Anthoney Lynch v. John or Jane Doe

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 21, 2023
• Docket: 20-17068
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONEY DARNELL LYNCH, No. 20-17068

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:09-cv-02097-AWI-HBK

v. MEMORANDUM* JOHN OR JANE DOE, Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison; JOHN DOE, Assistant Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison; JOHN DOE, State Prison Commissioner; UNKNOWN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Constructor Of Medical/Lockup Facility; UNKNOWN “MUNICIPALITY”, Authoritarian,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 14, 2023**

Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). California state prisoner Anthoney Darnell Lynch appeals pro se from the

district court’s post-judgment orders seeking reconsideration, counsel, and relief

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J,

Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We

affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lynch’s motions for

relief from judgment and for reconsideration because Lynch failed to establish any

basis for such relief. See Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 443-44

(9th Cir. 2019) (“A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show

extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a final

judgment.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)); Sch. Dist.

No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263 (setting forth grounds for reconsideration).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lynch’s motion for

appointment of counsel because Lynch failed to establish exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement

for appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants).

We do not consider Lynch’s contentions related to the district court’s

previous orders because Lynch did not timely appeal from those orders. See Fed.

2 20-17068 R. App. P. 4(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of

judgment or the denial of certain post-judgment motions); Tillman v. Ass’n of

Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The

court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to decide an appeal if the notice of appeal is not

timely filed.”).

We reject as unsupported by the record Lynch’s contention that he was

deprived of due process.

Lynch’s motion for a stay of proceedings (Docket Entry No. 47) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 20-17068