1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
9 ANTHONY RAYMOND LOCKHART, Case No. 1:25-cv-00770-KES-SKO
10 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Plaintiff, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 11 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED AND THE FINAL DECISION 12 v. OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY BE AFFIRMED 13 FRANK BISIGNANO, (Doc. 14) Commissioner of Social Security, 14 14-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendant. _____________________________________/ 16
17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 19 On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff Anthony Raymond Lockhart (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 20 seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the 21 “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) 22 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). (Doc. 1.) The 23 matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral 24 argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1 25 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for 26 summary judgment be denied, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be affirmed. 27 28 1 2 On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff protectively filed claims for DIB and SSI payments, alleging he 3 became disabled on June 10, 2021, due to back problems, kidney problems, arthritis, sciatica, bulging 4 discs, high blood pressure, and asthma. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 24, 74, 87, 101, 113, 318, 5 324, 339, 368.) 6 Plaintiff was born in 1974 and was 46 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (AR 30, 7 73, 86, 101, 113.) He has an eleventh-grade education and previously worked as a construction 8 worker and furniture mover. (AR 30, 66, 319, 322, 327.) 9 A. Relevant Evidence of Record2 10 In September 2021, Plaintiff complained of aching and radiating bilateral flank pain and 11 intermittent lower back pain. (AR 486–90.) His “significant” history of polycystic kidney disease 12 was also noted. (AR 486.) Plaintiff underwent an epidural steroid injection with “good relief,” and 13 the provider observed that Plaintiff’s pain is “well controlled” with medication and the injection. (AR 14 488.) 15 At a follow up appointment in June 2022, Plaintiff reported that his back and leg pain were 16 “becoming more bothersome” and requested an injection, which he relayed “provided excellent relief 17 of the pain in the past.” (AR 482.) 18 In September 2022, consultative examiner Robert Wagner, M.D., performed a comprehensive 19 internal medicine evaluation of Plaintiff, who complained of hypertension, asthma, and 20 thoracolumbar back pain. (AR 466–71.) Plaintiff reported that he cooks, cleans, drives, shops, 21 performs his own activities of daily living without assistance, and walks some for exercise. (AR 22 467.) Upon examination, Dr. Wagner observed that Plaintiff “was easily able to get up from a chair 23 in the waiting room and walk at a normal speed back to the examination room without assistance.” 24 (AR 467.) He “was easily able to get on and off the exam table and easily able to bend at the waist 25 to take off shoes and socks and put them back on, demonstrating good dexterity and good flexibility.” 26 (AR 467.) Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff’s “dexterity is good,” as he was “easily able to oppose his 27
28 2 Because the parties are familiar with the medical evidence, it is summarized here only to the extent relevant to the 1 fingertips to his thumb tips.” (AR 467.) Plaintiff exhibited normal station, normal gait without an 2 assistive device, normal finger-to-nose coordination, negative Romberg, normal deep tendon 3 reflexes, grossly intact cranial nerves, normal range of motion, 5/5 strength, and grossly intact 4 sensation. (AR 468–70.) 5 Plaintiff presented for a follow up appointment in December 2022, complaining that his back 6 pain was radiating, constant, aching, sharp, and aggravated by activity. (AR 474.) It was noted that 7 his past medical history was “significant” for polycystic kidney disease, for which a nephologist is 8 following up. (AR 474.) He reported “improvement of pain with medication” and “greater than 60% 9 reduction” of symptoms. (AR 475.) He also reported a “greater quality of life” and an ability to 10 “meet functional goals including performing [activities of daily living] independently.” (AR 475.) 11 Plaintiff wished to proceed with epidural steroid injections, as he was “pleased with the results.” (AR 12 478.) An MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine performed that same month showed “L5-S1 moderate to 13 severe degenerative disc disease with severe right and moderate to severe left foraminal stenosis 14 without central canal stenosis; L4-L5 mild to moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis; and L3-L4 mild 15 left foraminal stenosis.” (AR 512–13.) 