UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION
ANTHONY PEOPLES, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-1399 ) PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL ) CENTER et al., ) Defendants. )
ORDER COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Motions for Counsel (Docs. 4, 11), and a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP) (Doc. 12) filed by Plaintiff Anthony Peoples, an inmate at Joliet Treatment Center. I. Complaint A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing them liberally in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). B. Background
Plaintiff’s pleading concerns violations at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) allegedly committed by Defendants Vaughn, a Corrections Lieutenant, and Wagher, a corrections sergeant. Plaintiff asserts that on an unidentified date, Defendant Vaughn was escorting Plaintiff to his cell when Plaintiff refused Vaughn’s request for Plaintiff to return his
restraints. Plaintiff explained that he refused because he “needed a crisis call.” (Pl. Amend. Compl., Doc. 10 at 4.) Vaughn responded by hitting Plaintiff three times in the face and head with handcuffs that were wrapped around Vaughn’s hand. As a result, Plaintiff states he began to bleed. (Id.) C. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) are granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in
sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Wagher, as he does not state facts demonstrating or permitting the Court to infer that Wagher committed a constitutional
violation. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). The Court also notes Plaintiff identified Pontiac Correctional Center as a Defendant in his initial pleading, which he does not mention it in his amended pleading. Even if he had, Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim against a prison. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person
subject to suit under § 1983.”); see also Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued under § 1983). However, Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Vaughn. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)
(concluding that in an excessive force claim, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”). II. Counsel and IFP Petition Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 12) is moot as this Court has granted Plaintiff’s
previously filed IFP Petition (Doc. 3). Plaintiff moves for the recruitment of counsel. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request
counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied because he has not satisfied his
threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received. Furthermore, recruitment of counsel at this early stage of the proceedings is not warranted. As explained below, entry of the Court’s Merit Review Order begins the service phase. After Defendant Vaughn has been served and filed his answer to Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which usually takes sixty days, the Court will enter a scheduling order to provide guidance and deadlines to assist Plaintiff during the discovery process. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Pleading (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading.
2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Doc. 4, 11) are DENIED.
3) The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate Defendant Wagher and Pontiac Correctional Center as parties.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION
ANTHONY PEOPLES, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-1399 ) PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL ) CENTER et al., ) Defendants. )
ORDER COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Motions for Counsel (Docs. 4, 11), and a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP) (Doc. 12) filed by Plaintiff Anthony Peoples, an inmate at Joliet Treatment Center. I. Complaint A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing them liberally in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). B. Background
Plaintiff’s pleading concerns violations at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) allegedly committed by Defendants Vaughn, a Corrections Lieutenant, and Wagher, a corrections sergeant. Plaintiff asserts that on an unidentified date, Defendant Vaughn was escorting Plaintiff to his cell when Plaintiff refused Vaughn’s request for Plaintiff to return his
restraints. Plaintiff explained that he refused because he “needed a crisis call.” (Pl. Amend. Compl., Doc. 10 at 4.) Vaughn responded by hitting Plaintiff three times in the face and head with handcuffs that were wrapped around Vaughn’s hand. As a result, Plaintiff states he began to bleed. (Id.) C. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) are granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in
sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Wagher, as he does not state facts demonstrating or permitting the Court to infer that Wagher committed a constitutional
violation. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). The Court also notes Plaintiff identified Pontiac Correctional Center as a Defendant in his initial pleading, which he does not mention it in his amended pleading. Even if he had, Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim against a prison. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person
subject to suit under § 1983.”); see also Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued under § 1983). However, Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Vaughn. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)
(concluding that in an excessive force claim, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”). II. Counsel and IFP Petition Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 12) is moot as this Court has granted Plaintiff’s
previously filed IFP Petition (Doc. 3). Plaintiff moves for the recruitment of counsel. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request
counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied because he has not satisfied his
threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received. Furthermore, recruitment of counsel at this early stage of the proceedings is not warranted. As explained below, entry of the Court’s Merit Review Order begins the service phase. After Defendant Vaughn has been served and filed his answer to Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which usually takes sixty days, the Court will enter a scheduling order to provide guidance and deadlines to assist Plaintiff during the discovery process. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Pleading (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading.
2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Doc. 4, 11) are DENIED.
3) The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate Defendant Wagher and Pontiac Correctional Center as parties.
4) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Vaughn. Plaintiff’s claim against Vaughn proceeds in his individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
7) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
8) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered.
9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendant’s counsel. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
10) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
12) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard procedures.
ENTERED May 8, 2026.
s/ Colleen R. Lawless ____________________________________ COLLEEN R. LAWLESS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE