Anthony M. Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02050
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY M. DAVIS, No. 2:25-cv-02050-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 20 XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). The parties have consented to magistrate judge 21 jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary 22 judgment and deny the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff, born in 1968, applied for SSI on July 15, 2022, alleging disability beginning 25 September 16, 2021. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 17, 267. Plaintiff stated that he was 26 unable to work due to a brain injury, high blood pressure, and depression. AT 271. At the May 27 30, 2024, hearing on his application for benefits, plaintiff testified that he had attended college for 28 two years and previously worked installing windows at an auto manufacturing company and as a 1 security guard. AT 46, 48-50. 2 On July 15, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision finding plaintiff 3 not disabled since the application date, July 15, 2022. AT 17-28. The ALJ made the following 4 findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted): 5 1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 15, 2022, the application date. 6 2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: history of 7 traumatic brain injury/subdural hematoma with residual neck pain with intermittent radicular pain in the upper extremities and back 8 pain with intermittent radicular pain in the lower extremities; and mild neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury. 9 3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 10 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 11 4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the claimant has 12 had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. The claimant can sit for a maximum of 6 hours in a workday. The 13 claimant can stand and walk for a maximum of 6 hours in a workday. The claimant cannot perform work requiring a specific production 14 rate, such as assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas. The claimant can deal with occasional changes in a routine work 15 setting. The claimant can understand and remember detailed, but not complex instructions. 16 5. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a 17 Security Guard. This work does not require the performance of work- related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional 18 capacity. 19 6. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since July 15, 2022, the date the application was 20 filed.

21 AT 19-29. 22 ISSUES PRESENTED 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 24 disabled: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of a consultative examiner; and (2) the 25 mental residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence because it does not 26 account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, pace, and adaptation. 27 //// 28 //// 1 LEGAL STANDARDS 2 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 3 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 4 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 5 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 6 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 7 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 8 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 9 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 10 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 11 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 12 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 14 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 15 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 16 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 17 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 18 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 19 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 20 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 21 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 ANALYSIS 23 A. Medical Opinion 24 1. Dr. Stenbeck’s Opinion 25 Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in discounting the medical opinion of consultative examiner 26 Lauri Stenbeck, Psy.D., who examined plaintiff in October 2023 and submitted an opinion based 27 on her examination and review of a September 2022 mental evaluation indicating mild 28 neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury. AT 403-408. She diagnosed plaintiff with 1 Major Neurocognitive Disorder due to Traumatic Brain Injury and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 2 AT 406. Summarizing her findings, Dr. Stenbeck wrote that plaintiff 3 has history of a head injury occurring in 2004 with difficulties remembering appointments and tasks required for daily functioning. 4 He also has daily anxiety, reporting frequent and chronic worry over forgetting tasks and having difficult time retaining and recalling facts 5 and appointments. He will struggle with complex tasks that require sustained attention and concentration. A supervisor will have to 6 provide frequent prompts for him to remain consistent with simple tasks. Complex tasks will be difficult for him to retain and recall 7 given observed deficits in attention, concentration, and memory. His anxiety associated with the TBI and memory issues will also limit his 8 coping skills and impair his ability to engage effectively in social situations. 9 Given the claimant’s psychiatric and treatment history and results of 10 this evaluation, it appears that the mental health symptoms may be chronic in nature. . . . Overall, the claimant’s prognosis is poor. 11 12 AT 407. 13 In her mental status exam, Dr. Stenbeck found plaintiff to have impaired intelligence, 14 memory, and abstraction, slow speech, confused sensorium, limited attention, poor judgment, and 15 withdrawn mood and affect, along with fair to normal findings in some areas. AT 405-406. Dr. 16 Stenbeck opined multiple functional limitations as set forth by the ALJ, below. 17 2. ALJ’s Evaluation of Opinion 18 The ALJ summarized Dr. Stenbeck’s opinion, noting that she found marked limitations in 19 the following areas: ability to understand, remember and perform complex written and oral 20 instructions; maintain regular attendance in the workplace; and ability to complete a normal 21 workday or workweek without interruptions from psychiatric conditions. AT 28 (record citations 22 omitted). The ALJ noted that Dr. Stenbeck found plaintiff moderately limited in the following 23 areas: ability to perform work activities without special or additional supervision; ability to accept 24 instructions from supervisors; and ability to deal with the usual stresses of a work environment. 25 AT 28. In other mental functional areas, the ALJ noted, Dr. Stenbeck found plaintiff to have a 26 range of limitations, e.g., “mildly to markedly limited in his ability to perform work activities on 27 a consistent basis.” AT 28. The ALJ also noted Dr. Stenbeck’s findings that plaintiff would 28 1 require “additional supervision” and “frequent prompts” to stay on task, and that plaintiff had 2 “limited coping skills.” AT 28. 3 The ALJ assessed Dr. Stenbeck’s opinion as follows: 4 In supporting his1 medical opinion, Dr. Stenbeck primarily relied on his clinical examination of the claimant. Dr. Stenbeck specifically 5 noted the claimant’s declining cognitive presentation with observed difficulties with attention and memories. For the same reasons 6 discussed regarding Dr. Berry’s prior administrative finding, the undersigned finds Dr. Stenbeck’s medical opinion inconsistent and 7 unpersuasive. 8 AT 28 (record citations omitted). 9 Earlier in the decision, the ALJ discussed the 2023 opinion of J. Berry, M.D., a State 10 agency medical consultant who reviewed plaintiff’s medical record and completed a physical 11 RFC assessment. AT 26. As Dr. Berry opined on physical limitations and Dr. Stenbeck opined 12 on mental limitations, it makes no sense for the ALJ to discount the Stenbeck opinion “[f]or the 13 same reasons” as the Berry opinion. 14 Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s reference to Dr. Berry was a typo, and that the ALJ 15 “intended to refer to the findings of State agency psychological consultant Kim Morris, Psy.D.” 16 (ECF No. 16 at 5.) The ALJ found Dr. Morris’ 2023 mental RFC assessment (which included 17 multiple moderate mental limitations) unpersuasive for various reasons, citing mental status exam 18 findings and other evidence in the record. AT 27; see AT 86-90, 93-96 (Morris assessment). 19 3. Legal Standard 20 “The ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct 21 RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). In doing so, 22 the ALJ must articulate a “substantive basis” for rejecting a medical opinion or crediting one 23 medical opinion over another. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 24 Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ALJ cannot in its decision totally 25 ignore a treating doctor and his or her notes, without even mentioning them”). 26 The applicable rules provide that adjudicators for the Social Security Administration, 27

