Antoine Landing v. Builders FirstSource, Inc.

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

FERRIS W. WHARTON LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER JUDGE WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733 PHONE: (302) 255-0657 FAX: (302) 255-2273

August 12, 2025

James J. Meehan, Esquire Stephen F. Dryden, Esquire Shelsby & Leoni Krista E. Shevlin, Esquire 221 Main Street Weber Gallagher Simpson Wilmington, DE 19804 Stapleton Fires & Newby, LLP 2 Penns Way, Suite 300

Joseph Andrews, Esquire New Castle, DE 19720 Law Offices of Joseph Andrews 737 South Queen Street, Suite 3 Dover, DE 19904

RE: Antoine Landing v. Builders FirstSource, Inc., et al.

N23C-05-095 FWW

Dear Counsel:

Before the Court is Defendant Alleyne Trucking, LLC’s (“Alleyne”) Motion

for Summary Judgment.1 Plaintiff Antoine Landing’s (“Landing”) First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) alleges he was injured by Defendant Daniel T. Elvey (“Elvey”)

when he was struck by a vehicle operated by Elvey while he was a pedestrian.2

Landing alleges the vehicle Elvey was operating was owned by Defendant Builders

FirstSource, Inc. (“BFS”). 3 Alleyne was added as a defendant in the FAC by

Landing who alleges that Alleyne, as his employer, violated the Workers’

1 Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 76. 2 FAC, at ⁋ 12, D.I. 51. 3 Id. at ⁋ 11.

C.A. No. N23C-05-095 FWW Page 2 of 7 August 12, 2025

Compensation Act by failing to maintain workers’ compensation insurance entitling

him to damages under 19 Del. C. § 2301 et seq., 4 violated various statutory insurance

requirements, and failed to properly train its employees. 5 Defendants Elvy, BFS,

and BFS Operations LLC (the “Other Defendants”) crossclaimed against Alleyne

for contribution.6

In its Motion for Summary Judgment Alleyne argues that it is entitled to

summary judgment on Count IV because the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB”)

determined that Landing was never the employee of Alleyne. 7 It argues it should be

granted summary judgment on Count V because Alleyne failed to respond to certain

requests for admission.8 Among those requests deemed admitted for failure to

answer were admissions that: (1) Landing was working in his capacity as a driver

for L&J Services, LLC, a trucking company entirely owned by him; 9 and (2) “in

[Landing’s] opinion, the actions of neither Ralph Alleyne, Daynene Scott, nor

Alleyne Trucking in any manner caused the accident in question.” 10 Landing does

4 Id. at Count IV. 5 Id. at Count V. 6 Other Defs.’ Ans. and Crossclaim, D.I. 55. 7 Mot. for Summ. J. at ⁋ 5, citing Landing v. Alleyne Trucking, No. 1533208 (Del. I.A.B. Apr. 22, 2025), D.I. 76. 8 Id. at ⁋⁋ 6-9. 9 Id. at ⁋ 8(a). 10 Id. at ⁋ 8(j).

C.A. No. N23C-05-095 FWW Page 3 of 7 August 12, 2025

not oppose the motion “per se,” but notes that he did provide responses to the

requests for admission and asks that the requests not be deemed admitted. 11

The Other Defendants oppose the motion. They point out that their

Crossclaim lists numerous act of negligence on Alleyne’s part with respect to its

relationship with Landing, including that Alleyne: (1) failed to properly supervise

and direct Landing in the conduct of his work; (2) retained Landing to transport a

load that exceeded weight limits he was legally entitled to carry; (3) continued to

contract with Landing despite having actual or constructive notice he was unfit and

unlicensed to operate a commercial vehicle; and (4) knowingly violated Federal and

State laws regarding the responsibility of motor carriers in the operation of

commercial vehicles.12 They argue that, although the purpose of requests for

admission is to facilitate proof at trial by eliminating facts and issues not in dispute,

requests for admission should not be used to establish the ultimate facts in issue.13

Further, according to the Other Defendants, even if the requests were deemed

admitted, they cannot be used against them because they played no role in the

11 Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 87. 12 Other Defs.’ Resp., at ⁋ 3, D.I. 89. 13 Id. at ⁋ 7 (citing Donegal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Action Bus. Ctr., Inc. 1999WL 1568618, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 1999); Calbert v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 1989 WL 147394, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 19899 (concluding that the Court could not accept as admitted a request that would use Rule 36 to establish the ultimate facts in issue).

