COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Raphael and Bernhard PUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
ANTHONY ELIJAH PERKINS OPINION BY v. Record No. 0323-25-4 JUDGE DAVID BERNHARD MARCH 31, 2026 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Angela L. Horan, Judge
Collin Chayce Crookenden (Vanderpool, Frostick & Nishanian, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted Anthony Elijah Perkins of first-degree murder (two counts), conspiracy
to commit murder, and criminal gang participation. Perkins requested jury sentencing, which
fixed his sentence at 70 years’ incarceration. The trial court imposed the 70-year sentence, with
10 years suspended. On appeal, Perkins argues that the trial court erred in giving certain jury
instructions. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions.
This Court finds Perkins’s convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, conspiracy
to commit murder, and criminal gang participation are all amply supported by evidence. Perkins
issued a standing kill directive, identified the target, coerced compliance through a death threat,
and coordinated the murders in real time through Instagram—conduct from which a rational jury
could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Perkins was constructively present at the scene. He
assigned each participant his role, directed the common enterprise from inception through its
1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. final moments, and remained in active contact with the shooters until hours before the killings,
rendering him criminally liable as both a principal in the second degree and an accessory before
the fact. Because the jury instructions on both theories correctly stated Virginia law, including
the doctrine of constructive presence, and were each supported by more than a scintilla of
evidence, no error occurred in the trial court’s rulings. The criminal gang participation
conviction follows necessarily from the others, as Perkins himself conceded, given that he
directed these murders for the benefit of the Bloods criminal street gang.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
BACKGROUND2
Antoine Geter3 and TreSean Keene were close childhood friends. They were about 14
years old in the spring of 2021 when they met Perkins4 at a cookout. Perkins had a red bandana
“sticking out of his back pocket,” indicating that Perkins was a member of the “Bloods” gang.
Geter and Keene wanted to be a part of the gang5 and asked Perkins how to “get down.” Perkins
said to join, they “would have to put in work” for the gang. Geter understood that they would
2 We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, we discard any evidence that conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that can be fairly drawn from that evidence. Cady, 300 Va. at 329. 3 Geter is referred to in the record as “Ant” or “Twaan.” 4 Geter and Keene refer to Perkins by the nickname “V.” 5 Keene’s testimony was equivocal about his desire to be a member of the Bloods gang, but he said that he was “friends” with members of the gang. Geter testified that Keene was present and a part of the conversation with Perkins at the cookout, suggesting that they both were interested in being involved with the gang. -2- have to “prove” themselves by getting “jumped in,” committing a robbery, or the like. Geter and
Keene continued to maintain contact with Perkins through social media, “mainly Instagram.”6
Geter and Perkins met “about three more times” over the following year. Eventually,
Perkins gave Geter a directive. Perkins was “beefing” with rival gang members and told Geter to
“get them out of the way.” Geter was to wait for Perkins’s order. Geter knew this meant he had
to kill the rival gang members when told to do so. He feared if he did not follow through with
Perkins’s orders, he could be killed.
On Friday, May 13, 2022, Geter and Keene went to a party at Malik Davis’s7 apartment.
Keene arrived armed with a gun in a “fanny pack.” Among the guests at the party was Davis’s
friend, Christian Roberts. While at the party, Keene posted photos on his Instagram account
using Geter’s phone. The party continued through Friday night and into Sunday.
On Sunday morning, May 15, 2022, at 1:04 a.m., in response to the photos, Keene
received a message on Instagram from Perkins inquiring whether Davis was a “Crip.”8 Perkins
believed that Davis might have been involved with a rival gang and told Keene and Geter to
“keep eyes on” him. Perkins later directed Geter and Keene to kill Davis and said he would let
them know when he “want[ed]” them “to do it,” because he “wan[ted] to be there.”