28 1 The “his” appears to be a typo, as Dr. Lauri Stenbeck is presumably female. 1 including ALJs, evaluate medical opinions according to the following factors: supportability; 2 consistency; relationship with the claimant; specialization; and other factors such as the medical 3 source's familiarity with other evidence in the record or with disability program requirements. 20 4 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). The most important of these factors are supportability and 5 consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability is the extent to which an opinion or 6 finding is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the medical source’s supporting 7 explanations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency is the extent to which an opinion or 8 finding is consistent with evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources, 9 including the claimants themselves. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(2), 416.902(j)(1). The ALJ will 10 articulate how he considered the most important factors of supportability and consistency, but an 11 explanation for the remaining factors is not required except when deciding among differing yet 12 equally persuasive opinions or findings on the same issue. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b). The new 13 regulations “still require that the ALJ provide a coherent explanation of his reasoning” and 14 establish “a minimum level of articulation to be provided in determinations and decisions, in 15 order to provide sufficient rationale for a reviewing adjudicator or court.” Sam-Chankhiao v. 16 Kijakazi, 2:20-cv-0186 DB, 2022 WL 4226170, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022), citing Hardy v. 17 Commissioner, 554 F.Supp.3d 900, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2021). 18 4. Discussion 19 Here, the ALJ discounted Dr. Stenbeck’s entire opinion, including multiple mental 20 limitations, in one sentence: “For the same reasons discussed regarding [another medical 21 opinion], the undersigned finds Dr. Stenbeck’s medical opinion inconsistent and unpersuasive.” 22 Defendant argues that the ALJ’s reasoning with respect to Dr. Morris’ opinion is 23 sufficient to discount Dr. Stenbeck’s opinion also. The opinions are not the same, however.2 The 24 ALJ should have assessed Dr. Stenbeck’s particular findings, specifically whether they were 25 supported by her exam findings and consistent with other evidence in the record. 26

27 2 Dr. Morris found that plaintiff was able to complete a full workday/workweek for simple tasks (AT 94), while Dr. Stenbeck found he could not complete single-step tasks and would have 28 difficulty maintaining a consistent schedule and attendance. AT 405-406. 1 Defendant asserts that “[t]he ALJ found Dr. Stenbeck’s opinion unpersuasive because 2 although it was supported by the doctor’s own mental status examination findings from a one- 3 time examination, it was inconsistent with other evidence of record.” ECF No. 16 at 4, citing AT 4 28. In fact, the ALJ did not discuss whether Dr. Stenbeck’s opinion was supported by her exam 5 findings, but merely noted that (like most consultative examiners) she “primarily relied on [her] 6 clinical examination.” This does not amount to “a coherent explanation of [the ALJ’s] reasoning” 7 on the supportability factor. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We review 8 only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ 9 on a ground upon which he did not rely.”). Under the regulations, the ALJ must address the 10 “supporting explanations presented by a medical source ... to support his or her medical 11 opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1); see, e.g., Fidel R.P. v. O’Malley, 754 12 F. Supp. 3d 986, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (analyzing supportability factor in terms of whether 13 opinion was supported by opinion writer’s own findings or treatment records). Failure to do so is 14 error, and plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.3 15 REMEDY 16 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 17 benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 18 under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 19 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 20 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 21 whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 22 would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

23 24 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the 25 “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when 26 the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within 27

28 3 The Court does not reach the remaining claims. 1 | the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 2 | 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (‘Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 3 || proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 4 | benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 5 || uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”’). 6 Here, the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant was, in fact, 7 || disabled during the relevant period. On remand, the ALJ is free to develop the record as needed, 8 | including asking a vocational expert hypothetical questions about available jobs based on a 9 || revised RFC. The court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately be 10 | weighed, and any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not 11 | mstruct the ALJ to credit any particular opinion or testimony. The ALJ may ultimately find 12 | plaintiff disabled during the entirety of the relevant period; may find plaintiff eligible for some 13 || type of closed period of disability benefits; or may find that plaintiff was never disabled during 14 | the relevant period, provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal 15 || standards and is supported by the record as a whole. 16 | CONCLUSION 17 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 18 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED; 19 2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED; 20 3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff; and 21 4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this order. 22 | Dated: June 17, 2026 / hice fr fA. ? CAROLYNK.DELANEY 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 || 2/davi2050.ssi.ckd 28