Anton Andreyerich Iagounov v. U.S. Marshals Service, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: June 1, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-01313
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Anton Andreyerich Iagounov, Case No: 2:26-cv-01313-CDS-BNW

5 Petitioner Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Recusal 6 v.

7 U.S. Marshals Service, et al., [ECF No. 5]

8 Respondents

9 10 This is a now-closed1 purported habeas action that was brought by pro se petitioner 11 Anton Andreyerich Iagounov against the U.S. Marshals Service and Immigration and Customs 12 Enforcement. See Pet., ECF No. 1. Iagounov moves to recuse the undersigned from this action 13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Mot., ECF No. 5. That statute provides that a judge of the United 14 States shall disqualify herself from a proceeding in which her impartiality “might reasonably be 15 questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). That statute further provides that a judge shall disqualify 16 herself when she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of 17 disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. Id. at § 455(b)(1). Thus, under § 455, 18 recusal of a federal judge is appropriate for either actual bias or the appearance of bias if “a 19 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality 20 might reasonably be questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993); Preston 21 v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1991); Herrington v. Sonoma Cnty., 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 22 (9th Cir. 1987). In this context, the “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or 23 unduly suspicious,” but rather a “well-informed, thoughtful observer” who “understand[s] all 24 the relevant facts” and “has examined the record and law.” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 25 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). This standard does not mandate recusal upon the mere 26

1 Judgment was entered in favor of the respondents on May 1, 2026. See J., ECF No. 4. 1 “unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). And, “[s]ince a 2 federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking disqualification bears a substantial 3 burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 2007 WL 3165665, at *2 (N.D. 4 Cal. Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021–22 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). 5 Iagounov failed to meet his burden showing recusal is appropriate. First, proper 6 grounds for recusal alleging prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source. See Mayes v. 7 Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984). This means that a judge’s previous adverse ruling 8 alone is not sufficient bias for recusal. Id. Here, the petitioner moves in part to recuse the 9 undersigned because I have previously ruled against him. See ECF No. 5 at 1–2. The fact that the 10 undersigned has previously ruled against the petitioner is not a basis for recusal. Id.; see also 11 Holland, 519 F.3d at 913–14 (a judge should also bear in mind that § 455(a) is limited by the 12 “extrajudicial source” factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal something other 13 than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of a trial). 14 Indeed, as stated by the Supreme Court, “[j]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid 15 basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Litekey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 16 Second, Iagounov fails to meet his burden of showing my impartiality might be 17 reasonably questioned. While the motion correctly references my former employment as a 18 federal prosecutor, the remainder consists of allegations that are unfounded, untrue, and 19 seemingly rooted in mere suspicion. The reasonable person standard does not mandate recusal 20 upon the mere “unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice.” Garvey v. Donaldson, 21 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109069, at *2 (D. Nev. May 15, 2026). (citation omitted). Indeed, federal 22 judges regularly deny recusal motions where the judge’s prior employment had an arguable 23 relationship to the issues presented in the case before them. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tesla, Inc., 772 F. 24 Supp. 3d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States FDA, 156 F. Supp. 3d 36 25 (D.D.C. 2016)); see also United States v. Champlin, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183–84 (D. Haw. 2005) 26 (finding that judge’s prior employment as an Assistant U.S. Attorney did not give rise to 1|| reasonable questions regarding the court’s impartiality). Accordingly, recusal is not appropriate here, so lagounov’s motion is denied. 3 Conclusion 4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner’s motion for recusal [ECF No. 5] is 5] DENIED. 6 There can be no more filings in this closed action. *) 7 Dated: June 1, 2026 /

9 Cristina Kika 10 Uni ed states District Judge ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26