Anthony M. Herrera v. Kathleen Allison, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY M. HERRERA, No. 2:26-cv-00245-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KATHLEEN ALLISON, et.al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 On October 8, 2025, plaintiff was granted permission to file a first amended complaint 20 (FAC) which is now before the court for screening.1 21 I. Screening Requirement 22 As plaintiff has already been informed, the court is required to screen complaints brought 23 by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 24 governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion 25 thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state 26 1 Plaintiff’s original complaint named various defendants in Kern County; his amended complaint 27 names defendants in Sacramento County. ECF Nos. 1, 20. Because Sacramento County is in the Sacramento division of the Eastern District of California, this matter was transferred from the 28 Fresno division to the Sacramento division on January 29, 2026. ECF No. 23. 1 a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 2 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 7 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 8 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 9 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 10 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 11 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 12 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 13 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 14 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 15 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 16 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 17 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 18 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 19 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 20 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 21 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 22 II. Allegations 23 In Claim I, plaintiff alleges that on February 15, 2021, a group of correctional officers 24 pepper sprayed and beat him into unconsciousness. ECF No. 1 and 3. In Claim II, plaintiff 25 alleges that “custody staff at CSP-Sac retaliated” against him for filing a grievance. Id. at 4. 26 III. Legal Standards 27 A. Excessive Force 28 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 1 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 2 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 3 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 4 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 5 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 6 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 7 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 8 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 9 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 10 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 11 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 12 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 13 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 14 B. Retaliation 15 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 16 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 17 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 18 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 19 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 20 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 21 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See 22 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and 23 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate 24 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison 25 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First 26 Amendment). 27 C. Supervisory Liability 28 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 1 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 2 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 3 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 4 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 5 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 6 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 7 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 8 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 9 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 10 D. Linkage Requirement 11 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation 12 of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person 13 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. 14 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil 15 rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional 16 deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged 17 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 18 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). 19 IV. Analysis 20 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and finds that it fails to state 21 a claim upon which relief can be granted under federal law. Although plaintiff names a number 22 of correctional officers as defendants, he does not provide any information as to what each 23 defendant did or did not do. Further, plaintiff names several defendants who appear to have 24 liability only under the doctrine of respondeat superior which cannot support his claims absent 25 allegations that those defendants either personally participated in or directed the alleged 26 deprivation of constitutional rights, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. 27 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court will grant him the opportunity 28 to file a second amended complaint in an attempt to remedy the deficiencies noted herein. 1 V. Amended Complaint 2 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 3 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 4 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 5 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 7 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 8 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 9 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 11 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 12 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 13 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 14 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 15 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 16 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 17 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 18 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 19 intended as legal advice. 20 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that service of 21 the complaint is not appropriate because you do not sufficiently describe what happened or 22 explain your belief as to why it happened. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 23 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 24 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 25 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 26 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 VII. CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20) is dismissed. 4 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a Second 5 || Amended Complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal 6 || Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the 7 || docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” Failure to 8 | file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this 9 || action be dismissed. 10 | Dated: April 6, 2026 / aa LaF / ip a

12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 | Ckd.herrera.245screen. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28