Anthony Lemoha v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 5, 2005
• Docket: 10-03-00344-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-03-00344-CR

Anthony Lemoha,

                                                                      Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                      Appellee

From the County Crim Court No 7

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court # MB02-59750-H

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

       Appellant appeals his conviction for criminal trespass.  See Act of May 5, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 161, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 633, 633 (amended 2003) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)).  We will affirm.

       In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient.  The misdemeanor information alleged that Appellant “enter[ed] and remain[ed] in a building and on property of another.”  The building and property were a bus terminal.  The other person was the complainant, an employee of the company that provided security services for the terminal.  Appellant argues that there was no evidence that the building and property were those of the complainant.  We will overrule Appellant’s issue.

       Appellant points to evidence that the complainant is not the “owner” of the terminal.  “[O]wnership is not an element of criminal trespass.”  Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis in orig.); accord Arnold v. State, 867 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  The criminal trespass statute “requires only that the actor remained on property of another after receiving notice to depart.”  Langston, 855 S.W.2d at 721 (emphasis in orig.); accord Arnold, 867 S.W.2d at 379; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(5) (defining “another”).  “[F]or the State to convict [the defendant] of entering and remaining on another’s property, [the defendant] may not have any claim to the property.”  State v. Kinsey, 839 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992) (emphasis in orig.), rev’d on other grounds, 861 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see Young v. State, 976 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Bustillos v. State, 832 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d).  It is legally sufficient for the State to make out a prima facie case that property is that of a person other than the defendant.  Bustillos at 671-72. 

       The complainant testified that the bus terminal manager gave officers of the complainant’s employer “authority on the premises” in order “for [them] to be security on the premises, that is, “[t]o protect the passengers, to make sure everybody has a ticket inside” the terminal.  The complainant also testified that he had “a greater right to control what was happening within th[e] property than” did Appellant.  Appellant does not point to any evidence that he had any claim to the bus terminal.  “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” we hold that a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  We overrule Appellant’s issue.

       Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

          Justice Vance, and

          Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed January 5, 2005

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