16 A consultative examination was held in June 2023 with Rajendra Kewallal, Psy.D., in June 17 2023. (AR 706–12.) Plaintiff reported that he was suffering from depression due to his physical 18 functioning. (AR 706.) He stated that he had “[n]o significant difficulties with shopping, self-care, 19 or independent living,” “is independent for basic [activities of daily living],” and “does not need help 20 with preparing meals or doing light household chores.” (AR 707.) Upon examination, he was alert 21 and oriented with a friendly manner, good grooming, good eye contact, cooperative attitude, normal 22 speech, good mood, full affect, adequate attention and concentration, adequate fund of knowledge, 23 adequate memory, adequate ability for abstraction, adequate insight and judgment, linear thought 24 process, and normal thought content. (AR 708.) The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth 25 Edition, was administered and Plaintiff’s scores indicated his intellectual ability was within the 26 “extremely low” range. (AR 709.) Based on her examination, Dr. Kewallal issued an opinion, co- 27 signed by Kellie Suller, Psy.D., that Plaintiff had no more than mild limitations in any area of mental 28 functioning, including maintaining regular attendance, performing complex and detailed tasks, 1 working on a consistent basis, completing a normal workday, working without special or additional 2 supervision, accepting instruction from supervisors, interacting with co-workers, and dealing with 3 stress. (AR 712.) In June and September 2023, respectively, Plaintiff underwent a right and left 4 lumbar radiofrequency ablation. (AR 713–16.) 5 In October 2023, Plaintiff continued to complain of chronic low back pain that radiates to his 6 lower extremities. (AR 717–20.) He reported that the ablation “helped at first but then [he] had 7 hernia repair surgery[,] which may have reduced [its] efficacy.” (AR 718.) Plaintiff also reported 8 “improvement with medication,” that he had “greater than 60% reduction of [symptoms],” and that 9 he was “able to meet functional goals including performing [activities of daily living].” (AR 718.) 10 Plaintiff underwent an MRI of his lumbar spine in January 2024, which showed “[m]oderate 11 foraminal stenosis at L5-S1” and “[f]acet arthopathy at multiple levels.” (AR 803.) That next 12 month, he complained of bilateral flank pain. (AR 803.) He stated that opioids improve his pain 13 and function. (AR 803.) 14 B. Plaintiff’s Statements 15 In July 2022, Plaintiff completed a “Pain Questionnaire,” in which he complained of pain that 16 radiated to his right leg and right shoulder. (AR 314.) According to Plaintiff, his pain was 17 exacerbated by prolonged standing and walking, bending, twisting, and driving. (AR 314.) He 18 reported that injections cause less pain but do not alleviate it. (AR 314.) 19 Plaintiff completed an “Adult Function Report” in March 2023. (AR 360–67.) He reported 20 that his pain caused sleep disturbances and difficulty performing household chores. (AR 361–62.) 21 According to Plaintiff, he can complete his personal care activities within his physical tolerances. 22 (AR 361.) He denied needing reminders to bathe and to take medications. (AR 362). He reported 23 activities of daily living including driving, cooking simple meals, managing money, watching 24 television, and reading. (AR 362–63.) He can pay bills and handle a savings account independently. 25 (AR 363.) He participates in activities, such as watching television, reading, and socializing with 26 others via video chat. (AR 364.) He also sits in his front yard and talks to others. (AR 364.) He 27 reported that he can only walk about two to three blocks before needing to stop and rest and could 28 only stand for a few minutes at a time. (AR 365.) He stated that he may forget parts of spoken 1 instructions and would need them repeated. (AR 365.) He can handle changes in routine “slowly, but 2 surely” with the support of others. (AR 366.) 3 C. Administrative Proceedings 4 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on October 20, 2022, 5 and again upon reconsideration on June 29, 2023. (AR 132–37, 140–47.) Consequently, Plaintiff 6 requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 155–73.) The ALJ conducted 7 a hearing on August 29, 2024. (AR 40–72.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with his attorney and 8 testified. (AR 49–65.) A Vocational Expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing. (AR 65–72.) 9 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 10 At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he cannot work due to low back pain, sciatica, and 11 drowsiness due to his medications. (AR 58.) He uses a cane as needed, but it was not prescribed by 12 a doctor. (AR 64–65.) 13 2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 14 The VE testified at the hearing that Plaintiff had past work as a construction worker and 15 furniture mover. (AR 66.) The ALJ asked the VE to consider a person of Plaintiff’s age, education, 16 and past work history. (AR 66–67.) The VE was also to assume this person could perform light 17 work, except they can frequently climb, stoop, crouch; should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, 18 odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation; and they can have occasional exposure to hazards such as 19 unprotected heights and moving machinery. (AR 67.) The VE testified that such a person could not 20 perform Plaintiff’s past work, but could perform other light exertional jobs in the national economy, 21 such as general cashier, Dictionary of Operational Titles (DOT) code 211.462-010 with a specific 22 vocational preparation (SVP)3 of 2; fast food worker, DOT code 311.472-010 with an SVP of 2; and 23 housekeeping cleaner, DOT code 323.687-014 with an SVP of 2. (AR 67.) 24 With the additional limitations in a second hypothetical that the first hypothetical person could 25 frequently grasp, handle, finger with the nondominant left upper extremity, the VE testified that such 26 3 Specific vocational preparation, as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical worker 27 to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). Jobs in the 28 DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the highest level – 1 a person could perform all jobs previously identified, except for the fast food worker. (AR 67–68.) 