While Geter and Keene awaited Perkins’s order, they devised a plan to kill Davis. They
knew Davis was armed with a gun. So, Geter planned to ask to borrow Davis’s gun to pose for a
picture. They also believed that Roberts was armed, so Geter planned to shoot Roberts first,
6 Perkins’s Instagram username is “xertifiedslime93x.” Geter’s username is “2kutthroat.antt.” Keene’s username is “young.doublee.” 7 Davis is intermittently referred to as “Leak” in the record. 8 The record suggests that Perkins did not know Davis by name but that the two had interacted on at least one occasion. Davis was wearing a brown jacket in the photos that Keene posted on Instagram. The message Keene received from Perkins sought to clarify whether the person “in the brown jaxket [sic]” was a “Crip.” -3- “just in case.” Keene was going to wait in the bathroom until he heard the first shot, then come
out with his gun and assist Geter.
Without waiting for Perkins to arrive though, the two put their plan into motion. Geter
asked to hold Davis’s gun for a picture, and when Davis handed Geter the gun, he shot Roberts
in the head from “about three feet” away. He then fixed the gun on Davis and started firing.
Keene came out of the bathroom and shot at Davis. As the two fled the apartment, Geter “heard
[Davis] cry out.” Geter returned to where Davis was lying on the ground and “finished the job.”
Geter was arrested at school four days later. Initially, he was not forthcoming with police
about the incident. Geter was afraid that Perkins would harm him or his family if he
“snitch[ed].” But in an interview with Detective Andersen about four months after the murders,
he disclosed Keene’s involvement. Police arrested Keene a few days later. Keene’s initial
interviews with police were also evasive. While police were aware of Perkins’s possible
involvement, Geter and Keene concealed the extent of his role in the incident. So, after further
investigation and a series of interviews with Geter and Keene over the course of eight months,
Perkins was directly indicted and arrested about a year and a half after the shooting.
At trial, Geter and Keene admitted that they shot and killed Davis and Roberts. They also
conceded that Perkins was not present when the killing occurred, nor had he given them the
means to kill Davis and Roberts. Geter testified that Perkins directed him, “orally” and “in
person,” to “kill” a rival gang member. Geter did not want to kill Davis, but Perkins threatened
“to kill [Geter]” if he “didn’t do the work.” He further testified that he would not have killed
Roberts if Perkins “hadn’t told [him] to kill” Davis. Though Keene denied that he posted photos
to his Instagram account or conversed with Perkins through his account on the night of the
murders, the Instagram messages between Perkins’s account and Keene’s account were entered
into evidence.
-4- Detective Darien Cupka, a certified specialist in gang investigation, testified as an expert
for the Commonwealth. In his time investigating gang activity, Cupka had seen a lot of gang
communication through Instagram. Regarding Perkins’s Instagram username,
“xertifiedslime93x,” Cupka explained that Bloods typically replace the letter “c” with an “x,”
and that the “93” was likely a reference to the “9 Trey Gangster Bloods.” Cupka indicated “Nine
Trey” is one of the “most prominent” and “most violent” subsets of the Bloods gang. The
messages between Perkins and Keene indicated that Perkins believed that Davis was “at least an
associate” of a rival gang. Cupka further confirmed that the rival gang was active in Prince
William County. Cupka interpreted Perkins’s message thread to be a “directive” to take “some
action . . . directed towards” Davis. Cupka emphasized that it was hard to tell exactly what was
being said in the message thread because the responses from Keene to Perkins had been deleted.
He did note that there was a message from Keene to Perkins, responding to Perkins’s assertion
that he “want[ed] to be there,” which Perkins “liked.”
Perkins stipulated to his membership in the Bloods contemporaneously with the murders.
He also conceded that his Instagram account was in fact the “xertifiedslime93x” username that
had communicated with Keene. He further agreed that “the Bloods, a criminal street gang, have
members who individually or collectively have engaged in the commission of, attempt to
commit, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of two or more predicate criminal acts, at least one
of which is an act of violence, provided such acts were not part of a common act or transaction.”
But Perkins moved to strike the evidence, arguing that the Instagram messages in
evidence were only speculative. He argued that he messaged Keene telling them not “to do it” at
that time, because he would let them know when they should act. And that he said he wanted to
be there when they killed Davis, but he was never there. Perkins insisted that Geter and Keene
did the opposite of what he had asked of them by killing Davis when they did. Thus, according
-5- to Perkins, he did not have a shared intent with Geter and Keene because he told them, “[D]on’t
do it now.” Perkins also argued that Geter had his own motivations to kill Davis. Regarding
Roberts, Perkins asserted that he did not even know Roberts was there and therefore could not
possibly have “[i]ncited, encouraged, aid[ed], abetted, demanded, order[ed], [or] directed”
Roberts’s murder. He made similar arguments concerning the charges for conspiracy to commit
the murders. The trial court granted Perkins’s motion to strike the charge of conspiracy to
murder Roberts but sent the remaining charges to the jury.
