Anthony Oliver v. Warden Wilcox State Prison

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-11968
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11968 ____________________

ANTHONY OLIVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WARDEN, WILCOX STATE PRISON, CAPTAIN LAWSON, OFFICER DEESE, OFFICER SEAN WEAVER, OFFICER STANFIELD, Wilcox State Prison, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00183-TES ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Following an attack by a fellow inmate at Wilcox State Prison, Anthony Oliver filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against certain prison guards and their supervisors alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm Oliver faced from his assailant. After discovery, the defend- ants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were enti- tled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity because they were not deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm Oliver faced. Oliver now appeals that order as it relates to three defend- ants, Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver. After carefully consid- ering the record and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s ruling. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Anthony Oliver is an inmate at Wilcox State Prison. When he arrived at Wilcox State Prison in the late summer of 2020, he USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 3 of 19

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told prison staff that he identified as a woman. 1 Oliver, however, “is not on hormone therapy, has not started hormone therapy, and has not otherwise begun the process of making a transition from male to female.” Oliver’s transgender identity thus was not evi- dent from his appearance. On October 28, 2020, Oliver was moved into an administra- tive segregation dormitory after the Wilcox State Prison warden learned that Oliver had sent threatening messages to the Clerk of Chatham County. In segregation, Oliver was placed in a single cell across from another inmate, Anquavious Morgan (“Morgan”). Be- cause there was “nothing to do in segregation except talk through the door,” Oliver and Morgan started “talking back and forth” to one another. According to Oliver, over the next few weeks, Mor- gan made sexual comments and was “trash-talking” Oliver. Specif- ically, Morgan tried “to entice [Oliver] . . . to move into the cell with him,” asked him “[i]f [he] was homosexual,” and said “[e]xplicit sexual things” like “I’m going to get you in a cell” and “fuck your tight, pink ass.” Oliver recounted that “[t]here was a lot of [Morgan] arguing through the door, going back and forth, and a lot of what you would call trash-talking . . . [saying] [a] bunch of filthy things about ejaculating all over my face, and how he wants to do this and that.” Oliver never informed correctional officers that Morgan threatened to sexually assault him. Instead, Oliver generally

1 The record does not contain any evidence that Oliver conveyed this infor-

mation to Officers Stanfield, Deese, or Weaver. USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 4 of 19

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informed Officer Stanfield that Morgan had made “a lot of sexual comments and statements about doing stuff.” And he generally informed Officers Deese and Weaver that he wanted to “go [] to another cell.” On November 25, 2020—several weeks after Oliver’s trans- fer to segregation—Officer Stanfield and another prison guard told Oliver that he had to move into Morgan’s cell. Oliver told the of- ficers that he did not “want to go in there” and that Morgan’s nick- name was “the booty bandit.” 2 They moved him into Morgan’s cell anyway. Shortly after Oliver moved in, “Morgan took off all his clothes down to his underwear.” According to Oliver, Morgan “kept pulling out his penis and playing with it, and he kept asking sexual questions.” Morgan asked Oliver if he wanted “to give him oral sex and [Oliver] told him, no.” Rebuffed by Oliver, Morgan then “talked about other stuff, him getting out of prison, prison- talk . . . to bypass the time[.]” After about “four hours,” Oliver “got pulled out for a medical follow-up . . . to be checked for COVID.” During his check-up, Oliver told Officer Stanfield, another officer, and a nurse: “I don’t feel comfortable with this guy in there. He’s going [to] do something. He’s already got his penis hanging

2 According to Oliver, that nickname was given to Morgan by one of the fe-

male officers and “all” of the officers used it. Oliver also testified that he “heard inmates calling [Morgan] that” and that the other inmates “would yell it out at night.” But there is no record evidence showing that Morgan ever sexually assaulted another inmate. USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 5 of 19

