Anthony Floyd Wainwright v. State of Florida

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: SC2025-0708
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2025-0708 ____________

ANTHONY FLOYD WAINWRIGHT, Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

June 3, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Floyd Wainwright is a prisoner under sentence of

death for whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for

June 10, 2025. He appeals the circuit court’s order summarily

denying his amended eighth successive motion for postconviction

relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1 For the

reasons that follow, we affirm. We likewise deny his motion to stay

execution.

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. I

Wainwright was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1994

murder of C.G. Wainwright v. State (Wainwright I), 704 So. 2d 511,

512 (Fla. 1997). After Wainwright and co-perpetrator Richard

Hamilton escaped from prison in North Carolina, they stole guns

and a car and drove to Florida. Once in Florida, Wainwright and

Hamilton accosted C.G., a young mother of two, at gunpoint as she

loaded groceries into her car in a Winn-Dixie parking lot. They stole

the car and took off with C.G. “They raped, strangled, and executed

[C.G.] by shooting her twice in the back of the head, and were

arrested the next day in Mississippi following a shootout with

police.” Id.

Wainwright was found guilty of first-degree murder, robbery,

kidnapping, and sexual battery, all with a firearm. The jury

unanimously recommended death. The trial court sentenced

Wainwright to death after finding six aggravating circumstances, 2

2. The aggravating circumstances were: (1) Wainwright committed the murder while under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Wainwright had been convicted of a prior violent felony; (3) the murder was committed during the course of a robbery, kidnapping, and sexual battery; (4) the murder was committed to effect an escape; (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;

-2- no statutory mitigating circumstances, and some nonstatutory

mitigation. 3 Id. at 512-13. Wainwright raised nine claims on direct

appeal.4 This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences as

corrected. 5 Id. at 516. Wainwright’s convictions and sentences

and (6) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. Wainwright I, 704 So. 2d at 512 n.2.

3. For nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court found: “The Court finds that defendant’s difficulties in school and his social adjustment problems, due in part to his problems associated with bed-wetting do provide some measure of mitigation.” Wainwright I, 704 So. 2d at 513 n.3. However, the trial court accorded the mitigating circumstances little weight and found the mitigating circumstances were outweighed by any single aggravating circumstance.

4. Wainwright’s claims on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court erred by allowing Wainwright’s pretrial statements to be introduced; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the final three DNA loci to be introduced; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the case to be tried jointly with separate juries; (4) the trial court erred by allowing introduction of evidence of other crimes; (5) the trial court erred by removing a juror on the tenth day of trial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing introduction of testimony that C.G. routinely picked her children up from preschool; (7) the trial court erred by overlooking the State’s failure to establish the corpus delicti of sexual assault; (8) the trial court erred by allowing introduction of Wainwright’s statement to police that he had AIDS; and (9) the trial court erred by imposing the mandatory minimum portions of the noncapital sentences and retaining jurisdiction over the life sentences. Wainwright I, 704 So. 2d at 513 n.4.

5. The Court ordered that “Wainwright’s sentencing forms for the non[]capital offenses reflect the imposition of no mandatory minimum terms under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993),

-3- became final when the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari on May 18, 1998. Wainwright v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1127

(1998).

Wainwright has since unsuccessfully challenged his

convictions and death sentence in both state and federal court.

Wainwright filed an initial motion for postconviction relief raising

fourteen claims. 6 Wainwright v. State (Wainwright II), 896 So. 2d

and no retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983).” Wainwright I, 704 So. 2d at 515-16.

6. Wainwright’s claims in the initial postconviction motion were: (1) trial counsel was ineffective regarding the admission of additional DNA evidence; (2) trial counsel was ineffective regarding Wainwright’s statements and admissions; (3) trial counsel was ineffective regarding evidence of Wainwright’s out-of-state crimes; (4) trial counsel was ineffective regarding a microphone discovered in Wainwright’s cell; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the penalty phase instructions on the aggravators; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument at the guilt and penalty phases; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain a proper attorney-client relationship, failing to ensure that Wainwright received adequate mental health evaluations, and failing to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the victim’s family to testify at sentencing; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an alleged Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), error; (10) initial counsel was ineffective in his pretrial representation of Wainwright; (11) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to be prepared for trial; (12) trial counsel was ineffective for introducing statements of the co- defendant; (13) trial counsel was ineffective for committing an

-4- 695, 697 (Fla. 2004). After the circuit court denied the motion,

Wainwright raised eight issues on appeal to this Court. Wainwright

also filed a habeas petition raising four claims. 7 This Court

affirmed the denial of the postconviction motion and denied the

habeas petition. Id. at 704. The United States Supreme Court

denied Wainwright’s certiorari petition. Wainwright v. Florida, 546

U.S. 878 (2005).