2 According to the VE, in a third hypothetical, when changing the exertional level to sedentary (and 3 keeping all other limitations), the second hypothetical person could perform the jobs of telephone 4 information clerk, DOT code 237.367 046 with a SVP of 2; charge account clerk, DOT code 205.367- 5 014 with an SVP of 2; and ampoule sealer, DOT code 559.687 014 with an SVP of 2. (AR 68.) The 6 VE further testified that adding a limitation to the second and third hypotheticals that the individual 7 could understand, remember and carry out simple work instructions would eliminate the general 8 cashier, the telephone information clerk, and the charge account clerk. (AR 68–69.) 9 Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE if adding to the first hypothetical individual a requirement 10 of “hourly checks by a supervisor to make sure that they’re doing the job correctly and then retrain 11 and reorient them as necessary to make sure that all tasks are performed satisfactorily . . . on an 12 ongoing basis” would be work preclusive, and the VE answered in the affirmative, stating that such 13 would “reflect more of a sheltered work environment.” (AR 69–70.) 14 D. The ALJ’s Decision 15 In a decision dated September 18, 2024, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as 16 defined by the Act. (AR 17–32.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 17 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. (AR 19–32.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff met the insured status 18 requirements of the Act through December 31, 2022, and he had not engaged in substantial gainful 19 activity since June 10, 2021, the alleged onset date (step one). (AR 19–20.) At step two, the ALJ 20 found Plaintiff’s following impairments to be severe: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; 21 hypertension; chronic kidney disease; and obesity. (AR 20–22.) Plaintiff did not have an impairment 22 or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 23 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”) (step three). (AR 22–24.) 24 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC)4 and applied the 25
26 4 RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. TITLES II 27 & XVI: ASSESSING RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY IN INITIAL CLAIMS, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual’s 28 medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. “In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ 1 assessment at steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (“Before we go 2 from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity . . . . We use this residual 3 functional capacity assessment at both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these 4 steps.”). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC: 5 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except frequently climb, stoop, and crouch; should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, 6 dusts, odors, gases, and poor ventilation; occasional exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights and moving machinery; and frequently grasp, handle, and finger 7 with the non-dominant left upper extremity. 8 (AR 24–30.) Although the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be 9 expected to cause the alleged symptoms[,]” the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not 10 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons 11 explained in this decision.” (AR 25.) 12 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work (step four) but 13 that, given his RFC, he could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, 14 specifically general cashier and housekeeping cleaner (step five). (AR 30–32.) The ALJ concluded 15 Plaintiff was not disabled from June 10, 2021, through the date of the decision. (AR 32.) 16 Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review on 17 May 7, 2025. (AR 1–6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 18 Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Applicable Law 20 An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if they are unable 21 “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 22 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 23 to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). However, 24 “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [their] physical or mental 25 impairment or impairments are of such severity that [they] are not only unable to do [their] previous 26 work but cannot, considering [their] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind 27
28 symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.’” Robbins v. Soc. 1 of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). 2 “The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining 3 whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 4 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The 5 Ninth Circuit has provided the following description of the sequential evaluation analysis: 6 In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step 7 two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or 8 combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ proceeds to step three and considers whether the impairment or combination of 9 impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, [a]pp. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ 10 proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing [their] past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds 11 to step five and examines whether the claimant has the [RFC] . . . to perform any 12 other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 13 14 Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (providing 15 the “five-step sequential evaluation process” for SSI claimants). “If a claimant is found to be 16 ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” 17 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 18 “The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of the 19 analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 20 “However, if a claimant establishes an inability to continue [their] past work, the burden shifts to the 21 Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work.” Id. 22 (citing Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687). 23 B. Scope of Review 24 “This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of [social security] benefits [only] when 25 the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record 26 as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more than a 27 mere scintilla,’” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 28 adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting 1 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See also Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 2 (9th Cir. 2020). 3 “This is a highly deferential standard of review . . . .” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 4 Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by 5 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 6 2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the 7 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund v. Massanari, 8 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 9 interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.” (citations 10 omitted)). 11 Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific 12 quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 13 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both 14 evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Id. 15 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). 16 Finally, courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 17 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 18 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Harmless error “exists when it is clear from the record that ‘the 19 ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 20 at 1038 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[T]he burden of 21 showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” 22 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted). 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred during their RFC analysis in their consideration of 25 Plaintiff’s mild mental limitations as opined by Dr. Kewallal (and co-signed by Dr. Suller), and that 26 the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for discounting his testimony regarding his 27 subjective complaints. (Docs. 14, 20.) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s treatment of 28 Plaintiff’s mild limitations was proper and supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ 1 properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined the credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations of 2 disabling symptoms and limitations. (Doc. 16.) The undersigned agrees with the Commissioner. 3 A. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Mild Limitations Was Not Erroneous 4 1. Applicable Law 5 The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [their] limitations” and represents an 6 assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The 7 RFC must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. 8 §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–8p. In doing so, the ALJ must 9 determine credibility, resolve conflicts in medical testimony and resolve evidentiary ambiguities. 10 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). “In determining a claimant’s RFC, an 11 ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record such as medical records, lay evidence and the 12 effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable 13 impairment.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.935(a)(3) 14 (residual functional capacity determined based on all relevant medical and other evidence). “The 15 ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 16 evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 17 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). 18 Where a claimant alleges a mental impairment, steps two and three require the ALJ to apply 19 the psychiatric review technique (“PRT”) outlined at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 416.920a to 20 determine the severity of the claimant’s impairment at step two, and to determine whether the 21 impairment satisfies Social Security regulations at step three. If the claimant is found to have a 22 medically determinable mental impairment, the ALJ must “specify the symptoms, signs, and 23 laboratory findings that substantiate the presence of the impairment(s),” then “rate the degree of 24 functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s) in accordance with paragraph (c) of [Sections 25 404.1520a, 416.920a],” which specifies four broad functional areas: (1) understand, remember, or 26 apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage 27 oneself. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b), (c)(3); id. §§ 416.920a(b), (c)(3). The four functional areas are 28 known as the “paragraph B” criteria. 1 The functional limitations are rated on a five-point scale of “[n]one, mild, moderate, marked, 2 [or] extreme,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). An impairment causing no more than 3 mild limitations in any area is generally considered a non-severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 4 416.920a(d)(1). If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the 5 ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC. The RFC determination is thus distinct from the PRT (and 6 consideration of the “four broad functional” areas) though the discussion often overlaps. 7 2. Analysis 8 Here, in performing the psychiatric review technique, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild 9 limitations in all four categories, including: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying 10 information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) 11 adapting or managing oneself. (AR 20–21.) Dr. Kewallal opined that Plaintiff had no more than 12 mild limitations in any area of mental functioning, including maintaining regular attendance, 13 performing complex and detailed tasks, working on a consistent basis, completing a normal workday, 14 working without special or additional supervision, accepting instructions from supervisors, 15 interacting with co-workers, and dealing with stress. (AR 712.) 16 The ALJ found the opinion persuasive, explaining that it is 17 consistent with [Plaintiff’s] generally independent activities of daily living that were 18 limited mainly due to his physical impairments, as well as [Plaintiff’s] lack of mental health treatment, generally benign mental status exams, and [Plaintiff’s] extensive 19 work history. Dr. Kewallal supported this opinion with an examination of [Plaintiff] that included a generally unremarkable mental status examination and test results 20 indicating extremely low intellectual ability that would cause challenges performing complex tasks. 21 22 (AR 22 (internal citations omitted).) 23 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Kewallal’s opinion was persuasive. 24 Instead, he argues that despite finding Dr. Kewallal’s opinion persuasive, the ALJ’s RFC conflicts 25 with the opinion in that it does not include any mental limitations and, where the RFC conflicts with 26 a medical source opinion, Social Security Ruling 96-8p requires the ALJ to explain why the opinion 27 was not adopted. 28 Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing, however, because there is no requirement that mild 1 limitations such as those opined by Dr. Kewallal be incorporated in the RFC, or that the ALJ must 2 explain the omission thereof. A mild limitation means that “functioning in this area independently, 3 appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is slightly limited.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. 4 App. 1, Listing 12.00(F)(2). Relatedly, where a mental impairment causes no more than mild 5 limitations, the impairment is non-severe (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1)), and a 6 non-severe impairment “does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work 7 activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522, 416.922. 8 In Woods v. Kijakazi, the Ninth Circuit found no error where the ALJ assessed mild limitations 9 in two of the four functional categories but included no mental limitations in the RFC. 32 F.4th 785, 10 794 (9th Cir. 2022). In so holding, the Woods panel noted that “Woods does not identify any 11 particular evidence that the ALJ failed to consider or explain why the record does not support the 12 ALJ’s findings regarding her mental functioning.” Id. The Ninth Circuit found the ALJ’s decision 13 procedurally sufficient, even though the ALJ neither accommodated Woods’s mild mental limitations 14 in the RFC nor explained why accommodations were unnecessary. Following Woods, this Court has 15 concluded: “Simply put, there is no requirement that mild limitations be incorporated into the RFC.” 16 Stoy v. O’Malley, No. 1:24-CV-00131-GSA, 2024 WL 4752438, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2024). 17 Plaintiff’s brief does not mention Woods—much less explain how it is distinguishable or 18 inapplicable. Instead, Plaintiff points to cases that are inapposite not only because they predate 19 Woods’ binding authority, but because they concern moderate, not mild, limitations, which some 20 courts have found must be incorporated into the RFC. See, e.g., Wascovich v. Saul, 2:18-cv-659- 21 EFB, 2019 WL 4572084, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2019) (“Where the ALJ accepts the medical 22 assessment of moderate limitations, those limitations must be accounted for in the RFC.”) (citing 23 Betts v. Colvin, 531 F. App’x 799, 800 (9th Cir. 2013)). 24 As in Woods, Plaintiff does not identify specific evidence of mental limitations that the ALJ 25 failed to consider in assessing the RFC. Nor does Plaintiff contend that the ALJ erred in failing to 26 find his persistent depressive disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, or adjustment disorder 27 severe. (See AR 20, 22.) Even if the ALJ had erred, the Ninth Circuit has observed that there is “no 28 authority to support the proposition that a severe mental impairment must correspond to limitations 1 on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 2 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 Plaintiff also identifies no support for the suggestion that “mild” limitations in the abilities to 4 “accept instructions and perform work activities without special or additional supervision,” as opined 5 by Dr. Kewallal, imply a “sheltered employment environment involving frequent supervision, 6 retraining, and reorientation,” which the VE testified would be a work-preclusive limitation (AR 69– 7 70). The ALJ expressly found otherwise, concluding no mental limitations were warranted in the 8 RFC because “the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation 9 in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.” (AR 21; see also AR 24 (“In making this [RFC] 10 finding, the undersigned has considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can 11 reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”).) 