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default.14

Alleyne submitted a letter in reply.15 It argues that the Other Defendants lack

standing under Rule 36(a) because the requests for admission only applied to

Landing.16 If summary judgment were granted for Alleyne, the Other Defendants

would suffer no prejudice since they could obtain necessary evidence through other

means.17 In Alleyne’s view, it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no

longer any case in controversy pertaining to it. 18

Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is

appropriate if, when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”19 The moving party

initially bears the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its

claims or defenses.20 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the

non-moving party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the

14 Id. at ⁋ 10. 15 Def. Alleyne’s Reply, D.I. 90. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d 845, 847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del.1979). 20 Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.

C.A. No. N23C-05-095 FWW Page 5 of 7 August 12, 2025

ultimate fact-finder.21 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the

Court’s function is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any,” in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether

genuine issues of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.” 22 Summary

judgment will only be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of

material fact. When material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire

more thoroughly into the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the

circumstances,” summary judgment will not be appropriate.”23 However, when the

facts permit a reasonable person to draw but one inference, the question becomes

one for decision as a matter of law.24

Alleyne’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Landing is GRANTED as

unopposed by Landing. Alleyne also seeks summary judgement in its favor on the

Other Defendants’ Crossclaim. While the Motion addresses Counts IV and V of the

FAC with particularity, it has almost nothing to say about the Crossclaim, appearing

21 Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995). 22 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del. 1992). 23 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-60, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v. Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)). 24 Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).

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to rely on the collateral effect of the IAB’s decision as support for its contention that

there are no material facts in issue. But, the Other Defendants were not parties to

the IAB decision.25 In fact, the IAB’s decision was simply a ratification of a

stipulation between Alleyne and Landing that Landing was never an employee of

Alleyne. 26

Nonetheless, Alleyne argues that because there is no controversy between it

and Landing, there can be no controversy between it and the Other Defendants. In

other words, Landing and Alleyne stipulated the Other Defendants’ Crossclaim

away. But, there is more to the story. Landing and the Other Defendants stipulated,

and the Court ordered, that the Other Defendant could file a Third-Party Complaint

to add Alleyne as a third-party defendant.27 The Court’s Order was entered on

November 15, 2024. 28 On the same day, Landing filed his FAC, naming Alleyne as

an additional defendant.29 At that point, the Other Defendants simply answered the

FAC and crossclaimed against Alleyne.30

The Crossclaim mirrors the allegations in the proposed Third-Party

25 Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex 1, D.I. 76. 26 Id. 27 D.I. 54. 28 Id. 29 FAC, D.I. 51. 30 Other Defs.’ Ans and Crossclaim, D.I. 55.

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Complaint, seeking contribution from Alleyne for any judgment against the Other

Defendants. 31 Both allege that Landing was “an independent contractor” of

Alleyne. 32 Rather than eliminating the Crossclaim, summary judgment against

Landing in favor of Alleyne simply converts the Other Defendants’ Crossclaim into

a Third-Party Complaint. Alleyne’s status as an independent contractor was not part

of the IAB Order, and is a genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated.

Accordingly, summary judgment is DENIED against the Other Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.

cc: File & ServeXpress

31 Other Defs.’ Ans. and Crossclaim, D.I. 55; Stip. to File Third-Party Compl., at Ex. A, D.I. 53. 32 Id.