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out and making . . . a lot of sexual comments and statements about doing stuff.” Oliver also told them that Morgan has been “asking [sexual] questions, and [] was playing with himself in the cell.” Ol- iver “protested” going back into the cell, but Officer Stanfield made him. When Oliver got back to the cell, he saw Morgan in bed “do- ing a masturbation simulation with his penis out.” Morgan asked Oliver if he “wanted to help him out,” but Oliver said no. Morgan and Oliver then ate lunch and Morgan got “extremely high” off ma- rijuana. Morgan kept talking to Oliver—going “on and on” “about some bizarre things, mostly sexual.” Around 6:00 p.m.,3 Officers Deese and Weaver arrived for their evening shift. Oliver told Officer Deese: “I need to leave this room . . . I don’t feel safe in here.” Officer Deese told Oliver to “take [it] up with the captain tomorrow.” About two hours later, Oliver told Officer Weaver: “[S]ir, I don’t feel safe in here. I’d like to go back to another cell. There’s plenty of open cells.” But Weaver did not move Oliver. Oliver also told Officer Deese: “[T]here’s something not right about this guy. He’s on . . . narcotics, drugs and I need to be moved out.”

3 As the district court noted, the record does not lay out a clear timeline of the

events of the assault. For example, Oliver testified that “it was probably 8:30, 9:00, maybe eight o’clock” when Morgan assaulted him. The above account presents our best understanding of how the evening’s events unfolded. USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 6 of 19

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Sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., Morgan started smoking “paper . . . dipped into animal tranquilizer.” Morgan then “pulled [Oliver] from the top bunk and began punching [him].” Ol- iver “felt an instant pop” in his back when he hit the ground. Mor- gan then grabbed a “knife from underneath his mattress,” and when Oliver tried to get up, Morgan hit him with “a plastic dinner tray that he had inside the cell.” Morgan continued to beat up Ol- iver and then raped him anally. He then ordered Oliver to perform oral sex on him at knifepoint. Oliver yelled for help during the as- sault, but no one came. Despite Oliver communicating to Officers Deese and Weaver that he did not “feel safe in [his cell],” neither Officer was in the building during the assault. When Officer Deese eventually returned, Oliver discretely informed him about the attack. Six or seven officers then came to separate Oliver from Morgan. On June 1, 2021, Oliver filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia alleging, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that a handful of Wilcox State Prison officials— including Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver—acted with delib- erate indifference to his safety by failing to protect him from Mor- gan in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 4 After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were

4 Oliver originally made a claim under the Georgia Constitution. The district

court found that this claim was abandoned. Oliver does not appeal that ruling here and therefore has abandoned the issue on appeal as well. See United States v. Willis, 649 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.2011). USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 7 of 19

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entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was not un- constitutional, let alone clearly established as unconstitutional. The district court granted Defendants’ motion, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Oliver faced a substantial risk of serious harm, or that any Defendants actually knew that Oliver faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Accordingly, the court con- cluded that the Defendant-Officers were entitled to qualified-im- munity. Oliver timely appealed, challenging the district court’s deci- sion on his deliberate-indifference claim only as to Officers Stan- field, Deese, and Weaver. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). In doing so, “we view all the evidence and draw all reasonable infer- ences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Cald- well v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 616 (11th Cir. 2007)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evi- dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party ‘presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.’” Id. (quoting Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1045 (2013)). But if, based on the evidence pre- sented, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” there is a genuine factual dispute and summary judgment USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 8 of 19

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should not be granted. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). III. ANALYSIS On appeal, Oliver contends that, based on the record evi- dence, a reasonable jury could find that (1) Oliver faced a substan- tial risk of being seriously harmed by Morgan; (2) Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver were “deliberately indifferent” to that risk be- cause they put Oliver in a cell with Morgan and failed to appropri- ately supervise them; and (3) the Officers’ deliberate indifference caused Oliver’s injuries. The Defendants respond that they cannot be found liable because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Af- ter consideration of the relevant case law and the record, we hold that the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the sub- stantial risk of serious harm Oliver faced. Since Oliver has not met his burden to show an Eighth Amendment violation, his claim fails. “The defense of qualified immunity completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted)). A government official must prove that he was acting within his dis- cretionary authority before being granted qualified immunity. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1098. Because Oliver concedes that the offic- ers here were acting “within the scope of their discretionary USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 9 of 19