12 In sum, because limitations due to mild mental impairments are not required to be included 13 in the RFC, Plaintiff has identified no error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment as it pertains to their analysis 14 of Dr. Kewallal’s opinion. See Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:24-CV-02781 DAD SCR, 2025 15 WL 3470255, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2025) (noting courts “have consistently followed Woods in 16 finding that ALJs are not required to incorporate ‘mild’ limitations in the RFC.”) (collecting cases). 17 See also Marie Beth D. v. King, No. 3:24-CV-00525-W-AHG, 2025 WL 504368, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 18 Feb. 14, 2025) (“Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ found Dr. Livesay’s opinion persuasive, he 19 was compelled to either incorporate the mental limitations in Dr. Livesay’s opinion or explain his 20 decision not to include them. The undersigned disagrees.”); Saul R. v. O’Malley, Case No. EDCV 21 23-01232-FWS (AS), 2024 WL 3641041, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal., July 3, 2024) (“the ALJ was not 22 required to include the mild mental limitations in the RFC because, as the ALJ noted, the record did 23 not reflect that Plaintiff’s mental impairment caused a significant limitation in his ability to work.”). 24 B. The ALJ Properly Found Plaintiff Less Than Fully Credible 25 1. Legal Standard 26 In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective complaints, an 27 ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, 28 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 1 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Id. The 2 claimant is not required to show that his impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause the 3 severity of the symptom [they have] alleged; [they] need only show that it could reasonably have 4 caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th 5 Cir. 2007)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can 6 only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if they give “specific, clear 7 and convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained: 8 The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation 9 for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 10 testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 11 treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing. 12 13 Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bray v. 14 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2009). Other factors the ALJ may 15 consider include a claimant’s work record and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning 16 the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he complains. Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 17 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 18 The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet,” as it is “‘the most 19 demanding required in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 20 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). General 21 findings are not enough to satisfy this standard; the ALJ “‘must identify what testimony is not credible 22 and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.’” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 23 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). 24 2. Analysis 25 As noted above, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to 26 cause the alleged symptoms,” but rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not entirely consistent 27 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (AR 25.) Since the ALJ found 28 Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 1 symptoms,” the only remaining issue is whether the ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing 2 reasons” for Plaintiff’s adverse credibility finding. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 3 Here, the undersigned finds that the ALJ identified at least three valid reasons for discrediting 4 Plaintiff’s testimony. 5 a. Activities of Daily Living 6 First, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations were “inconsistent with his activities of daily 7 living.” (AR 25.) As discussed by the ALJ, the record contains reports of Plaintiff’s ability to drive, 8 cook simple meals, manage money, watch television, and read. (See AR 362–63, 467.) “[S]ome of 9 the physical and mental abilities and social interactions required in order to perform these activities,” 10 the ALJ noted, “are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.” (AR 11 25.) 12 An ALJ may properly consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating credibility. Fair 13 v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the nature of daily activities may be considered when 14 evaluating credibility). Moreover, in evaluating a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider 15 inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s conduct and whether the 16 claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms. Molina, 674 F.3d at 17 1112. Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they are grounds for 18 discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 19 impairment. Id. at 1113. 