Wainwright also sought federal habeas relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Wainwright v. McDonough, No. 3:05-cv-276-J-25,

2006 WL 8449862, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2006). The Middle

District of Florida dismissed the petition as untimely. Id. at *4. The

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s

alleged discovery violation; and (14) trial counsel’s illness during trial rendered him ineffective. Wainwright II, 896 So. 2d at 697 n.1.

7. Wainwright’s claims in the habeas petition were: (1) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) trial counsel failed to raise an issue involving the felony murder jury instruction; (3) the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings before requiring Wainwright to wear a stun belt at trial; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993), inquiry. Wainwright II, 896 So. 2d at 703 & n.7.

-5- dismissal. Wainwright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 537 F.3d 1282, 1287

(11th Cir. 2007).

Wainwright then filed a first and second successive motion for

postconviction relief raising newly discovered evidence claims. This

Court affirmed the denial of both postconviction motions.

Wainwright v. State, 2 So. 3d 948 (Fla. 2008); Wainwright v. State,

43 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 2010). Wainwright filed five more successive

postconviction motions. This Court dismissed or denied each

appeal, or Wainwright did not appeal the circuit court’s denial to

this Court. Wainwright v. State, 63 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2011);

Wainwright v. State, 77 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 2011); Wainwright v. State,

No. SC2015-2280, 2017 WL 394509 (Fla. Jan. 30, 2017);

Wainwright v. State, No. SC2022-1187, 2022 WL 4282149 (Fla.

Sept. 16, 2022).

In 2019, Wainwright filed a Rule 60(b) motion in his federal

habeas case in the Middle District of Florida. Wainwright v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-13639, 2023 WL 4582786, at *1 (11th

Cir. July 18, 2023). The district court denied the motion, and the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial. Id. at *7. The United States

-6- Supreme Court denied certiorari. Wainwright v. Dixon, 144 S. Ct.

1363 (2024).

On May 9, 2025, Governor DeSantis signed a death warrant

for the execution of Wainwright. The execution is scheduled for

Tuesday, June 10, 2025, at 6:00 p.m.

Timely under this Court’s scheduling order and the circuit

court’s extended deadline for seeking postconviction relief,

Wainwright filed an amended eighth successive motion for

postconviction relief. The motion raised three claims: (1) finding the

prior violent felony aggravator violated the Sixth Amendment right

to trial by jury in light of Erlinger; 8 (2) newly discovered evidence of

the effects of Wainwright’s father’s exposure to toxins during the

Vietnam War; and (3) newly discovered evidence of a Brady 9

violation based on the State’s alleged failure to disclose a benefit for

one jailhouse informant and the expectation of a benefit for another

jailhouse informant.

8. Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).

9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

-7- The circuit court held a Huff 10 hearing, after which it

determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The

circuit court summarily denied the amended eighth successive

motion for postconviction relief on May 20, 2025. Wainwright

timely appealed the circuit court’s order. He also filed a motion for

stay of execution.

II

“Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is

appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case

conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Bogle v.

State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(h)(6).

In reviewing a circuit court’s summary denial, “this Court must

accept the defendant’s allegations as true to the extent that they are

not conclusively refuted by the record.” Tompkins v. State, 994 So.

2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008) (citing Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176,

179 (Fla. 2006)). Still, “[t]he defendant bears the burden to

establish a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim; mere

10. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

-8- conclusory allegations are insufficient.” Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d

82, 96 (Fla. 2011) (citing Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061

(Fla. 2000)). A circuit court’s decision whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion “is tantamount to a pure

question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d

1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137

(Fla. 2003)).

Also relevant here, postconviction claims in capital cases must

generally be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence

become final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). With certain exceptions,

rule 3.851 prohibits both untimely and repetitive claims. Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2); see also Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122,

1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction

proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a

successive motion.” (citing Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347, 362

(Fla. 2013))).