The trial court instructed the jury that a “principal in the second degree” and an
“accessory before the fact” are liable just the same as “the person who actually committed the
crime.” Perkins objected to the form of the trial court’s instruction on principal in the second
degree.9 Perkins also objected to instructing the jury on accessory before the fact, asserting that
it was a separate charge altogether, and not just a theory on which the jury could convict him for
murder. The trial court rejected Perkins’s arguments and instructed the jury on both theories.
The jury convicted Perkins on both remaining charges of first-degree murder, conspiracy to
murder Davis, and criminal gang participation. Perkins appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Jury Instructions
“We review a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a proposed jury instruction for an
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Kartozia, 304 Va. 321, 331 (2025). “We apply the
deferential abuse of discretion standard alongside our recognition that ‘[a] litigant is entitled to
jury instructions supporting his or her theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to
9 Perkins’s proffered instruction on principal in the second degree included the language, “[a] principal in the first degree is the person who actually commits the crime.” He objected to the Commonwealth’s proffered instruction, which did not include that language, but was otherwise the same. -6- support that theory and if the instructions correctly state the law.’” Id. at 332 (alteration in
original) (quoting Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 268 Va. 74, 78 (2004)). “A reviewing
court’s responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is ‘to see that the law has been clearly stated
and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.’” Fahringer v.
Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 208, 211 (2019) (quoting Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App.
485, 488 (1988)). “[W]hether a jury instruction accurately states the relevant law is a question of
law that we review de novo.” Watson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 197, 207 (2019) (quoting
Payne v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 855, 869 (2016)).
Perkins argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the law concerning
principal in the second degree and accessory before the fact. He claims that there was not
sufficient evidence to support instructing the jury on either theory. Perkins’s arguments on
appeal differ somewhat from his objections at trial, where he generally challenged the propriety
of the instruction’s language rather than the sufficiency of evidence to support giving the
instructions at all. Assuming without deciding that his objections were stated with sufficient
certainty to preserve the evidentiary-support issue for appeal, see Rule 5A:18, we reach the
merits and find no error in either instruction.
“A principal in the second degree . . . is one who is present, actually or constructively,
assisting the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.” Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269
Va. 451, 482 (2005) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 372 (1967)). A principal in
the second degree does not have to be physically present when the crime occurs. Sutton v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 667 (1985). Where “several persons set out together” for the
purpose of carrying out an unlawful “common design” and “each takes the part assigned him,”
any one of those several persons may be found constructively present when the crime is
committed. Id.
-7- Constructive presence does not require physical proximity to the scene. Id. at 667. Here,
the sequence of events from Perkins’s initial directive at the cookout to his real-time Instagram
coordination on the night of the murders precisely demonstrates the structure Sutton describes.
Perkins assigned Geter and Keene their roles—surveillance, execution, and gang initiation
through violence—and actively managed the enterprise by identifying the target, issuing the kill
directive, and remaining in contact with the executors until just hours before the murders.
An accessory before the fact is “not present at the commission of the offense,” but was “in
some way” involved before commission of the crime, as a “contriver, instigator or adviser.”
Littlejohn v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 409 (1997) (quoting Hitt v. Commonwealth, 131 Va.
752, 759 (1921)). Thus, a conviction as an accessory before the fact requires that the accused knew
or had “reason to know of the principal’s criminal intention” and “intend[ed] to encourage, incite, or
aid the principal’s commission of the crime.” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 427 (1980).
The trial court instructed the jury that:
A princip[al] in the second degree, is a person who did not actually commit the crime, but rather is present and knowingly assists by helping in the commission of the crime. It must be shown that he intended by his words, gestures, signals, or actions to encourage, advise, urge[,] [o]r help the person who actually committed the crime[,] and shared the criminal intent of the person who actually committed the crime. Presence and consent alone are not sufficient to make a person a princip[al] in the second degree.