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authority,” he “bears the burden to show that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (cleaned up); see Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1232 (explaining that “the burden shifts to the plaintiff” to defeat qualified immunity after it has been established that an official was acting within his discretionary duties). To meet this burden, Oliver must “show (1) that the offi- cial[s] violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1232 (emphasis added) (citing Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099). The district court determined that because Oliver could not show that Defendants violated a constitutional right, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. 5 We agree. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Because prisoners have shown “proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, con- duct,” are stripped of almost all means of self-protection, and can- not receive help from the outside world, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)) (internal quotations omitted), the Eighth Amendment requires

5 The district court did not consider the “clearly-established” prong of the qual-

ified-immunity analysis—it found that the Defendants were entitled to quali- fied immunity after determining there was no constitutional violation. USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 10 of 19

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“prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee” in- mates’ safety. Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099). In practice, this means that prison officials must protect prisoners from “violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. (quot- ing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). But not every injury sustained “by one inmate at the hands of another” “translates into a constitutional liability for prison offi- cials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A “prison official [only] violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). To establish a deliberate-indiffer- ence claim, “a plaintiff must show (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.’” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307). “The first element of deliberate indifference—whether there was a substantial risk of serious harm—is assessed objectively and requires the plaintiff to show ‘conditions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307). 6

6 The district court determined that Oliver failed “to show an objectively sub-

stantial risk personal to him.” Drawing all factual inferences in Oliver’s favor, we would not necessarily reach the same conclusion. Oliver provided evi- dence that Morgan told him that he was “going to make arrangements” to USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 11 of 19

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The second element—whether officials were deliberately in- different to that risk—requires a plaintiff to prove both an objective and subjective component. Id. “The subjective component re- quires” the plaintiff to provide “evidence that the defendant officer actually (subjectively) knew of the risk to the plaintiff inmate.” Nel- son v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Sellers v. Nelson, 145 S. Ct. 178 (2024) (citing Mosley, 966 F.3d at 1270–71) (internal quotations omitted). “‘This standard is one of subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’ and it is ‘a diffi- cult burden for a plaintiff to meet[.]’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40; then quoting West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th

“get [him] in a cell, and . . . fuck [his] tight, pink ass.” That is not evidence of Morgan’s “propensity to misbehave,” but instead evidence of a specific and particularized threat made to Oliver by Morgan. Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1296–97; see also Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 at 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2003) (per cu- riam) (explaining that evidence of an attacker’s “generally problematic nature” will not alone suffice to prove that he posed a substantial risk of serious harm; however, showing “a particularized threat or fear” can); and compare Rodri- guez, 508 F.3d at 617 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding summary judgment in favor of prison officials inappropriate where plaintiff-inmate had provided evidence that his life was threatened by members of his former gang who were inmates in the same prison) and Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1297 (finding that a white inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm when he had to share a cell with an inmate whose underlying offense was stabbing a white man only because he was white) with Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per cu- riam) (finding that summary judgment in favor of prison officials was appro- priate when an inmate-plaintiff reported an unspecified “racial problem” in his shared cell). But even if we disagreed with the district court’s holding on the first element, it would not change the outcome of this case because we con- clude that Oliver has not shown that the defendants were subjectively aware of that objectively substantial risk. USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 12 of 19

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Cir. 2007)). The objective component requires the plaintiff show that the official “responded to the known risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she ‘knew of ways to reduce the harm’ but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620). Finally, the plaintiff must show that the officer’s failure to reasonably respond caused his or her injury. See id. In sum, to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show (1) that an official was subjectively aware of a (2) substantial risk of serious harm and (3) disregarded that known risk by not responding to it in an objectively reasonable manner that (4) caused plaintiff’s injury. Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099; Rodri- guez, 508 F.3d at 617. Oliver argues that Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver were subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm Morgan posed to him. He also argues that all three defendants were deliberately indifferent because they allowed Oliver to re- main in a cell with Morgan, leaving him vulnerable to a serious risk of harm. As we explain, Oliver’s arguments fail because the record lacks evidence that any of the defendants were aware of a “partic- ularized threat” that would “enable them to conclude that” Oliver faced a “strong likelihood,” rather than a “mere possibility,” of in- jury. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350; Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1236; Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537. Because Oliver’s communications with Officer Stan- field were separate from his communications with Officers Deese USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 13 of 19