20 The undersigned finds that the above-described activities tend to suggest, as the ALJ 21 concluded, that Plaintiff’s ability to participate in the enumerated activities “diminishes the 22 consistency of [his] allegations of functional limitations” (AR 25). See Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (finding 23 that if a claimant has the ability to perform activities “that involved many of the same physical tasks 24 as a particular type of job, it would not be farfetched for an ALJ to conclude that the claimant’s pain 25 does not prevent her from working”); see also, e.g., Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 26 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the ALJ sufficiently explained their reasons for discrediting the 27 claimant’s testimony because the record reflected that the claimant performed normal activities of 28 daily living, including cooking, housecleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband managing 1 finances); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s 2 determination regarding claimant’s ability to “fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard, and 3 occasionally care for his friend’s child” was a specific finding sufficient to discredit the claimant’s 4 credibility); Kelly v. Astrue, 471 F. App’x 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that ALJ properly made 5 an adverse credibility finding because, in part, claimant’s daily activities included driving, washing 6 the dishes, shopping, and caring for her two children); Nelson v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00696-SKO, 7 2016 WL 3407627, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) (ALJ properly discredited subjective complaints 8 of claimant who suffered from chronic back problems where claimant engaged in activities such as 9 preparing simple meals, washing dishes, driving a car, shopping for groceries and household supplies 10 2–3 times a week, walking up to a mile, using a computer for about half an hour at a time, visiting 11 with family, mopping and vacuuming, independently handling her own finances, and doing yoga 12 tapes at home.). 13 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s reliance on his activities is error because the ALJ “did not 14 address Plaintiff’s Pain Questionnaire and Function Report statements at all in the decision,” which 15 show that his daily activities are “extremely limited.” (Doc. 14 at 12.) Plaintiff is mistaken. The 16 ALJ did consider both the Pain Questionnaire (AR 25, 28) and the Function Report (AR 20–22, 25, 17 28, 30) in the decision—including the very pages of those Reports cited by Plaintiff in his briefing 18 (compare Doc. 14 at 12 with AR 20, 25). And the ALJ recognized in the decision that Plaintiff has 19 some work limitations because of his impairments, including additional postural and environmental 20 limitations beyond those allowed by light exertional work. (See AR 24 (RFC formulation); see also 21 AR 33 (deeming the consultative examiner’s opinion “somewhat persuasive” because he “did not 22 sufficiently consider the claimant’s symptoms that included radiation of his pain to his posterior right 23 thigh and increased pain with bending and lifting, suggesting that [Plaintiff] is more limited than the 24 doctor assessed.”).) The undersigned concludes that the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s 25 testimony that his limitations render him completely unable to work, however. Fair, 885 F.2d at 604; 26 see also Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (“So long as the adjudicator makes 27 specific findings that are supported by the record, the adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s 28 allegations based on inconsistencies in the testimony or on relevant character evidence.”). Where the 1 ALJ makes a reasonable interpretation of Plaintiff’s testimony, it is not the Court’s role to second- 2 guess it. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ’s credibility 3 determination even where the claimant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly she 4 was able to keep up with all the activities and noting that the ALJ’s interpretation “may not be the 5 only reasonable one”). See also Ford, 950 F.3d at 1159 (“Our review of an ALJ’s fact-finding for 6 substantial evidence is deferential”). 7 b. Objective Medical Evidence 8 The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s testimony of extreme limitations to be “inconsistent with the 9 objective medical evidence of record.” (AR 26.) An ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective 10 complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of [the 11 impairment].” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. Nonetheless, “lack of medical evidence . . . is a factor that 12 the ALJ can consider in [their] credibility analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. See also Moisa v. 13 Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. Stated differently, “[a]lthough 14 the inconsistency of objective findings with subjective claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting 15 subjective complaints of pain, it is one factor which may be considered with others.” Salas v. Colvin, 16 No. 1:13–cv–00429–BAM, 2014 WL 4186555, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (citations omitted). 