A

In his first argument on appeal, Wainwright argues that his

death sentence is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment in

light of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), because a

-9- judge instead of a jury made the findings necessary to impose

death. This is so, says Wainwright, because the prior violent felony

aggravator applied in his case required a finding of fact (1) of a prior

conviction and (2) that the prior crime involved the use or threat of

violence to the person. 11 Wainwright argues that only a jury is

constitutionally permitted to determine whether the crime was one

that involved the use or threat of violence to the person. He says

that because a judge made that finding in his case, every

aggravating circumstance applied in his case requires at least one

factual finding that should have been made by a jury.

We agree with the circuit court that Wainwright’s claim is

procedurally barred. Wainwright has raised this exact claim before.

11. In contrast to the categorical approach utilized by federal courts, Florida takes a fact-specific approach to determining whether a previous conviction was for a violent felony. See, e.g., Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 855 (Fla. 2003) (“Whether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of the prior crime.” (citing Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Fla. 1997))); Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. 2003) (holding that trial court did not err in admitting testimony that demonstrated the defendant’s conviction for attempted sexual battery was actually a completed sexual battery), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Cruz v. State, 372 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2023).

- 10 - Wainwright’s habeas petition challenged Florida’s capital sentencing

scheme as unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Wainwright II, 896 So. 2d at 703-04. And in his sixth successive

motion for postconviction relief, Wainwright argued:

In this case, the court made the findings regarding the fact of the prior conviction, as well as the additional findings that the Defendant was serving a sentence of imprisonment and that the prior felony was violent. Thus, proof of more than the fact of a prior conviction was required. . . . As a result, [the] sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.

We rejected the claim based on Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla.

2016), a case in which we applied our state-specific retroactivity

test and concluded that Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), does

not apply retroactively to sentences that became final before the

issuance of Ring. So, because Wainwright’s current claim has been

raised and rejected, it is procedurally barred. 12 See, e.g., Jackson v.

12. While we do not agree with the State that Erlinger categorically never applies in the capital postconviction context, we agree that Wainwright’s specific claim has been raised and rejected. Wainwright’s argument is that a jury instead of a judge was required to determine whether his prior felony conviction was, in fact, violent. It was rejected because his sentence was final prior to Ring, which encompasses any refinement of Apprendi protections

- 11 - State, 335 So. 3d 88, 89 n.2 (Fla. 2022) (concluding that a claim

was procedurally barred because a “prior successive postconviction

motion . . . raised essentially the same arguments” (citing Hendrix,

136 So. 3d at 1125)).

This does not end our analysis though because Wainwright

argues an exception to the procedural bar: that Erlinger constitutes

a new rule of law that should apply retroactively to his case. See

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(B), (e)(2) (exempting from the one-year

time limitation motions alleging that “the fundamental

constitutional right asserted was not established within the period

provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply

retroactively”).

We reject Wainwright’s argument because even if Erlinger

constitutes a change of law, it does not apply retroactively. 13 A

provided by Erlinger. As such, it is not a new claim simply because Wainwright now relies on Erlinger instead of Hurst.

13. Although we conduct a state-law analysis, we conclude that Erlinger also does not apply retroactively based on federal law. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 258 (2021); Teague v.

- 12 - change in the law only applies retroactively to final cases if the

change (1) emanates from the Florida Supreme Court or the United

States Supreme Court, (2) is constitutional in nature, and (3)

constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Dettle v.

State, 395 So. 3d 1054, 1057-58 (Fla. 2024) (quoting Witt v. State,

387 So. 2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980)). A change of law is of fundamental

significance when it (1) places beyond the authority of the state the

power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties or

(2) is of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application

under the three-factor test in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618

(1965). 14 Dettle, 395 So. 3d at 1058 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at

929). “We have said this retroactivity analysis is supposed to

balance the justice system’s dual goals of fairness and finality.” Id.

(citing Witt, 387 So. 2d at 926). “And, we have said, we use it to

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)). We agree. See also Stackhouse v. United States, No. 8:15-cr-177-VMC-TGW, 2024 WL 5047342, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024) (deciding Erlinger’s procedural rule does not apply retroactively).

14. Those factors are (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. Dettle, 395 So. 3d at 1058 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 926).

- 13 - determine whether a new rule amounts to a ‘jurisprudential

upheaval[]’ (to which we give retroactive effect), or whether it is more

like an ‘evolutionary refinement[] in the criminal law’ (to which we

do not).” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at

929).