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and Weaver, we will analyze Oliver’s claims against Officer Stan- field separately. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 618–24. A. Officer Stanfield Oliver argues that the district court erred in finding for Of- ficer Stanfield because there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Of- ficer Stanfield was aware of the harm Oliver faced. Specifically, Ol- iver contends that the record shows that he told Officer Stanfield: (1) that he didn’t “feel comfortable with [Morgan]. He’s going [to] do something. He’s already got his penis hanging out and making a - - a lot of sexual comments and statements about doing stuff.”; (2) that Morgan’s nickname was “Booty Bandit”; and (3) that he was transgender. Oliver also argues that the record shows that Of- ficer Stanfield was assigned to the building that Oliver and Morgan lived in and therefore could hear Morgan’s specific threats to Oli- ver. Oliver argues that this evidence is sufficient to show Officer Stanfield actually knew Oliver faced a substantial risk of being harmed by Morgan. We disagree, as this Court’s precedent establishes that no reasonable jury could reach such a conclusion based on this sum- mary judgment record. The record evidence does not show that Oliver told Officer Stanfield that Morgan had explicitly threatened him, nor does it contain evidence that Oliver provided any addi- tional information to Officer Stanfield about what he thought Mor- gan planned to do. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (“Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 14 of 19

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and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists—and the prison official must also ‘draw that inference.’”). We have repeatedly held “that officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a ‘strong likelihood’ of injury, not a ‘mere possibility.’” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537). Officer Stanfield simply did not possess enough details here. Oliver only told Officer Stanfield that Morgan would do “something” and that he didn’t feel “comfortable” in the cell. He never told Officer Stanfield that he “feared [Morgan] or that [Morgan] clearly threatened [him].” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349; cf. id. at 1349–50 (finding no deliberate in- difference by a deputy warden despite Plaintiff complaining to him about Plaintiff’s cellmate “acting crazy, wanting to fake a hanging, and making a statement that Plaintiff would help in the fake hang- ing ‘one way or another,’” because the Plaintiff never communi- cated to the deputy warden that the cellmate clearly threatened him or scared him). And while it is understandable that Oliver would prefer not to share a cell with someone who masturbated in front of him and made sexual remarks, we can’t say that this be- havior alone put Officer Stanfield on notice that Morgan would at- tack Oliver. This Court’s decision in Marbury v. Warden is instructive. See 936 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2019). In that case, an inmate “was at- tacked by a fellow prisoner after making multiple requests to be USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 15 of 19

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transferred to a different dormitory or put in protective lock-up.” Id. at 1231. In one of his requests, the inmate asked a correction officer “to have the captain put him in lock-up until he could be transferred because he had heard from a friend that another inmate wanted to hurt him.” Id. One day later, he wrote a letter to a prison warden that said: “I was told by a friend to watch my back, because he got word someone was out to do harm to me.” Id. at 1232. He also said in the letter that he needed to be put in lock-up quickly because “he was in fear of being hurt or possibly killed.” Id. In Marbury, we held that a reasonable jury could not con- clude that the defendants were aware of a substantial risk based on “Marbury’s statement that he had heard from a friend that an un- armed prisoner intended to hurt him, and that he was afraid of be- ing hurt or killed, without any further details.” Id. at 1236. In ex- plaining our decision, we noted that usually further information— “beyond the plaintiff having informed the defendant officers of [a] threat”—is needed for a prison official to conclude “that a particu- lar threat evidenced a substantial threat.” Id. Unlike in Marbury, Oliver did not repeatedly convey that he was fearful of being harmed or killed due to threats he had received. Instead, Oliver only vaguely speculated to Officer Stanfield that he thought Morgan was going to “do something.” And that is just simply not enough. Officer Stanfield’s knowledge of Morgan’s nickname and Ol- iver’s transgender identity does not change this analysis. The rec- ord does not indicate the significance of Oliver’s nickname. And USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 16 of 19

