Anthony Brown v. Director, Division of Workforce Services

2023 Ark. App. 389

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: September 20, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 389 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. E-22-362

ANTHONY BROWN Opinion Delivered September 20, 2023 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW V. [NO. 2021-BR-05612]

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES APPELLEE AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Anthony Brown (“Brown”) appeals to this court, challenging the Arkansas Board of

Review’s (“Board’s”) decision requiring him to repay unemployment-compensation benefits

he previously received in the amount of $3,324. We affirm in part and remand in part.

I. Background and Procedural History

The record indicates that Brown received $231 in weekly state unemployment

benefits from July 4 through July 25, 2020, which amounts to a total of $924. In addition,

Brown received $600 in weekly Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (“FPUC”)

from July 4 through July 25, 2020, for a total of $2,400. The record also contains a notice

of agency determination dated November 20, 2020, that disqualified Brown from receiving

benefits beginning June 28, 2020. The Board decision in this matter notes that Brown’s

disqualification for unemployment benefits was ultimately upheld by the Board in a separate appeal. That underlying disqualification is not before us because the Board’s decision on

the matter was not appealed further. We address only the issue of repayment.

II. Standard of Review

Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.

Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence

that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of

unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences

deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is

evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board

could have reasonably reached its decision as a result of the evidence presented. Id. However,

our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the Board.

Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 171,

517 S.W.3d 427.

III. Analysis

This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d

852, confirmed that, for purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the

repayment may be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct

result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against

equity and good conscience.” Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)). Carman also holds that FPUC

repayment may be waived if the State determines that the payment of the FPUC was without

2 fault on the part of the individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and

good conscience. Id. at 8, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

In the present case, the Board found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of

a final disqualifying Board determination finding that Brown was not able and available to

work during the weeks in question, not due to agency error. We hold that there is substantial

evidence to support the Board’s findings. The record indicates, and Brown admits, that he

was unable to work due to illness and/or quarantine. Because Brown fails to satisfy the first

prong of his state unemployment-waiver analysis, we affirm the decision requiring Brown to

repay $924 in state unemployment benefits.

However, the Board also found that Brown was not at fault in causing the

overpayment. This meets the first prong of the FPUC-waiver analysis. The Board failed to

make findings regarding the second prong of the FPUC analysis, i.e., whether repayment

would be contrary to equity and good conscience. If adequate findings of fact are not made

on the issue presented, we remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law

upon which to perform proper appellate review. Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341, at 4.

We therefore remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding

whether repayment of the $2,400 in FPUC benefits would be contrary to equity and good

conscience.

Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

ABRAMSON, J., agrees.

HIXSON, J., concurs.

3 Anthony Brown, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.