17 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ conclusion by asserting that the ALJ “did not explicitly consider 18 . . . highly relevant evidence” such as a “later lumbar MRI” and records documenting his “[p]olycystic 19 kidney disease,” including an “abdominopelvic CT scan.” (Doc. 14 at 10.) Once again, Plaintiff is 20 mistaken. The ALJ included a discussion in the decision of each of these records. (See AR 26 (lumbar 21 MRI); AR 27 (polycystic kidney disease and CT scan).) At bottom, Plaintiff’s disagreement lies with 22 the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical evidence, yet it is not within the province of this Court to 23 second-guess the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of that evidence, even if such evidence could give 24 rise to inferences more favorable to Plaintiff. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 25 2001) (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 604). 26 The undersigned therefore finds the ALJ’s conclusion that the evidentiary record does not 27 support, and in fact undermines, Plaintiff’s subjective statements is supported by substantial evidence. 28 The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s complaints are inconsistent with the objective medical 1 evidence is therefore another clear and convincing reason for discounting his subjective symptom 2 testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (concluding that the ALJ properly discredited claimant 3 testimony based on inconsistencies with objective medical evidence).; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 4 416.929(c)(3). 5 c. Conservative Treatment 6 Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment for back pain has been “essentially routine 7 and/or conservative in nature.” (AR 26–27.) Specifically, the ALJ observed that although the record 8 indicated degenerative disc disease (AR 512–13), Plaintiff’s treatment at most consisted of epidural 9 steroid injections, medication, and physical therapy. (AR 475, 478, 482, 488, 718, 803.) 10 Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s characterization of his treatment as conservative.5 (See 11 Doc. 12 at 13 (“Plaintiff acknowledges that this constitutes conservative treatment.”).) Based on the 12 above-described conservative treatment for Plaintiff’s back pain, which is supported by the record 13 and not contested by Plaintiff, the ALJ was therefore entitled to discount Plaintiff’s credibility. See 14 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (evidence of conservative treatment is 15 sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment); Johnson v. 16 Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may properly rely on the fact that only conservative 17 treatment has been prescribed). Accordingly, the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination based on 18 Plaintiff’s conservative treatment for his back pain will not be disturbed. 19 In sum, the undersigned finds that the ALJ provided at least three clear and convincing 20 reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to discredit Plaintiff’s reports regarding the extent of his 21 5 Plaintiff does, however, claim that such conservative treatment “failed.” (Doc. 14 at 10–11.) It does not appear that 22 the ALJ predicated their credibility finding on the efficacy of Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, thereby precluding judicial review. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We are constrained to review the reasons 23 the ALJ asserts.”). But, even if they had, the undersigned observes that there is substantial evidence in the record— most reported by Plaintiff himself—documenting improvement in his pain symptoms with such treatment (see, e.g., AR 24 488 (pain is “well controlled” with medication and injection); AR 482 (injection provided “provided excellent relief of the pain”); AR 475, 718 (reporting “improvement of pain with medication,” “greater than 60% reduction” of symptoms, 25 “greater quality of life” and an ability to “meet functional goals including performing [activities of daily living] independently”); AR 478 (“pleased with the results” of injection); AR 803 (medication improves his pain and 26 function).). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)–(v); (an ALJ may find a plaintiff less credible when their symptoms can be controlled by treatment and/or medication); see also Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 27 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purposes of determining eligibility for [disability] benefits.”). To the extent the ALJ based his credibility finding on such 28 conclusion, it will not be second guessed here. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 1 limitations. 2 V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 4 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) be DENIED; 5 2. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security be AFFIRMED; and 6 3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Frank 7 Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Anthony Raymond 8 Lockhart, and to CLOSE this action. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the District Judge assigned to this 10 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen (14) 11 days of service of these recommendations, any party may file written objections to these findings and 12 recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 13 captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 14 The District Judge will review the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant 15 to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 16 time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 17 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19
20 Dated: February 13, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21
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