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the record contains no evidence that Morgan had ever engaged in a sexual assault before. Without knowing more, Officer Stanfield cannot be expected to infer that a substantial risk of harm existed. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (A defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”). And because Oliver presents as a man, Officer Stanfield would have no reason to think—much less know—that other inmates knew Ol- iver was transgender. Officer Stanfield’s personal knowledge of Ol- iver’s gender identity is irrelevant. What would matter is if Officer Stanfield knew that Morgan was aware of Oliver’s gender identity. And the record provides no evidence of that contention. Oliver’s argument that Officer Stanfield knew about Mor- gan’s specific threats to Oliver because he overheard them also falls flat. There is no evidence in the record that Officer Stanfield was within ear-shot of Morgan’s cell any of the times Morgan made threatening or sexual statements to Oliver. Oliver points to the evidence that (1) Officer Stanfield was “permanently assigned to [Oliver’s] building at the time” Morgan threatened Oliver and (2) that he was sometimes around to run showers or move inmates between cells. But nothing in the record suggests that Officer Stan- field’s “permanent assignment” to Oliver’s building would entail monitoring Oliver’s cell block at all hours. And there is no evi- dence that Morgan made threatening remarks to Oliver when Of- ficer Stanfield was running showers or moving inmates between cells. Accordingly, a reasonable jury would have no basis for con- cluding that Officer Stanfield overheard—and therefore knew USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 17 of 19

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about—Morgan’s threats due to being within hearing-distance of Morgan at the time he made threats to Oliver. In sum, the record lacks sufficient evidence to show that Of- ficer Stanfield had actual knowledge that Oliver faced a serious risk of harm. We thus conclude that Officer Stanfield was not deliber- ately indifferent in violation of the Eighth Amendment. B. Officers Deese and Weaver Oliver’s claims against Officers Deese and Weaver fare no better. Oliver argues that: (1) he orally told Officers Deese and Weaver that “there’s something not right [with Morgan]. He’s on - - on narcotics, drugs, and I need[] to be moved out.”; (2) Officers Deese and Weaver had a substantial amount of daily contact with the inmates, making them aware of Morgan’s threats; and (3) Of- ficers Deese and Weaver, like Officer Stanfield, knew about Mor- gan’s nickname. Similar to his arguments about Officer Stanfield, Oliver asserts that this evidence is enough to show Officers Deese and Weaver’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Again, we disagree. Oliver’s statements to Officers Deese and Weaver, like those made to Officer Stanfield, are vague and do not convey any “spe- cific facts” that would enable Officers Deese or Weaver to draw an inference that Oliver faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. They also do not convey to Officers Deese or Weaver that Morgan ever made a particular threat to him. Cf. id. at 1350 (affirming summary judgment on a deliberate indiffer- ence claim because the prison official was only aware of the USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 18 of 19

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attacker-inmate’s “propensity for being a problematic inmate” and not any “particularized threat or fear”). Oliver’s statements to Officers Deese and Weaver are like those made by the plaintiff in Carter. See id. at 1348. In that case, the plaintiff complained to prison officials that his cellmate was “acting crazy, wanting to fake a hanging,” and told the plaintiff that he “would help in the fake hanging ‘one way or another.’” Id. at 1349. We held in Carter that those statements were not sufficient for the prison officials “to make the inferential leap that [the plain- tiff faced] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1350. We fur- ther explained that the plaintiff’s statements only made the prison officials aware of the plaintiff’s cellmate’s generally problematic na- ture and that such “a generalized awareness of risk in these circum- stances does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.” Id. Oliver’s statements similarly lack the requisite particularity. Like the plaintiff’s statements in Carter, Oliver’s comments to Of- ficers Deese and Weaver only made them aware of generalized risks Morgan posed, not specific or particularized ones. See id. Be- cause Officers Deese and Weaver only possessed awareness of a general risk, we cannot conclude that they had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Lastly, Oliver’s arguments about the Officers’ daily contact with inmates and their knowledge of Morgan’s nickname are iden- tical to those made for the claim against Officer Stanfield, and they fail for the same reasons. IV. CONCLUSION USCA11 Case: 23-11968 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 04/23/2025 Page: 19 of 19

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What happened to Oliver was awful. But on this record, he simply has not carried his burden to show that Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver had actual knowledge about any specific threats made by Morgan to Oliver. So we must conclude that Of- ficers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver were not deliberately indiffer- ent to a substantial risk Oliver faced. Because no constitutional vi- olation has been established against any of the defendants, we af- firm the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Officers Stanfield, Deese, and Weaver. AFFIRMED.