost his senses of smell and taste. D.T. testified as the State’s next witness. D.T. testified that he saw Montrell and Brandon

3 High and others stomping on Ervin while he lay unconscious on the ground. D.T. further testified that when he spoke to authorities on the night in question, he related that he thought he heard that a person known as “Polly” was “in on the assault.” D.T. identified Appellant as “Polly.” D.T. further stated that everything he told authorities that night was truthful. On cross examination, D.T. testified that he did not see Appellant anywhere near Ervin on the night in question, nor did he see Appellant hit or kick Ervin. On redirect examination, the State elicited testimony from D.T. concerning signed stipulations from multiple participants in Ervin’s assault, none of whom D.T. could testify that he knew. T.C. testified next on the State’s behalf. T.C.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Tibbs v. Florida
457 U.S. 31 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Watson v. State
204 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Johnson v. State
871 S.W.2d 183 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Malik v. State
953 S.W.2d 234 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Thompson v. State
54 S.W.3d 88 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Johnson v. State
23 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Wooley v. State
273 S.W.3d 260 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Escobedo v. State
6 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Van Zandt v. State
932 S.W.2d 88 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Santellan v. State
939 S.W.2d 155 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Clewis v. State
922 S.W.2d 126 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Antonio Ates v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/antonio-ates-v-state-texapp-2009.