A princip[al] in the second degree is liable for the same punishment as the person who actually committed the crime. A person is considered present at the scene of a crime if he was in a place to incite, encourage, advise, or assist in the commission of the crime. Presence may be actual or constructed [sic].
There is constructive presence when several persons set out on a common unlawful purpose, and each takes the part assigned to him for the success of the common enterprise.
-8- The trial court further instructed that:
An accessory before the fact is one who was not present at the time of the commission of the Murder but who, before the commission of the Murder, in some way encouraged, incited or aided in the commission of the Murder knowing or having reason to know of the intent of the principal to commit the Murder. An accessory before the fact is liable for the same punishment as the person who actually committed the crime.
Perkins told Geter he would have to kill rival gang members to join the Bloods. On the
night of the murders, Perkins sent Keene messages on Instagram ordering them to kill a rival
gang member. Geter and Keene acted on Perkins’s instructions. Perkins correctly asserts that a
jury instruction must be supported by “more than a scintilla” of evidence. Kartozia, 304 Va. at
332. But in arguing that there was no evidence that he was present during the murders, he fails
to acknowledge the law concerning constructive presence of a principal in the second degree.
Perkins’s instruction to delay, rather than to stand down entirely, is fully consistent with
continued participation in and oversight of the common design.
Moreover, “[t]he amount of incitement or encouragement to commit the crime is
irrelevant if the encouragement in fact induces the principal to commit the offense.” McGhee,
221 Va. at 427. Perkins’s real-time engagement through Instagram on May 15, 2022, including
his “liking” of Keene’s final deleted message at 2:41 a.m., underscores that he remained an
active, constructively present participant in the enterprise until the moment the shooters acted.
More than a scintilla of credible evidence supported the jury instructions. See Kartozia, 304 Va.
at 332. The instructions also properly stated the law. See Muhammad, 269 Va. at 482; Sutton,
228 Va. at 667; Littlejohn, 24 Va. App. at 411. Thus, Perkins has not demonstrated that any error
occurred in the trial court’s giving of either instruction. See Kartozia, 304 Va. at 332;
Muhammad, 269 Va. at 482; Sutton, 228 Va. at 667; Littlejohn, 24 Va. App. at 411.
-9- II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal
conviction, its role is a limited one.” Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024). “The
judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)
(quoting Code § 8.01-680). “Thus, ‘it is not for this [C]ourt to say that the evidence does or does
not establish [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because as an original proposition
it might have reached a different conclusion.’” Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 97 (2023)
(alterations in original) (quoting Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 953 (1929)).
The only relevant question for this Court on review “is, after reviewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v.
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,
‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might
differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan v.
Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.
149, 161 (2018)).
A. First-Degree Murder
“Murder . . . by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder in the first
degree.” Code § 18.2-32. “In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and
every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if
a principal in the first degree.” Code § 18.2-18. A principal in the second degree must have
“share[d] the criminal intent of the party who actually committed” the crime or must be “guilty
of some overt act in furtherance thereof.” Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 57, 62 (1997)
- 10 - (alteration in original) (quoting Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 540 (1991)). A
conviction as an accessory before the fact requires proof that the defendant knew or had reason
to know “of the principal’s criminal intention” and intended to “encourage, incite, or aid the
principal’s commission of the crime.” McGhee, 221 Va. at 427. Presence during commission of
the crime is the “sole” distinguishing factor between the theories of principal in the second
degree and accessory before the fact. Id. at 426 n.3.
That distinction is meaningful here because the same conduct—Perkins’s standing
directive to kill a rival gang member, his real-time Instagram coordination on the day of the
murders, and his death threat ensuring Geter’s compliance—satisfies the elements of both
theories simultaneously. Code § 18.2-18 provides that “[i]n the case of every felony, every
principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried,
convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree.” Under either theory,
intent “may be proved by circumstantial evidence,” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App.
