Antonieta Garcia v. Office of Personnel Management

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided October 5, 2022·No. CH-844E-19-0212-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTONIETA GARCIA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-844E-19-0212-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: October 5, 2022 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Leah Bachmeyer Kille, Lexington, Kentucky, for the appellant.

Albert Pete Alston, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed OPM’s reconsideration decision denying the appellant’s disability retirement application but denied interim relief. On petition for review, OPM

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

argues that the administrative judge erred in applying the Bruner 2 presumption, in finding that it failed to rebut the presumption, and in finding that the appellant’s last position with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) was as a Distribution Clerk. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 11-17. OPM includes with its petition for review several Postal Service 50 (PS-50) forms. Id. at 19-136. Additionally, the appellant’s cross petition for review requests interim relief. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the agency’s petition for review and the appellant’s cross petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 3

2 In Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management, our reviewing court found that an employee’s removal for inability to perform the essential functions of her position constitutes prima facie evidence that she is entitled to disability retirement. 996 F.2d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 3 The additional PS-50s submitted for the first time on review do not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-136. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record closed before the administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). All of the PS-50s appear to have been issued before the close of the record below. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-136. OPM has not explained why it 3

¶2 Based on the Postal Service form 6075, Notice of Removal or Separation for Disability (Not OWCP), and the appellant’s hearing testimony that, following a 1-year recovery period from a March 2015 surgery, her physician imposed restrictions and advised her not to return to work and that the appellant informed her supervisor of the restrictions and remained away from work only after her supervisor informed her that there were no available accommodations or reassignments, the administrative judge correctly found that the Bruner presumption applies in this case. Initial Appeal File (IAF), T ab 31, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-5. ¶3 The administrative judge also found that the appellant’s last position with the USPS was as a Distribution Clerk and that her medical conditions are incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in the Distribution Clerk position. ID at 5-6, 9. However, the appellant stipulated that her last official position with USPS was as a Sales Service/Distribut ion Associate (SSDA). IAF, Tab 24 at 4. A stipulation is sufficient to prove the fact alleged. Swift v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 441, 445 (1991); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.63. Nonetheless, the administrative judge ultimately considered both the positions of a Distribution Clerk and a SSDA in arriving at her conclusion. ID at 5-6, 9. Moreover, the appellant and her supervisor both testified that the positions have some overlapping duties. IAF, Tab 25, Hearing Compact Disc (testimony of the appellant and the appellant’s supervisor). We have reviewed the medical evidence of record and the requirements of the SSDA position, as set forth in the position description and the testimony of the appellant and her supervisor, and we conclude that the appellant is unable to provide useful and efficient service in the SSDA position. Thus, any error committed by the

was unable to submit these documents below nor has it shown that they are of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. Accordingly, we have not considered them. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). 4

administrative judge in determining that the appellant’s last position with the USPS was as a Distribution Clerk, and not a SSDA, did not prejudice OPM and does not constitute a basis to disturb the initial decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). Additionally, we agree with her conclusion that OPM failed to rebut the Bruner presumption and that the appellant otherwise met all of the elements required to secure disabil ity retirement benefits. ID at 7-9; see 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a). ¶4 In her response to OPM’s petition for review, the appellant requested interim relief. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10. The Board’s regulations do not provide for an award of interim relief at the petition for review level. To the extent the appellant is asserting that the administrative judge erred in declining to aw ard interim relief below, ID at 10, the Board reviews such a claim under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Norton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 8 (2009). In Steele v.

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Antonieta Garcia v. Office of Personnel Management, (Miss. 2022).

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