Erlinger is not a development of fundamental significance

under our existing retroactivity test. First, we reject Wainwright’s

argument that Erlinger places beyond the authority of the state the

power to impose the death penalty or other enhanced sentence on a

defendant who has not been found eligible for such penalty by a

jury of his peers. We have said cases that fall within that class

categorically limit the state’s ability to impose a sentence of death.

See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013, 1019 (Fla. 2020) (citing

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), as an example of a case that

placed beyond the authority of the state the power to impose the

death penalty, which held that the Eighth Amendment categorically

prohibits imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape of an

adult woman as cruel and unusual punishment). Erlinger does not

place beyond the authority of the state the power to impose a

- 14 - certain penalty because it, at most, merely altered the manner of

determining a defendant’s culpability.

Second, Erlinger does not satisfy the Linkletter test. Indeed, in

State v. Johnson, 122 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2013), we concluded

application of the Linkletter test to a materially identical precedent

failed to justify retroactive application. Id. at 861-66. At issue

there was whether an Apprendi progeny case, Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied retroactively. Johnson,

122 So. 3d at 861. Applying Apprendi, Blakely held that a fact that

increases the sentencing range had to be found by the jury.

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. We concluded that decision, like

Apprendi itself, was a new rule that was nonretroactive under the

three-part Linkletter test. Johnson, 122 So. 3d at 861-66

(explaining why the purpose of the new rule in Blakely did not

support retroactivity, that Florida had significantly relied on the old

rule, and why applying Blakely retroactively would have an adverse

impact on the administration of justice). We reached the same

result in Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 846 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting

argument that Apprendi applied retroactively based on analysis of

the Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)/Linkletter factors).

- 15 - Guided by our analysis in Johnson and Hughes, we conclude

Linkletter’s first factor weighs against retroactive application of

Erlinger. Retroactive application is generally favored when it

furthers the new rule’s purpose. See Williams v. State, 421 So. 2d

512, 515 (Fla. 1982). But we have declined to give retroactive effect

to new procedural rules unless their absence would “cast serious

doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding.”

Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929; see, e.g., Williams, 421 So. 2d at 515

(refusing to apply a rule in part because it “would not enhance the

reliability of the fact-finding process [and] . . . has no bearing on

guilt and did not involve an attack on the fairness of the trial”);

Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. 2005) (“This rationale

for the new rule weighs against its retroactive application because

the rule’s purpose is not to improve the accuracy of trials or even to

improve the reliability of evidence.”).

The purpose of any new rule announced by Erlinger does not

demand retroactive application. Like Blakely, the purpose of

Erlinger is to conform criminal procedure to the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee. It properly allocates decision-making rather than

increasing the fairness or accuracy of convictions. See Schriro v.

- 16 - Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (concluding that judicial

factfinding did not so seriously diminish accuracy such that there

was an impermissibly large risk of punishing conduct the law did

not reach). For that reason, it does not fall into the type of

significant procedural changes this Court has determined justify

retroactive application.

As to the second and third prongs of the Linkletter test, our

analysis in Hughes and Johnson applies equally here. Johnson, 122

So. 3d at 865 (citing Hughes and concluding second prong of

Linkletter test weighed against retroactivity because Florida had

relied on trial courts in sentencing for a significant period); Hughes,

901 So. 2d at 845 (repeating district court’s observation that

retroactive application of Apprendi would have a far-reaching

adverse impact on the administration of justice and concluding

third prong of Linkletter test did not warrant retroactive

application). We again conclude that consideration of Linkletter’s

second and third prongs counsels against retroactive application of

Erlinger.

In sum, Wainwright’s claim is procedurally barred because the

substance of his claim, whether a judge rather than a jury must

- 17 - find that his prior felony conviction was violent, has been raised

and rejected. And even if Erlinger announced a new rule that might

serve as a vehicle for Wainwright to overcome this procedural bar,

Erlinger does not apply retroactively. As a result, we affirm the

circuit court’s order denying Wainwright’s claim.

B

In his second argument on appeal, Wainwright asserts that

the circuit court erred in denying his claim based on allegedly newly

discovered evidence of the effect his father’s exposure to toxins

during the Vietnam War had on Wainwright. Wainwright argues

that evidence has accumulated showing that he has long suffered

from neurobehavioral deficits, but a causative explanation for these

deficits was missing.

Because Wainwright is seeking to vacate his death sentence

based on allegations of newly discovered evidence, he must

establish “(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by

the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it

could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that

the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a

less severe sentence on retrial.” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94,

- 18 - 100 (Fla. 2023) (omission in original) (quoting Dailey v. State, 329

So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021)). Additionally, for a claim relying on

newly discovered evidence to be considered timely, the successive

rule 3.851 motion must be filed within one year of the date on

which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.