185, 205 (2015), and “may, and often must, be inferred” from the defendant’s “conduct and
statements,” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 520 (1994) (en banc), a determination
that rests “within the province of the jury,” id. at 519 (quoting Ingram v. Commonwealth, 192
Va. 794, 802 (1951)). Under the principal-in-the-second-degree theory, the sequence of
conduct—standing directive, real-time target identification, kill order, expressed intent to be
present, and final Instagram contact just hours before the murders—permited the jury to infer
that Perkins directed the common enterprise up to the moment of execution, placing him
constructively at the scene. Sutton, 228 Va. at 667; Muhammad, 269 Va. at 482. Under the
accessory-before-the-fact theory, that same direction and coercion, occurring before and in
anticipation of the killings, permitted the jury to infer the knowing encouragement and
incitement the law requires. McGhee, 221 Va. at 427; Littlejohn, 24 Va. App. at 409. Whether
- 11 - the jury convicted on one theory or the other, the evidence sustains the verdict under either.
Allard, 24 Va. App. at 62.
1. Malik Davis
Perkins argues that he was not involved in Geter and Keene’s plan to murder Davis. He
insists that they acted on their own because he was going to let them know “when he wanted
them to take action,” but they did not wait for his order. Rather, he argues, they “took matters
into their own hands.” In support of this argument, Perkins highlights Geter’s testimony that he
and Keene planned the specifics of how the shooting would take place.
On the day of the murder, May 15, 2022, Perkins inquired whether Davis was part of a
rival gang. Once he believed that Davis was at least associated with a rival gang, he directed
Geter and Keene to “keep eyes on” him and that he would let them know “when [he] want[ed]
[them] to do it.” Geter did not want to kill Davis, but Perkins threatened severe retribution if he
did not. Perkins informed Keene and Geter that he “wan[ted] to be there” when they killed
Davis. Cupka testified that there were deleted communications from the Instagram message
thread. Cupka noted that there was a message they could no longer read from Keene responding
to Perkins’s assertion that he wanted to be present for the killing of Davis. Perkins “liked” the
missing message from Keene at 2:41 a.m., which was the last correspondence between Perkins,
Geter, and Keene before police found Davis and Roberts’s bodies shortly after 6:00 p.m.
Whether Perkins’s Instagram messages, along with other evidence, evinced a shared
intent with Geter and Keene to kill Davis was a factual question for the jury. Hughes, 18
Va. App. at 519-20. Perkins’s assertion that he did not have the requisite intent because he
wanted them to wait to kill Davis is inconsequential because “[t]he amount of incitement or
encouragement to commit the crime is irrelevant if the encouragement in fact induces the
principal to commit the offense.” McGhee, 221 Va. at 427. There was evidence supporting the
- 12 - jury’s determination, and the jury “determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn
from the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017).
The same evidence supports Perkins’s conviction whether the jury reached its verdict
under the theory of principal in the second degree or accessory before the fact. Under the
principal-in-the-second-degree theory, Perkins’s real-time direction of the enterprise, including
his identification of the target, his kill order, and his continued Instagram engagement until just
hours before the killings, places him constructively at the scene within the meaning of Sutton,
228 Va. at 667. Under the accessory-before-the-fact theory, that same course of conduct satisfies
McGhee’s requirements of knowledge of the principals’ criminal intention and intent to
encourage, incite, or aid the commission of the murders. McGhee, 221 Va. at 427. Because
presence is the sole distinguishing factor between the two theories, id. at 426 n.3, and because
the evidence is sufficient under either, there is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict.
2. Christian Roberts
Perkins argues that he did not even know Roberts existed and that Geter and Keene acted
alone in killing him “just in case” Roberts posed a threat. Thus, Perkins advances he did not
have the requisite intent to murder Roberts. “[L]ack of intent is usually a defense to a conviction
as” an aider or abettor, unless “there was concert of action and the resulting crime, whether such
crime was originally contemplated or not, is a natural and probable consequence of the intended
wrongful act.” McMorris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 500, 505-06 (2008). Concerted action
“has been planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on and settled between parties acting together
pursuant to some design or scheme.” Rollston, 11 Va. App. at 542 (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 262 (5th ed. 1979)).
