Anthony Seda v. Social Security Administration

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 15, 2023
DocketPH-0752-17-0451-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Anthony Seda v. Social Security Administration (Anthony Seda v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anthony Seda v. Social Security Administration, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTHONY SEDA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-17-0451-I-1

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY DATE: June 15, 2023 ADMINISTRATION, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Anthony Seda, Aberdeen, Maryland, pro se.

Jennifer Karangelen, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his appeal of his trial-period termination for lack of jurisdiction. Seda v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-17-0451-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 13, Initial Decision (0451 ID) at 6. Specifically,

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA) claim because he failed to allege that his termination was due to his prior military service. Id. The administrative judge also found that any claims the appellant sought to raise that his termination was improper or the result of whis tleblower reprisal were precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 6-9. The administrative judge observed that he addressed those claims in the appellant’s prior appeals, in which he found a lack of Board jurisdiction under either chapter 75 or the Whistleblower Protection Act. Id. In his petition for review, the appellant contends for the first time that he did not raise a claim under USERRA. Seda v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-17-0451-I-1, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 4 at 9. He reiterates the whistleblower reprisal claims he made in his appeal below and reargues the merits of his January 2006 trial-period termination, contending that the agency denied him due process, violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), and discriminated and retaliated against him for equal employment opportunity activity without affording him an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 9-25. He also attaches documents to his petition for review and argues that the agen cy improperly terminated him under chapter 43 for poor performance. Id. at 21-23, 27-183. ¶2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 3

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner ha s not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶3 As noted above, the appellant states for the first time in his petition for review that this is not a USERRA appeal. PFR File, Tab 4 at 9. Therefore, we have not further considered his USERRA claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating his probationary te rmination and his whistleblower reprisal claims. 0451 ID at 6-9. ¶4 The Board applies collateral estoppel to determine whether a previous adjudication of a jurisdictional issue precludes its relitigation. McNeil v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶ 16 (2005). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate when: (1) the issue is identical to that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior acti on; (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party against whom the issue preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Id., ¶ 15. Collateral estoppel may be grounds for dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction if a jurisdictional determination in a prior decision is afforded collateral estoppel effect, and the appellant provides no other valid basis of Board jurisdiction. Hau v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 13 (2016), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 878 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017). ¶5 Previously, the appellant filed an October 19, 2006 appeal of his probationary termination, which the administrative judge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant lacked the requisite 1 year of current continuous service necessary to be an “employee” with adverse action appeal 4

rights to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). Seda v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-07-0053-I-1, Initial Decision (0053 ID) (Jan. 31, 2007). That decision became the Board’s final decision on whether the appellant met the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) when the Board denied the appellant’s subsequent petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113; see Seda v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-07-0053-I-1, Final Order (May 8, 2007). ¶6 Applying the elements of collateral estoppel set forth above, t he administrative judge correctly determined that the issue of whether the appellant was an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511 is identical to his claims in this appeal, was actually litigated in the previous action, was necessary to the finding in that appeal, and the appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue . 0451 ID at 8-9; compare 0053 ID, with IAF, Tabs 1, 3-4, 12, and PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-25. Moreover, because the same definition of “employee” applies to the appellant under chapters 75 and 43, he also is precluded from appealing his termination as a performance-based action under chapter 43. PFR File, Tab 4 at 20-22; IAF, Tab 11 at 17, Tab 10 at 97-99; see 5 U.S.C.

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Anthony Seda v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anthony-seda-v-social-security-administration-mspb-2023.