Dillbeck v. State, 304 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Jimenez

v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008)); see also Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.851(e)(2) (allowing the trial court to dismiss a successive

postconviction motion “if the trial court finds the claim fails to meet

the time limitation exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2)(A),

(d)(2)(B), or (d)(2)(C)”). We have explained that “the circuit court is

authorized to summarily deny a newly-discovered-evidence claim if

the motion, files, and record refute the allegations pertaining to

either (or both) prongs of the Jones [v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla.

1998)] test.” Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021).

Here we agree with the circuit court that the information that

Wainwright relies on is not newly discovered evidence.

Wainwright’s newly discovered evidence claim is based on two

expert reports prepared specifically for this case. But those reports

are based on preexisting studies dating years back. For example,

- 19 - the report cites studies from 1996 and 2001 and relies in large part

on a study from 2023. And while the report points to shortcomings

in the investigation of the effects of toxins on the children of

Vietnam veterans, it does not suggest the information was

unavailable. Under our precedent this report is insufficient to

support a newly discovered evidence claim. Sliney v. State, 362 So.

3d 186, 189 (Fla.) (concluding a claim of newly discovered evidence

based on the publication of a new manual in 2021 was untimely,

explaining that, while a new manual might provide more support for

the claim, the underlying scientific facts were available before

2021), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 501 (2023); Barwick v. State, 361 So.

3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (recent report based on compilation of

studies relying on previously available data did not constitute newly

discovered evidence).

Similarly, we reject Wainwright’s argument that he had no

reason to pursue a claim regarding the effect of Agent Orange

exposure until he became aware that his father may have been

exposed to it in the first place. See Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 788

(denying a newly discovered evidence claim where the defendant

- 20 - “alleged that three of his brothers had knowledge” of the allegedly

new evidence).

We also agree with the circuit court that the alleged evidence

would not be material. First, while Wainwright says he was

unaware of the cause of his cognitive and neurobehavioral

impairments, his intellectual, behavioral, and psychological issues

have been an issue throughout the postconviction proceedings. 15

Thus, it is unlikely that one additional cause to explain this set of

behaviors would result in a life sentence. See, e.g., Hutchinson v.

State, No. SC2025-0497, 2025 WL 1155717, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 21,

2025) (concluding that additional mitigation concerning brain injury

and cognitive issues would only have a marginal effect at a new

penalty phase where trial court had heard evidence of cognitive and

mental health issues), cert. denied, No. 24-7079, 2025 WL 1261215

(U.S. May 1, 2025).

15. See, e.g., Wainwright II, 896 So. 2d at 697 n.1 (initial postconviction motion alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that Wainwright received adequate mental health evaluations); Wainwright v. State, 43 So. 3d at 45 (second successive postconviction motion alleged that newly discovered evidence showed that Wainwright’s mental age at the time of the murder was below eighteen years).

- 21 - Likewise, Wainwright’s case involved six statutory aggravators.

This Court has described the heinous, atrocious, or cruel; cold,

calculated, and premeditated; and prior violent felony aggravators

as “three of the most serious and weighty aggravators in the capital

sentencing scheme.” Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 56 (Fla. 2020)

(citing Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 215 (Fla. 2020)). Given the

heavy aggravation and limited mitigation, the alleged new evidence

would not probably result in a life sentence, especially here where

the trial court indicated the mitigating circumstances were

outweighed by any single aggravating circumstance. See Dillbeck,

357 So. 3d at 102 (concluding that the defendant could not

demonstrate the probability of a lesser sentence in light of weighty

aggravation). We therefore affirm the circuit court’s denial of

Wainwright’s second claim. 16

16. To the extent Wainwright argues this additional information makes his sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we reject the claim. The argument is inadequately briefed and without merit. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S71, 2025 WL 1198037 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025), cert. denied, No. 24-7087, 2025 WL 1261217 (U.S. May 1, 2025).

- 22 - C

Lastly, Wainwright argues that the postconviction court erred

by denying a claim of newly discovered evidence of a violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), for not disclosing that a

State’s witness, Robert Allen Murphy, expected a benefit from his

testimony. Wainwright has not established that the postconviction

court erred in denying this claim.

