Anthony Morris v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: 4:23-cv-03277
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTHONY MORRIS, Case No. 23-cv-03277-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM MAGISTRATE 9 v. JUDGE’S PRETRIAL ORDER

10 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 163 11 Defendants.

12 13 Defendants filed a motion for relief from a nondispositive pretrial order of a magistrate 14 judge under Civil Local Rule 72-2. Dkt. No. 163 (“Mot.”). Defendants seek relief from Judge 15 Hixson’s order compelling the production of audit materials concerning Defendants’ rate lock 16 extension fee (“RLEF”) practices for the (1) 2013-2017 and (2) pre-2013 populations. Mot. at 2; 17 Dkt. No. 156 (“Order”). 18 A district court may refer nondispositive pretrial issues to a magistrate judge under 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this 20 subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or 21 contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a). A district court 22 reviews the magistrate judge’s factual determinations for clear error and reviews the magistrate 23 judge’s legal conclusions to determine whether they are contrary to law. Perry v. 24 Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010). This standard is highly deferential, and a 25 district court “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. 26 City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). 27 The Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated that Judge Hixson’s order is 1 clearly erroneous with respect to the 2013-2017 audit materials because Plaintiff recently moved 2 to certify a class encompassing only the pre-2013 population. Mot. at 2, 5–6. Earlier in the 3 litigation, Defendants objected to including the 2013-2017 period in the scope of class discovery, 4 arguing that claims covered by the 2013 policy were time-barred. See Dkt. No. 90 at 4. Judge 5 Hixson overruled the objection, finding that the 2013-2017 period was “plainly within the scope of 6 the alleged class,” and declining to “cut off discovery by predicting success in future motion 7 practice before the district judge.” Dkt. No. 99 at 1. Partially because of that determination, 8 Defendants were required to produce the 2013-2017 audit materials. See Order at 1. 9 Defendants assert that Judge Hixson’s order is erroneous because of the class definition 10 now asserted in Plaintiff’s pending motion for class certification. Defendants do not cite any cases 11 assessing a similar circumstance. The Court is not persuaded that it should disturb an otherwise 12 legitimate order just because a party has successfully waited out the required production and 13 circumstances have changed. 1 But even if it could, documents from after the class period can still 14 be relevant. See Zelman v. JDS Uniphase Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 956, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“The 15 proposed class period dates function only to define the plaintiff class, not to restrict the universe of 16 relevant or actionable facts in this case.”). Plaintiff previously argued to Judge Hixson that these 17 documents were also relevant even for someone that paid RLEFs before 2013. See Dkt. No. 90 at 18 2 (“Discovery into the [2013-2017] time period during which Defendants admit substantially 19 similar misconduct occurred is relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.”). Given this, the Court will not set 20 aside Judge Hixson’s ruling. 21 Second, Defendants argue that (1) the pre-2013 audit materials are not relevant because 22 they relate only to the scope of the population, not the practices that are the subject of the RFP; (2) 23 these materials are not responsive because they relate to RLEF remediations rather than practices; 24 and (3) production of these materials is unduly burdensome. Mot. at 2, 5. Judge Hixson already 25 considered these exact arguments, Dkt. No. 138 at 8–9, determining that the records were 26

27 1 If it was critical for Judge Hixson to know about the class definition change, the Court wonders ] “relevant and responsive,” and that production was not burdensome because these documents are 2 || “contained in a noncustodial database that [is] organized by specific audit IDs.” Order at 1. This 3 determination was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 4 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: 2/24/2026

eG S. GILLIAM, JR. if 9 United States District Judge 10 1] a 12

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