Even as to Roberts, whom Perkins did not know was present, the concert of action
doctrine forecloses any personal lack of intent defense. See McMorris, 276 Va. at 505–06.
- 13 - Geter testified that he planned to shoot Roberts first “just in case,” because both he and Keene
believed Roberts was armed. Roberts’s death was a foreseeable consequence of Perkins’s
scheme to kill an armed man in a room with at least one other armed person. “[T]he law is well
settled in Virginia that each co-actor is responsible for the acts of the others, and may not
interpose his personal lack of intent as a defense.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 122, 126
(1986).
Perkins told Geter and Keene that they would need to “put in work” to join the Bloods.
Cupka explained that “to put in work,” could be anything from selling drugs, stealing, or
committing acts of violence to benefit the gang. Where “the original plan” is “for a wrongful
purpose,” an aider and abettor may be criminally liable for a principal’s actions. Rollston, 11
Va. App. at 542. The evidence permitted the jury to conclude that Perkins set in motion the plan
for the wrongful killing of Davis. And the very testimony that Perkins highlights in support of
his lack of intent to kill Roberts, that Geter planned to shoot Roberts first “just in case,”
demonstrates that Roberts’s death was a natural and probable consequence of Davis’s murder.
As we have recognized, “[a]n incidental and probable consequence of the use of a firearm” in the
commission of a felony “is that someone will get killed.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App.
384, 389 (1992).
B. Conspiracy to Commit Murder
Perkins argues that Geter and Keene devised their own plan to murder Davis. He claims
that he was not part of an agreement to kill Davis because he instructed Geter and Keene “not to
attack Davis yet.” We disagree.
“A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons by some concerted action to
commit an offense.” Gray v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 675, 680 (2000). “The agreement is the
essence of the offense,” Merritt v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 719, 734 (2010) (quoting Hodge
- 14 - v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 351, 355 (1988)), and it is completed “when the parties agree to
commit an offense,” Gray, 260 Va. at 680. Conspiracy “may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Indeed, because of the very nature of the offense, ‘it often may be established only by
indirect and circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 580
(1978)).
The same evidence from which the jury reasonably concluded that Perkins acted as an
aider and abettor to Davis’s murder, supports its finding that Perkins made an agreement with
Keene and Geter to kill Davis. Perkins’s desire to be present, and ignorance of Geter and
Keene’s specific plan, is irrelevant. Once an agreement to commit the unlawful act exists,
“[l]iability as a conspirator is not dependent on knowledge of the entire scope of the conspiracy.”
Amato v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 544, 552 (1987) (quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 14
(1979)). A co-conspirator’s knowledge need not “extend to all the details of the conspiracy.” Id.
(quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy, supra § 14). “When one accedes to the conspiracy[,] he
sanctions” everything done “in furtherance of the common object.” Id. at 553.
C. Criminal Gang Participation
“Any person who actively participates in or is a member of a criminal street gang and
who knowingly and willfully participates in any predicate criminal act committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang is guilty” of criminal gang
participation. Code § 18.2-46.2. A “predicate criminal act,” under Code § 18.2-46.2, includes
“first-degree murder.” Slacedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525, 537 (2011). Perkins
concedes that the charge of criminal gang participation “resolves hand-in-hand with the other
three convictions.”
Perkins’s membership in the Bloods is undisputed. He further agrees that “the Bloods, a
criminal street gang, have members who individually or collectively have engaged in the
- 15 - commission of, attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of two or more
predicate criminal acts, at least one of which is an act of violence, provided such acts were not
part of a common act or transaction.” Perkins told Geter and Keene that to join the Bloods, they
“would have to put in work” for the benefit of the gang. Cupka testified that “putting in work”
could mean committing violent acts; and “forms of violence[] and putting fear into other gang
members in the community” are an expedient means of rising in the ranks of the gang. These
actions benefit the gang by growing its numbers, expanding territory, eliminating competition,
and striking fear in rival gangs. From this information, and Geter’s and Keene’s actions, the jury
reasonably could infer that Perkins directed the commission of first-degree murder for the benefit
of the Bloods. See Moseley, 293 Va. at 464 (“the factfinder determines which reasonable
inferences should be drawn from the evidence”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 16 -