Wainwright’s Brady claim is based on a May 13, 2025,

affidavit by Robert Murphy, who was housed with Wainwright at

Taylor County Jail and later testified at Wainwright’s trial. The

affidavit alleges that Murphy spoke with another inmate who told

Murphy that he was receiving a benefit from the State for testifying

against Wainwright. This led Murphy to ask the State if he could

also receive a benefit in exchange for his testimony. The affidavit

recounts that the prosecutor “said that he could not make me a

promise but the way he said it made it clear to me that I would get

a benefit if I testified.” The affidavit also explains how Murphy

received a modified sentence following his testimony against

Wainwright. Wainwright does not claim that Murphy received a

promise from the State, only that Murphy had a “clear

- 23 - understanding and expectation on his part that he would get a

benefit.”

We agree with the circuit court that Wainwright failed to

exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing this claim. Freeman, 761

So. 2d at 1062 (“[T]here is no Brady violation where the information

is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where

the defense either had the information or could have obtained it

through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (quoting Provenzano

v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993))). As the circuit court

determined, it was clear from the trial testimony that Murphy had a

motion for modification of sentence pending at the time of

Wainwright’s trial. And it was a matter of public record that

Murphy was released on probation shortly after his testimony.

Murphy’s recent affidavit was not necessary to pursue this claim.

So as the circuit court observed, his recent affidavit really adds

“nothing” to this claim. All of the information necessary for this

claim to be raised was readily available to postconviction counsel

decades ago. See id. at 1062-63 (finding no Brady violation when

defense counsel could have discovered the details of a witness

- 24 - statement through reasonable diligence, such as by deposition or

another discovery method).

Even if this claim was reasonably pursued though, the

evidence presented by Wainwright is insufficient to establish a

claim. 17 To establish a Brady violation, Wainwright must also

demonstrate that “(1) the evidence was either exculpatory or

impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently

suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material,

the defendant was prejudiced.” Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803,

827 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla.

2017)). “To establish materiality or prejudice under Brady, the

defendant ‘must demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability that the

jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed

information been used at trial.’ ” Id. (omission in original) (quoting

Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)). “Reasonable

probability” means “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

17. We review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions on a Brady claim de novo. Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 827-28 (Fla. 2022) (citing Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017)).

- 25 - in the outcome.” Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 (Fla. 2003)

(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

We agree with the postconviction court that the Brady claim

fails because the allegations are insufficient to establish that the

State suppressed evidence. See Stein v. State, 406 So. 3d 171, 175

(Fla. 2024) (holding allegation that a witness expected a deal with

the State in exchange for testifying at trial was insufficient to

establish Brady claim where defendant did not allege specific facts

showing that the State knew about or suppressed information

relating to the witness’s expectations), reh’g denied, 2025 WL

855671 (Fla. Mar. 19, 2025); Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 828

(defendant did not demonstrate the State willfully or inadvertently

suppressed favorable evidence as necessary to prevail under Brady

where evidence did not establish that the witness entered into a

specific deal with the State in exchange for his testimony); Davis v.

State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1115-16 (Fla. 2005) (evidence was

insufficient to establish Brady violation where the witness had the

hope that the State would assist him in his effort to secure his gain

time, but there was no evidence that a deal was in fact made or a

promise conclusively extended).

- 26 - We also agree with the postconviction court that the alleged

evidence would not be material. In addition to Murphy’s testimony,

there was other significant evidence introduced against Wainwright.

See Wainwright I, 704 So. 2d at 515; Wainwright II, 896 So. 2d at

700. The alleged evidence of Murphy’s expectation of a benefit for

his testimony would not undermine confidence in the outcome. 18

We affirm the postconviction court’s decision to deny this claim.

III

For the reasons stated, we affirm the postconviction court’s

order summarily denying Wainwright’s amended eighth successive

motion for postconviction relief. As a result, we deny his motion for

stay of execution. See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 103 (“[A] stay of

execution on a successive motion for postconviction relief is

warranted only where there are substantial grounds upon which

relief might be granted.” (quoting Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867,

873-74 (Fla. 2014))).

18. For these reasons the affidavit also does not constitute newly discovered evidence. Wainwright does not show that there is evidence that was not previously available. The alleged new evidence also would not probably lead to a life sentence.

- 27 - No motion for rehearing will be considered by this Court. The

mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hamilton County, Melissa G. Olin, Judge Case No. 241994CF000150CFBXMX

Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida; and Terri L. Backhus, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

- 28 -